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THE

COMMUNION

OF SAINTS

DIETRICH BONHOEFFER

THE

COMMUNION

OF SAINTS

A DOGMATIC INQUIRY INTO

THE SOCIOLOGY OF

THE CHURCH

HARPER & ROW, PUBLISHERS
NEW YORK AND EVANSTON

THE COMMUNION OF SAINTS

Copyright © 1960 by Christian Kaiser Verlag. Copyright
© 1963 in the English translation by William Collins Sons
& Co. Ltd., London, and Harper & Row, Inc., New York.

Printed in the United States of America. All rights reserved.
No part of this book may be used or reproduced in any
manner whatsoever without written permission except in
the case of brief quotations embodied in critical articles
and reviews. For information address Harper & Row, Pub-
lishers, Incorporated, 49 East 33rd St., New York 16, N. Y.

This translation is published in Great Britain under
the title, Sanctorum Communio.

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOG CARD NUMBER:

64-10749

Foreword

The student of Bonhoeffer who wishes to know the sources of his
'religionless interpretation of biblical concepts in a world come
of age', the worldly Christianity of the letters from prison, will
have to turn to Bonhoeffer's early writings. There he will find
both the basis and the starting-point for the ideas in the letters.
The letters, it is hardly necessary to say, read more easily than
those early works.

Sanctorum Communio is Bonhoeffer's first work. He was only
twenty-one when he presented it, in 1927, as a dissertation to
the Theological Faculty in Berlin. Difficult and overloaded
though it is, in many respects unclear and youthful in style,
nevertheless it moves clearly across the continental map of
theology of that time into new country. It begins from two
conflicting bases. First there is the sociological school, which
had a powerful effect on Berlin theology of the twenties by way
of Troeltsch. Bonhoeffer had studied in this atmosphere and
learned its language. He worked in Harnack's seminar, but under
Seeberg he turned to systematic theology. The second base was
dialectical theology. Though it was making stormy advances in
Germany, it had not then found a single advocate in Berlin
University. Its concern was not with the sociological and
statistical understanding of the church, but with its strict and
sole source in revelation. In spite of Harnack and Seeberg
it was this theology to which the young Bonhoeffer now became
attentive. He was attracted by the impossible. What he tried
to give in Sanctorum Communio was a sociological theology of the
church, or a theological sociology. He turned to this task with
immense self-conscious power.

Both these bases, the sociology and the theology of the church,
have by no means lost their pressing importance for us to-day in,
our view of the church, whether we regard them as reconcilable
or not. The revelatory character of the church points to its
raison d'etre, its sociological character points to its reality and

FOREWORD

concreteness. Both elements, the raison d'etre and the this-
worldliness, were to be constant motives in Bonhoeffer's develop-
ment. They may be discerned even in his later formulations
concerning religionless Christianity.

For his first effort, which was so much more diligently worked
over than his last, Bonhoeffer found at that time no readers. It
took him three and a half years to get Sanctorum Communio pub-
lished, in the midst of the German inflation, at an impossible
price. The work had to be shortened, and he had to subsidise
the publication himself. The publisher reproached him for not
helping to make the work known. A friend wrote to him that few
would see what he was after. The Barthians would not see,
because of the sociology, and the sociologists likewise because of
the Barth. It was the bold individuality of the letters from
prison, following the individuality of The Cost of Discipleship ,
which forced attention back upon his first work.

In fact Bonhoeffer was never interested in making his writings
better known. He never drew the attention of his students to
them. The book Sanctorum Communio soon disappeared from his
view, because he was too heavily engaged with the thing itself,
the sanctorum communio. He was always ready to describe the
thing itself in a new way. For this very reason it is both exciting
and rewarding for us to read how Bonhoeffer regarded the church
when he began his work, and to see what his answers were then.
Both continuity and discontinuity can be seen.

If we are attracted by Bonhoeffer's later views, and want to
find the answers to his questions, then we are on more solid and
controlled ground if we add to our considerations this pre-
cocious and astonishing essay.

Eberhard Bethge

Contents

author's preface page 13

A NOTE ON THE TRANSLATION 1 4

I TOWARDS A DEFINITION OF SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY

AND SOCIOLOGY I 5

II THE CHRISTIAN CONCEPT OF THE PERSON AND THE
CONCEPTS OF BASIC SOCIAL RELATION

A The four schemes for the concepts of basic social
relation in the light of the Christian concept of
the person and of basic relation 22

b The concept of God and basic social relations

and the concept of the I-Thou relationship 36

III THE PRIMAL STATE AND THE PROBLEM OF COM-
MUNITY

A Preliminary 38
B The theological problem: the original com-
munity 39
c The socio - philosophical problem : human

spirituality and sociality 44

1. Personal being as structurally open 44

2. Personal being as structurally closed 48
d The sociological problem 53

1 . Social community as community of will 53

2. Typology of social communities 55

3. Objective spirit 65

IV SIN AND THE BROKEN COMMUNITY 71

A Original sin 72

b Ethical collective persons 82

CONTENTS

V SANCTORUM COMMUNIO

a Basic principles

i. Conclusion of the discussion in the concept

of the church: retrospect and prospect 86

2. A brief outline of the New Testament view

of the church 97

b Positive presentation leading to the basic

problems and their development 103

1. The church established in and through
Christ — its realisation 106

2. The Holy Spirit and the church of Jesus
Christ — the actualization of the essential
church 115
a Multiplicity of spirits 117
b Community of spirit 118
c The spiritual unity of the church — the

collective person 137

3. The empirical form of the church

a The objective spirit of the church and

the Holy Spirit 144

b The logical relation between the em-
pirical and the essential church 1 50
c Sociological forms and functions of the
empirical church
i The worshipping congregation 155
ii The Sanctorum Communio as bearer

of the ministry 1 60

iii The sociological context of the acts
of the ministerial office and the
congregation, the three concentric
circles 163

iv The sociological problem of the care

of souls 171

CONTENTS

V SANCTORUM COMMUNIO [contd.]

d Authority and freedom in the empirical

church 173
e The church as an independent socio-
logical type and its place in the order of

sociological types 175

i Church and sect 1 85
f The individual form of the objective

spirit in the church of to-day 1 90

i Church and proletariat 190
g Faith in the Sanctorum Communio and

'experiencing the church' 194

4. The church and eschatology 1 98

notes 205

index of scripture references 247

index of names 249

index of subjects 252

Preface

This study places social philosophy and sociology in the service
of dogmatics. Only by this means did the structure of the
Christian church as a community seem to yield itself to syste-
matic understanding. The subject under discussion belongs to
dogmatics, not to the sociology of religion. The inquiry into
Christian social philosophy and sociology is a genuinely dog-
matic one, since it can be answered only if our starting-point
is the concept of the church. The more theologians have con-
sidered the significance of the sociological category for theology,
the more clearly the social intention of all the basic Christian
concepts has emerged. Ideas such as 'person', 'primal state',
'sin' and 'revelation' are fully understandable only in relation to
sociality. The fact that every genuinely theological concept can
be correctly comprehended only when set within and supple-
mented by its special social sphere is proof of the specifically
theological nature of any inquiry into the sociology of the
church.

This book was written more than three years ago. I was un-
able completely to revise it before it went to press, but had to be
content with rewriting it in parts. In view of the course the
subsequent debate has taken, this is a defect. My justification
for publishing the book in its present form is the basic approach
adopted in dealing with the problem, which now as then seems
to me the right and profitable one.

I should like particularly to thank Herr Geheimrat Reinhold
Seeberg, who from the outset has shown a most friendly interest in
this work. My thanks are due also to the Minister for Science,
Art and Education for the help accorded me in getting the book
printed. It was the Notgemeinschaft fur deutsche Wissenschqft,
together with a grant from the Reinhold Seeberg foundation,
which made publication possible. For this too I should like to
express my thanks.

July 1930

A note on the translation

This translation is based on the third German edition
of i960. That edition had substantial additions,
printed in an Appendix, which had not appeared in
the earlier editions. They had been removed partly
at the wish of the publisher, partly to please Reinhold
Seeberg, Bonhoeffer's teacher in Berlin. In this
translation these additions have been incorporated in
the main text. This version therefore corresponds
more closely to the original text of the author than even
the latest German edition.

The task of translation has passed through various
hands. However, the undersigned undertook to
revise the entire text, and must take responsibility
for the final version.

R. Gregor Smith

THE

COMMUNION

OF SAINTS

CHAPTER I

Towards a definition of social philosophy
and sociology x

If this introductory chapter were to present and criticise the
many different attempts at solving the problem of these defini-
tions, it would swell to a monograph. As our concern is with the
material and not the method of sociology, we shall not develop
the whole problem of method. Moreover, a discussion of method
may be found in most of the larger sociological works.2 It will
suffice if we discuss the problem briefly and give our own attitude
to it.

It is characteristic of the situation that when chairs of sociology
were asked for by the universities, and the ministry of education
requested statements about the aim and the object of the science
of sociology, the statements were so varied that no uniform picture
emerged. It is further characteristic that almost every new work
on the subject suggested a new goal, or a modification of a pre-
vious goal; and the number of works increased enormously.
And if we examine the principles of the great 'classic' works, we
are appalled at the confusion even in the most fundamental
matters. The historical and psychological reason for this seems
to me to lie in the fact that the chief material interest of most
sociologists is to be found in the political and economic or
historical field. Sociology has therefore a particular relation to
these disciplines. But this means that a clear view of the real
object of sociology is lost; yet this real object does not seem to me
to be too difficult to define. Economic politics, comparative
religion and the philosophy of history were all presented as
though they were sociology. The word 'sociology' was used, but
the concept was quite unclear. A dozen different things from all

THE COMMUNION OF SAINTS

sorts of fields of knowledge were named as the real object of
sociology, instead of one which might be held to constitute its
essence.3 In this confusion it might seem impossible to find any
uniform lines. Nevertheless I think that certain clearly emerging
types may be distinguished at least among the chief sociological
works.

In a well-known essay Troeltsch4 has made such a distinction,
into two groups, the first 'historical-philosophical-encyclopaedic',
and the second 'analytic and formal'. It is the latter, the more
recent, which has established itself in the universities as scientific
sociology.5 It deals with the 'relations and connections within the
group and its products'.6 Its object is 'society', not as con-
stituted of elements, that is, individual persons, but 'so far as it is
the bearer of inwardly established interactions between its
individual members'.7 The basic category of sociological
thought must therefore be relation.8 And questions must be
asked concerning social forces as well as kinds of relation.9 Since
the time of Simmel 'social forces' are taken to mean such con-
stitutive concepts as love, subordination, mystery, conflict, etc.
By 'kinds of relation' is intended, for example, the classic dis-
tinction made by Tonnies between community and society.10
On this basis there arises the question of the products of society,
such as culture, economic life, and 'materialising of the objective
spirit' (see below).

So far we have looked at the problem of the object of sociology.
But the significance of sociology is equally that it is also a funda-
mentally new method (similar to induction in its time), for the
investigation of historical, psychological and political problems,
which it believes it can solve only by knowing inter-human
relations. The method is applied to the problems of language, of
religion, of the state, and takes the ground from under the
theory that all these goods were invented by individuals. It is
true that as a method sociology always presupposes the concept
of the object, on the basis of which the linguistic problem must
be considered. Basically, this means that in order to grasp a
great number of historical problems a consideration of the
social form is important. That is, sociology adds something to

SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIOLOGY

the other disciplines. For this concept Simmel coined the term
'sociological method'.11

The chief representatives of this analytic and formal study are
Tonnies, Simmel, Vierkandt and von Wiese12 in Germany, in
France Durkheim13 with his great work, Totemism as a Social
Phenomenon, Tarde with his discovery and account of the imitative
instinct in its significance for sociology,14 and in England
McDougall.15

The historical-philosophical group acknowledges Comte16 and
Spencer17 as their originators. Among them may be named
Schaffle,18 Spann,19 Oppenheimer20 and Muller-Lyer.21 This
group aims at describing the historical course of social life, and
its historical and philosophical basis. Sociology here becomes a
collective name for all the humane sciences, and thus without
being aware of it renders itself superfluous. In seeking too
many objects it fails to find one. Thus in Oppenheimer22
sociology simply becomes a universal science. For a dis-
cussion of this matter Troeltsch's essay is the most convenient
locus.

In opposition to this weakening of the concept formal sociology
takes as its object the 'forms' of society.23 Though we are in
formal agreement with this limitation of the problem, we feel
bound to define the content differently. We cannot regard the
problem as solved by the method of formal sociology. We agree,
so far as it concentrates on the problem of society ; we disagree,
so far as it regards the content as consisting simply of relations
and interactions, we disagree also in respect of its normal
method. Our first disagreement concerns the social and philo-
sophical basis on which formal sociology builds, namely, the
theory of atomism. This is most clearly expressed by von Wiese
and Vierkandt, in their teaching about relation.

As might be expected it is their concept of persons which we
must oppose. There are here two apparently different courses of
thought. Starting from the fact of change brought about by the
environment (an officer on duty, and in his family, a scholar in
his profession, and, say, in politics, or a child with a weaker and
stronger child), first the conclusion is drawn that the person is

THE COMMUNION OF SAINTS

not a unity, and the decisive emphasis is laid upon the power
of relationships. Man is regarded as a product of social relation-
ships, to which, it is true, he contributes his little share.24 Along-
side this idea25 there is a second, that distinguishes man, as an
isolated structure, at rest, from the 'forces which play between
persons in relative independence from them'.26 At first glance
this seems to involve sheer contradiction; but there is unity of
view here. Basically, persons are here regarded as firm objects,
whose social 'capacities' permit and establish relations with other
persons. Man as a person is therefore not of interest. What is of
sociological interest is the forces which play between persons.
These forces can transform the person's social sphere, but the
personal kernel is untouched. If such an isolated personal
kernel is once granted, the whole investigation remains in the
sphere of an atomist and individualist theory of society, how-
ever carefully the idea is worked out of a mutual penetration
within the social sphere. In this Vierkandt is more cautious than,
for example, von Wiese.27 But basically they are agreed: we
are presented with a multitude of isolated I-centres, which can
enter into an outward connection with one another through
some stimulus.

Now it would be quite wrong to identify the philosophical
individualism of this social theory with the atomist theories of
the individual, say of the Enlightenment. Formal sociology does
recognise and evaluate positively the basic significance of man's
living in society for his whole spiritual life. It is only the social
and metaphysical ordering of the social phenomenon which fails
to carry conviction. It is not sociology itself, but the social
philosophy which underlies it, which is atomist. Nor is this state
of affairs equally clearly expressed by all formal sociologists.
But when these matters of principle are discussed, the con-
clusions are plainly as I have described them.28

When the social and philosophical insights are deepened, the
object of sociology takes another form. But the concept of the
object in this teaching involves a method which we must like-
wise reject, namely, the empirical and scientific method. The
procedure is to enumerate and to arrange the many possible

SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY AMD SOCIOLOGY

interactions. Most typical is von Wiese. But in fact this is not a
sociological achievement at all, but at most the gathering of
material for sociological study. In saying that a proper grasp of
the concept of the object in sociology depends on the most
profound social and philosophical insights into the nature of the
person and of society, we realise that the view we shall give of this
concept, and of sociological method, can only be confirmed as
our concrete study of the problems proceeds.

All the same, we give here the concept of social philosophy and
sociology with which we shall work. Social philosophy and
sociology, being two disciplines with different subject matter,
should be strictly distinguished.29 If this is not done, there arises
a hopeless confusion of terms, though of course individual
results may be largely correct. The two disciplines are related
through sociology building on the results of social philosophy.
The sociologist may be unaware of these results. Moreover, the
permanent norm of sociology is found in social philosophy.
Neither discipline is a natural science; they are both humane
sciences. As independent disciplines they have their own
subject-matter.30

Social philosophy investigates the ultimate social relations
which are prior to all knowledge of and will for empirical com-
munity, and the 'origins' of sociality in man's spiritual life and
its essential connection with it. It is the science of the original
and essential nature of sociality. It is a normative science in so
far as its results supply the necessary corrective for the inter-
pretation of actual social conditions. Sociology is the science of
the structures of empirical communities. Hence its true subject
is not the laws governing the origin of empirical social groupings,
but the laws concerning their structure. Thus sociology is not a
historical but a systematic science. In principle it is possible to
do sociology without a basis of social philosophy, so long as this
limitation is kept in mind. What is meant by the structure of a
community will be fully clarified as we proceed with our investiga-
tion. It is sufficient at this point to say that it is not exhaustively
expressed by relations or interactions, although these do sustain
social activity. Sociology is concerned with tracing the manifold

THE COMMUNION OF SAINTS

interactions to specific spiritual and intellectual acts of our being
which are the peculiar characteristic of the structure. Personal
units, however, as centres of action, belong just as much to the
structure of a community as the unit of the group as a 'forma-
tion'. The general structure of an empirical social grouping is
determined by all three.

This state of affairs has its consequences for the method : the
sociologist's approach is not morphological and descriptive (as in
Durkheim), but is that of the humane studies, concerned, that is,
with the essential structure of the spiritual phenomenon of the
group. The phenomenological method is derived from the
systematic nature of sociology. It seeks to grasp in empirical acts
the essential constitutive acts.31 This method is the only one
which can overcome the genetic approach which turns sociology
into a mere branch of history.

The sociology of religion is therefore a phenomenological study
of the structural characteristics of religious communities.32 But
to avoid misunderstanding it should be noted that the present
work on the sanctorum communio is theological rather than socio-
logical. Its place is within Christian dogmatics, and the insights of
social philosophy and sociology are drawn into the service of
dogmatics. We wish to understand the structure, from the
standpoint of social philosophy and sociology, of the reality of
the church of Christ which is given in the revelation in Christ.
But the nature of the church can be understood only from within,
cum ira et studio, and never from a disinterested standpoint. Only
by taking the claim of the church seriously, without relativising
it alongside other claims or alongside one's own reason, but
understanding it on the basis of the gospel, can we hope to see it in
its essential nature. So our problem has to be attacked from two,
or even from three, sides: that of dogmatics, of social philosophy,
and sociology.

In the next chapter we shall show that the Christian concept of
the person is real only in sociality. Then we shall show, in a
social-philosophical section, how man's spiritual being is likewise
possible and real only in sociality. Then in a purely sociological
section we shaft consider the structures of empirical communities,

SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIOLOGY

being by that time in a position to refute the atomist view of
society. Only then, through the insight we have acquired into
the nature of community, shall we be able to come near to a
conceptional understanding of Christian community, of the
sanctorum communio.

CHAPTER II

The Christian concept of the person and the
concepts of basic social relation

A. THE FOUR SCHEMES FOR THE CONCEPTS OF BASIC SOCIAL

RELATION IN THE LIGHT OF THE CHRISTIAN CONCEPT OF THE

PERSON AND OF BASIC RELATION

Every concept of community is related to a concept of the
person. The question about what constitutes community can
only be answered by asking what constitutes a person. Since the
aim of our inquiry is to understand a particular community,
namely, the sanctorum communio, we must investigate its particular
concept of the person. Concretely this means that we must study
the Christian concept of the person. In understanding the mean-
ing of person and community, we shall also have said something
decisive about the concept of God. For the concepts of person,
community and God have an essential and indissoluble relation
to one another. It is in relation to persons and personal com-
munity that the concept of God is formed. In principle, the
nature of the Christian concept of community can be reached as
well from the concept of God as from the concept of the person.
In choosing the latter as our starting-point, we cannot reach a
soundly based view of it, or of community, without constant
reference to the concept of God.

We shall now discuss the Christian concept of the person and
its concept of basic social relations in the light of the four schemes
for the concepts of basic social relations in philosophy. The
question is not about some social area in man which might have
a religious or other origin, nor about empirical communities of
will or merely social acts; but about basic ontic relations of
social being as a whole. It is these which establish the norm and

THE PERSON AND SOCIAL RELATION

the limit for all empirical sociality, and this proposition is of the
utmost significance for the concept of the church. Since it is
basic ontic relations which are to be discussed, it is not the types
of social theory but their philosophical precursors which we shall
adduce.

i . In Aristotle man becomes a person only in so far as he par-
takes of reason. The collective form, as more nearly approaching
the genus, is therefore ranked higher than the individual person.
Man is a £wov ttoXltlkov^ the state is the highest collective
form, preceding by its nature all individuals. The individual
only partially achieves identity between the vov<$ ttolOiitlko^
and noirj-LKos, just as in Plato's Timaeus only the reasoning,
that is, the universal, part of the soul is immortal.1 Essential
being lies beyond individual and personal being. The antithesis
between man and his destiny is the antithesis between the
individual and the universal — or, in the language of social
philosophy, between the individual and the race. Aristotle's
concept of God is thus impersonal.2

2. It was Stoicism with its concept of f]yep.oviKov which
for the first time in the history of philosophy formed the concept
of the ethical person. A man becomes a person by submitting to
a higher obligation. This obligation is universally valid, and by
obedience to it persons form a realm of reason, in which each
soul, submissive to the obligation, is at one with eternal reason
and thus also with the soul of other persons.

But here too, in spite of the emphasis upon the ethical and
'personal', that which really makes a person goes beyond the
individual. It is the ethical and reasoning life of the person which
is his essence, and it is so in abolishing him as an individual
person. 3

The first difference in principle between the Aristotelian and
the Stoic teaching is that for the Stoic the I is self-sufficient, and
reaches the full height of reason without any other; whereas
with Aristotle it is the genus, presented in the idea of the state,
which possesses the height of reason, so that the individual can
be thought of only as a part of the genus. One man enters into
connection with another only as he approximates to the genus

THE COMMUNION OF SAINTS

and transcends individual life. The genus is opposed to the
individual as something absolutely superior and conceptually
primary. For the Stoic the concept of the genus offers nothing
new in principle. The existence of a realm of reason merely
indicates the existence of a realm of like beings. Thus for the
Stoic the person is something finished in itself, complete, and
final. The realm of reason is still thought of as a realm of persons.
What is important for us in this is that the basic scheme is not a
metaphysical and intellectual one of the individual and the
universal, but that the individual and the universal are closely
interwoven, and the person is regarded as somehow ultimate.
Hence the relation of moral person to moral person is always
thought of as a relation of like to like, and this is the basic
relation of social philosophy.

3. Epicureanism, with its starting-point in Democritus's
atomic theory, which it applies to the social and ethical spheres,
maintains that life in society serves only to heighten the pleasure
of each individual. Social life is thus purely utilitarian, based on
a (rvv6i']Ki], and is inconceivable as a natural community.
Each individual is completed by the individual pleasure which
separates him from every other individual. Each person con-
fronts the other as alien and unlike, since each is aiming at the
highest pleasure. Here nothing remains either of the ethics of
Stoicism or of Aristotle's intellectual philosophy of mind.
Epicurean teaching reappears during the Enlightenment. It is
characterised by a defective concept of spirit, a negative descrip-
tion which can be interpreted as a theory of basic relations, in
which no original, significant or essential relation of spirit exists
between men; the connecting threads are sheerly utilitarian.
Basically, every man is alien to every other. Status hominum
naturalis est helium omnium contra omnes (Hobbes).4 On this basis all
social structures arise, and are thus purely contractual. In this
and the following two chapters this theory is implicitly criticised.

4. Descartes's transformation of the metaphysical question
into an epistemological one also changed the view of the person.
In Kant the development of the epistemological concept of the
person has made the perceiving I the starting-point for all

THE PERSON AND SOCIAL RELATION

philosophy. His synthesis of transcendental apperception
resolved both the I-Thou relation and the opposition of subject
and object in the higher unity of mind, of intellectual intuition.
This meant a fresh attempt in philosophy to master the problem
of basic social relations.

In this historical survey our only purpose is to show how various
philosophical approaches deal with the problem of social re-
lations, and how the relation of one man to another, or to the
genus, have been conceived. We emphasise that we have so far
not committed ourselves about a possible social province in man,
or said anything about empirical social relations. But we have
looked at the possible relations of person to person from the
standpoint of the various philosophical concepts of the person.
We have met with four basic approaches: i. the Aristotelian
scheme of the universal and the individual, the genus and the
individual, 2. the Stoic and Christian, of person and person,
3. the Democritean, Epicurean and Enlightenment view of an
atomist society and 4. the view of German idealism, expressed in
the subject-object relation of epistemology.

It is now possible to show that between the first and the
fourth type, despite their different starting point, there is a basic
kinship. Both types see the meaning of the subject to consist in
its entering into the general forms of reason. What is additional
in the epistemological view of the individual (in idealism) is its
regarding all that is opposed to the object as an object of know-
ledge; this is basic both to Fichte's ethical idealism and to Hegel's
logical idealism. But subject and object are not final opposites,
but in being recognised as such they are resolved in the unity of
intellectual intuition.

This brings us to our first systematic question, concerning the
philosophical basis of a Christian doctrine of person and com-
munity, in which we must criticise the basic schemes we have
described. The need to have some concept of the person arises,
as we have already said, from the very nature of our task, which
is to understand the specifically Christian community of persons,
the sanctorum communio.

It is a precondition of this investigation of the Christian

THE COMMUNION OF SAINTS

concept of the person and the basic social relations that neither
should be somehow abstracted from empirical social structures.
But both must be conceived of quite generally, in order to be
applied to the special case of empirical relations with basic
social relations. Empirical relations extend across a social
realm, a group of social acts, which are not our immediate
concern. We are asking, rather, whether a person must neces-
sarily be thought of in relation to another person, or whether a
person is conceivable in an atomist fashion ; and this leads to the
question of what are the basic relations between persons. That is
why in our historical introduction we discussed the philosophical
background of each social theory, and not the history of the
social theories themselves. In brief, we are dealing not with the
empirical fact of communities of will, and the specific sociological
problem of the interaction of wills, but with basic ontic relations
of social existence. Our problem, therefore, is the metaphysic
of sociality.

This part of our investigation is therefore not sociological, but
theological and philosophical. In this way we hope to find a
norm in these basic matters for empirical sociology. It is the
basic ontic relations which provide the norm for all empirical
social life. This is of the greatest significance for a concept of the
church.

In thus presenting basic social relations from the standpoint of
Christian dogmatics we do not mean that they are religious ; they
are purely ontic, but seen as such from the Christian perspective.
This provides us with the conditions for a positive presentation of
the philosophical basis of the Christian doctrine of persons and
basic relations. We must look for the scheme by which basic
Christian relations are to be understood.

We first ask whether the philosophical schemes are satisfactory.
The metaphysical scheme involves a basic overcoming of the
person by absorbing it into the universal. The epistemological
subject-object relation does not advance beyond this, since the
opposition is overcome in the unity of mind, in intellectual
intuition, but there is no distinction between the subject-object
and the I-Thou relation; but the latter is absorbed in the

THE PERSON AND SOCIAL RELATION

former. Fichte makes no advance on Kant when he speaks of the
self-conscious I as arising from the Not-I. For his Not-I is not I,
but an object. Both are in the end resolved in the unity of the I.
Hegel, too, sees the I as arising at the point where it is drawn into
objective spirit, and reduced to absolute spirit. Thus here too
the limit set by the individual person is in principle overcome.
Basically it is the concept of spirit which unites all these systems,
and indeed the concept of spirit as immanent. Such a concept is
bound to lead to the consequences which idealism in fact drew.5
The I is a person so far as it is spirit. Spirit, however, as Kant
says, is the highest principle of form, comprising and overcoming
all material, so that spirit and the universal are identical and the
individual loses its value.

Immanent spirit as the highest principle of form is formal law.
This holds true of ethics as well. Any exposition of Kant's
ethical formalism which claims to find in it the basis for the
freedom of a material ethic is in error.6 For the reasoning person
the supreme principle of action is universal validity. This
definition of the person was taken over by Fichte. But though he
has much to say about individuality, he makes no advance on
Kant. The goal of reason is satisfied by the individual accom-
plishment of his task, his duty. One I is like another. Only on
the basis of this likeness is a relation between persons conceivable
at all. Admittedly, this is true only in regard to basic relations;
for empirical social relations Kant recognised the decisive
importance of antagonism.7 It is the destiny of the human race
that it should disappear in the realm of reason, in which persons,
completely like and unanimous, are separated only by their
different activities, and determined by universal reason or by one
spirit. But this union of like beings — and this is the chief point —
never leads to the concept of community, but only to that of
sameness, of unity. But this is not a sociological concept. Thus
it may be seen that the subject-object scheme never leads to a
sociological category.8

With this conclusion we have formed the presuppositions for a
positive presentation of the specifically Christian view. But we do
not wish just to present this view; we wish to suggest a Christian

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philosophy in place of the idealist philosophy of immanence.
And we hope we may offer results which might determine the
direction of a Christian social philosophy.

The Christian concept of the person may now be defined as
constitutive of, and presupposed in, the concept of Christian
community; that is, in theological terms, the concept of the
person as found in primal man, but in man after the Fall, and
that means, not in man living in unbroken communion with God
and his fellow-men, but in man who knows good and evil. This
concept necessarily builds upon the fact of man's spiritual
nature, upon its structural and individual personal nature; but
of this we shall speak later. In this general concept, too, the
Idealist concept must be overcome by a concept which preserves
the concrete individual concept of the person as ultimate and
willed by God (cf. next chapter) . We must first discuss the specifi-
cally Christian concept of the person, in order to make clear the
difference from Idealism.

We must reject the derivation of the social from the epistemo-
logical category as a jue-d/^acng ei? aAAo yevo$. From the
purely transcendental category of the universal we can never
reach the real existence of alien subjects. How then do we reach
the alien subjects?9 By knowledge there is no way at all, just as
there is no way by pure knowledge to God. All idealist ways of
knowledge are contained within the sphere of the personal mind,
and the way to the Transcendent is the way to the object of
knowledge, to grasp which I bear within me the forms of mind :
thus the object remains an object, and never becomes a subject,
an 'alien P. Certainly a subject can also become an object of
knowledge, but in this case it is transferred from the social to the
epistemological sphere. These spheres can be in principle so
separate that in epistemological realism no social sphere may be
recognised, and in radical epistemological idealism, that is, solip-
sism, the social sphere may be fully recognised. This means that
neither sphere can be reduced to the other. We have now to
show what we mean by the social sphere.

So long as my mind is dominant, and claims universal validity,
so long as all contradictions that may arise with the perception of

THE PERSON AND SOCIAL RELATION

a subject as an object of knowledge are thought of as immanent
in my mind, I am not in the social sphere. This means that I
enter this sphere only when some barrier of principle appears at
some point to my mind. This can happen in the intellectual
sphere, but not in the epistemological-transcendental sphere:
the idealist's object is not a barrier. What matters is not the
nature of this barrier, but that it should really be experienced
and acknowledged as a barrier. But what does this mean ? It is
the concept of reality which must be discussed, the concept which
idealism has failed to think through exhaustively but has identi-
fied with self-knowing and self-active mind, involving truth and
reality. The person has command of his own ethical value,
possesses the dignity of being able to be ethical, and — so far as he
is a person — having to be ethical. The boundary between
obligation and being does not lie on the boundary of man as a
whole, but in idealism the dividing line runs through man. Of
course, in so far as every obligation, taken seriously, postulates
ethical transcendence, idealism could at this point have paused
for reflection. But with Kant's 'You can, for you ought' it
moved from ethical transcendence to the immanence of a philo-
sophy of mind.10 From this it followed, as the necessary conse-
quence of a one-sided epistemological philosophy, that the
reasoning person had command of his own ethical value, entered
by his own strength into the ethical sphere, and bore his ethical
motives within himself, as a person equipped with mind. The
real barrier was not acknowledged. This is possible only in the
ethical sphere; this does not mean, however, that the barrier
must have only an ethical content. As we have already said, it
can be purely intellectual, that is, it can be experienced, for
instance, in the conflict of perceptions. But the experience of the
barrier as real is of a specifically ethical character. But we have
still to say, in criticism of idealism and its implications, what we
mean by reality. This brings us to the problem of time.

Kant taught that the uninterrupted flow of time should be
understood as a purely intuitive form of our mind. As a result
his thinking, and that of the whole of idealism, is in principle
timeless. In Kant's epistemology this is obvious; but in ethics,

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too, he did not consciously get beyond this view. The same
starting-points which could have led to the perception of the real
barrier might also have overcome timeless thinking in ethics,
without prejudicing the absolute ethical claim. Fichte, with his
conception of individual duty, came nearer to it, but he too was
a long way from the radical change which was required. Despite
their constant emphasis upon the primacy of ethics, both are
under the persistent influence of their epistemology. We do not
dispute the epistemological view of time as a pure intuitive form.
But we start from other considerations. Like Fichte and Kant we
emphasise the absolute nature of the moral demand, and relate
it to the person faced by it. At the moment when he is addressed
the person is responsible, or, in other words, faced with a decision.
This person is not the idealist's reasoning person or personified
mind, but a particular living person. He is not divided in him-
self, but it is the entire person who is addressed. He is not present
in timeless fullness of value and spirituality, but he is responsible
within time, not in time's uninterrupted flow, but in the value-
related — not value-filled — moment. In the concept of the
moment the concept of time and its relations of value are in-
cluded. The moment is not the briefest part of time, as it were
a mechanically conceived atom, but the time of responsibility, of
relations of value — let us say, of relations with God — and
essentially it is concrete time, where alone the real moral claim is
realised. And only in responsibility am I fully aware of being
bound to time. It is not by my having a reasoning mind that I
make universally valid decisions, but I enter into the reality of
time by relating my concrete person in time in all its particul-
arities to this obligation, by making myself morally responsible.
Just as sound for the musician and sound for the physicist lie in
different spheres of knowledge, so with time for idealist epistem-
ology and the Christian concept of the person, without the one
sphere abolishing the other.

Thus from our concept of time there follows an idea which is
quite meaningless for the idealist: the person is continually
arising and passing in time. It is not something timelessly exist-
ing, it has a dynamic and not a static character; it exists only

THE PERSON AND SOCIAL RELATION

when a man is morally responsible ; it is continually recreated in
the perpetual change inherent in all life. Every other concept of
person cuts through the abundance of life of the actual person.
The ultimate reason for the inadequacy of idealist philosophy to
grasp the concept of the person lies in its having no voluntarist
concept of God, and in its lack of a profound concept of sin (as
we shall show) ; and joined to these defects is its attitude to the
problem of history. The idealist conception of the person does
not indicate an accidental logical defect, but is inherent in the
system. Idealism has no conception of movement. The move-
ment of the dialectic of mind is abstract and metaphysical,
whereas the movement of ethics is concrete. Further, idealism
has no understanding of the moment in which the person is
threatened by the absolute demand. The idealist moralist knows
what he ought to do, and, what is more, he is always in principle
able to do it, just because he ought. Where is there room for
distress of conscience, for infinite Angst in face of a decision ?

This brings us close to the problem of reality, of the real
barrier, and thus of basic social relations. It is a Christian
recognition that the person, as a conscious person, is created in
the moment when a man is moved, when he is faced with re-
sponsibility, when he is passionately involved in a moral struggle,
and confronted by a claim which overwhelms him. Concrete
personal being arises from the concrete situation. Here too, as in
idealism, the encounter lies wholly in the mind. But mind means
something different in each case. For Christian philosophy the
human person comes into being only in relation to the divine
person which transcends it, opposing and subjugating it. The
autonomy of the mind, in the idealist individualist sense, is un-
christian, since it involves the human mind being filled with
absolute value, which can only be ascribed to the divine mind.
The Christian person arises solely from the absolute distinction
between God and man ; only from the experience of the barrier
does the self-knowledge of the moral person arise. The more
clearly the barrier is recognised, the more deeply the person
enters into responsibility. The Christian person is not the bearer
of the highest values, but the concept of value is to be related to

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his being as a person, that is, to his creatureliness. Every
philosophy of value, even one which makes the value of the
person the supreme value (Scheler), is in danger of depriving
the person as such, as God's creature, of his value, and of regard-
ing him as a person only so far as objective, impersonal value is
apparent 'in' him. But this prevents any understanding of basic
personal and social relations.

When the concrete ethical barrier is acknowledged, or when
the person is compelled to acknowledge it, we are within reach
of grasping the basic social relations, both ontic and ethical,
between persons.

The concept of the barrier is decisive here. We must now
examine its form and structure, as experienced by the person.
It is not given in the relation between the individual and the
universal. The person is not simply the individual, and the
individual is not as such involved in the fall and sin (Schelling).
But the metaphysical concept of the individual denotes immed-
iacy, unlike the ethical concept of the person, which denotes
ethical and social reflection. From the ethical standpoint man is
not 'immediately' mind by and in himself, but only in responsi-
bility to 'another'. It is in this sense that we think of the ethical
concept of the individual as the basic concept of social relations;
for the individual cannot be spoken of without the 'other' also
being thought who has set the individual in the ethical sphere.
It might be objected that the 'other' has hitherto meant God,
but now we have suddenly introduced a concept of social relation,
and speak of the 'other' as another man.

We must, however, recall what was said at the beginning about
the connection between God, the community and the individual.
Moreover, the individual exists only through the 'other'. The
individuaf is not solitary. For the individual to exist, 'others'
must also exist. But what is this 'other' ? If I call the individual
the concrete I, then the other is the concrete Thou. But what is
the philosophical status of 'Thou' ? First, every Thou seems to
presuppose an I, which is immanent in the Thou, and without
which a Thou could not be distinguished from objects. Thus
Thou would seem to be equal to the 'other I'. But this is only

THE PERSON AND SOCIAL RELATION

correct within limits. Beyond the limit set to epistemology there
is a further limit, set to ethical and social knowledge, or discern-
ment. The other may be experienced by the I simply as Thou,
but not himself as I, that is, in the sense of the I that has become I
by the claim of a Thou. In the sphere of moral reality the Thou-
form is fundamentally different from the I-form. But since the
Thou, too, confronts me as a person, as a thinking and effective
mind, it must be understood as an I in the general sense, that is,
of self-consciousness and so on (cf. next chapter) . But the two
I-forms must be strictly distinguished. The Thou, as a form
which has reality, is independent in principle, over against the
I in this sphere. Its essential difference from the idealist object-
form is that it is not immanent in the mind of the subject. It is a
barrier to the subject, it activates a will with which the other will
comes into conflict, as an I for a Thou. If it is objected that the
other is the content of my consciousness, and immanent in my
mind, then the point has been missed about the different spheres,
of which we have spoken above. The transcendence of the Thou
has nothing to do with epistemological transcendence. This is a
purely moral transcendence, which is experienced only by the
man who makes a decision, which can never be demonstrated to
someone standing outside. Thus all that is to be said about the
Christian concept of the person can only be grasped by one who
is himself involved in responsibility.

I and Thou are not just interchangeable concepts, but they
comprise specifically different contents of experience. I myself
can become the object of experience for myself, but I can never
experience my own self as a Thou. It is perfectly possible for
another man to become for me an object for the contemplation
of his life as an I ; but I can confront him only as a Thou. I can
never become a real barrier for myself, but it is equally impos-
sible for me to leap over the barrier to the other. My I as a form
of Thou can only be experienced by the other I ; my I as a form
of I can only be experienced by myself. Thus in the experience
of a Thou the I-form of the other is never immediately given.
This means that I can be shown limits by a Thou which is not an
I in the sense of the I-Thou relation. So the Thou-form is to be

THE COMMUNION OF SAINTS

defined as the other who places me before a moral decision.
With this I-Thou relationship as the basic Christian relation we
have left the epistemological subject-object relationship behind.
Similarly with the concept of the Thou as the other I. Whether
the other is also an I in the sense of the I-Thou relation is some-
thing I can never discover.

The important question arises, how the I-Thou relationship
may be thought of along with the concept of God. Is the idea of
God to be included in the category of the Thou ? I know of no
philosophical system which has completely taken over the
Christian I-Thou relationship between God and man. In the
age of classical philosophy even the concept of God as personal
was rejected. Omnis determinatio est negatio, said Spinoza, and
his words were determinative for a long time. And if in dog-
matics, in more recent times, it was found possible to make a
philosophical application of the concept of person to the concept
of God, this may have reacted on philosophy, when you find the
attempt, as for example in Max Schelei , to do the same thing.
But it is interesting to note that where a personal concept of
God is advanced, there is always an effort made to keep it from
being too concrete and specific. In theology, too, this may be
seen happening not infrequently. Scheler is equally emphatic
about the personal nature of God (on the basis of a 'sociological
proof) and about the impossibility of God's relation to man being
an I-Thou relation. Can we nevertheless maintain the I-Thou
relation? We know God as the absolute, that is, however, also
as self-conscious and spontaneously active will. This expresses
formally and metaphysically the personal nature of God as pure
mind, whose image is present in every man, as the remnant of
God's likeness. Now it does not conflict with such a concept of
God that he may be experienced by us as a Thou, that is, as an
ethical barrier; further, this experience of God as Thou has
a priori no effect on his I, either as being individually limited or
as itself ethically addressed. If God is for us — that is, is active
will over against us — this does not mean that we are a barrier for
God. This has its application for the concept of God. God is
impenetrable Thou, and his metaphysical personality, conceived

THE PERSON AND SOCIAL RELATION

of as absolute self-consciousness and self-activity, does not affect
what we have said about his being as I.11

We might be accused of great one-sidedness. What of all that
might be said about the philosophical concept of the person ? In
fact we have not left the ethical situation. But our intention has
simply been to confront the Christian concept of the person
with the concept of idealist metaphysics. The positive gains of
the idealist concept will be made clear in another context.
Meantime we must maintain that the centre of the Christian
concept of the person lies elsewhere than in idealism. The at-
tempt of the former to reach the concrete reality of the other was
bound to fail, for we have to do with two spheres which are
qualitatively different. On the idealist path, from the idea of
the universal we come at best to the possibility of the other. The
other is a postulate, just as the entire conception of the historical
element in Christianity is a postulate for idealism (Christology) .
On the epistemological and metaphysical path one never reaches
the reality of the other. Reality cannot be derived, it is simply
given, to be acknowledged, to be rejected, but never to be
established by proofs, and it is given only to the moral person as
a whole. The Christian concept of the person rightly sees itself
as a view of the whole person. Every idealist construction uses
the concept of mind in order to cut through the living entirety
of the person. The Christian concept affirms the whole concrete
person, body and soul, in its difference from all other beings in
its moral relevance.

What form do these basic relations of persons now assume ?
Does the proposition that the Thou is not necessarily an I, not
conflict with the concept of community based on persons ? Is not
the person in the last resort completely isolated? For it is only
with the Thou that a person arises, and yet the person is com-
pletely isolated. It is unique, separate, and different from other
persons. In other words, the person cannot know but can only
acknowledge the other person, 'believe' in him. There is the
limit for psychology and epistemology, for the personal being of
the other is a moral reality which cannot be grasped by psychology
as a fact or by epistemology as a necessity.

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B. THE CONCEPT OF GOD AND BASIC SOCIAL RELATIONS AND
THE CONCEPT OF THE I-THOU RELATIONSHIP

The problem is the relation between the person, God, and social
being. The I arises only with the Thou; responsibility follows on
the claim. 'Thou' says nothing about its own being, but only
about its demand. This demand is absolute. What does this
mean? It claims the whole man in his claimlessness. But this
seems to make a man the creator of the other's moral person,
which is an intolerable thought. Can it be avoided ? The person-
forming activity of the Thou is independent of its personal being.
Now we add that it is also independent of the will of the human
Thou. No man can of himself make the other into an I, into a
moral person conscious of responsibility. God, or the Holy
Spirit, comes to the concrete Thou, only by his action does the
other become a Thou for me, from which my I arises. In other
words, every human Thou is an image of the divine Thou. The
character of a Thou is in fact the form in which the divine is
experienced; every human Thou has its character from the
divine Thou. This is not to say that it is not a Thou, but a
quality derived from God. But the divine Thou creates the
human Thou, and because God wills and makes it this human
Thou is real, absolute and holy, like the divine Thou. Here we
might speak of man as God's image in virtue of his effect upon ihe
other man (cf. below, the discussion of community of sr jrit,
where one man becomes Christ for the other). But since one
man's becoming Thou for another does not in principle alter
anything about the Thou as a person, it is not his person as an I
that is holy, but the Thou of God, the absolute will, here visible
in the concrete Thou of social life. The other man is Thou only
in so far as God makes him this. It is only in God that the claim
of the other resides ; but for this very reason it is the claim of the
other.

To sum up: the person in his concrete life, wholeness and
uniqueness, is willed by God as the ultimate unity. Social

THE PERSON AND SOCIAL RELATION

relations must therefore be understood as built up interpersonally
upon the uniqueness and separateness of persons. The person
cannot be surpassed by an a-personal mind, or by any 'unity'
which might abolish the multiplicity of persons. The basic social
category is the I-Thou relation. The Thou of the other man is
the divine Thou. So the way to the other man is also the way to
the divine Thou, a way of recognition or rejection. In the
'moment' the individual again and again becomes a person
through the 'other'. The other man presents us with the same
problem of cognition as does God himself. My real relation to
the other man is oriented on my relation to God. But since I
first know God's T in the revelation of his love, so too with the
other man : here the concept of the church finds its place. Then
it will become clear that the Christian person achieves his true
nature when God does not confront him as Thou, but 'enters
into' him as I.

Hence the individual belongs essentially and absolutely with
the other, according to the will of God, even though, or even
because, each is completely separate from the other.12

It could be objected that we have not come to grips with the
real problem of idealism, in that (i) we have not inquired about
the essence of the person, but have dealt with its origin, and
(2) so far as we have discussed the content of the personal we
have been biased in the direction of the ethical, and have ignored
man's 'spirituality', as though it were not an attribute of the
person. To (1) we reply that it was no mere accident that we
were driven from the question of the essence to the origin of the
person. The Christian person — though not only the Christian
person — consists in this continual coming into being. To (2) we
reply that man's 'spirituality', with its moral and religious
capacities, is certainly indispensable as a presupposition for moral
growth as a person. This has already been affirmed, and it will
be further developed in our discussion of the primal state.

Thus what follows in the next chapter must be regarded as also
containing the presupposition for what has been said so far.

CHAPTER III

The primal state and the problem of community

A. PRELIMINARY

Three main groups of ideas provide us with the doctrine of the
primal state. First, in contrast to the ethical and ontic relations
which have just been discussed, we shall show the real com-
munity of God and man in statu integritatis. Second, we shall
discuss the relation of human spirituality and sociality in general.
Third, we shall investigate the essential social forms. Our task
therefore falls into three parts, a theological, a socio-philo-
sophical, and a sociological. If the first part gives the original
image of the church, the second and third parts provide the
criteria for the sociological problem of the church. And before
we reach the church's concept of community the primal com-
munity must be broken by sin, and quite new ontic relations
established as basic. These have been to some extent described
in the previous chapter, so far as they are not directly connected
with evil will and are still real in the community of the church.
We shall then have to show the remarkable intentions towards
community which are found in the concept of sin, and how
these were overcome in the revelation in Christ and yet are still
active in the church. The concept of Christian community
appears as determined by its inner history. It cannot be grasped
'by itself, but only in a dialectic of history. In itself it is broken.
Its inner history becomes clear in the concepts of the primal
state, of sin, and revelation, all of which are fully understood only
when seen as aiming at community. It is therefore impossible
to present the concept of the church without placing it in this
inner dialectical history. It is of its essence that it still bears

THE PRIMAL STATE AMD COMMUNITY

within itself the community of sin and is real only by the constant
overcoming of this community of sin.

B. THE THEOLOGICAL PROBLEM: THE ORIGINAL
COMMUNITY

The theological doctrine of the primal state can serve only one
purpose, to construct dogmas about man's original spirituality
in a state of integrity. Moreover, what is of interest is the original
state of man's religious and moral life. If we regard man as a
free spiritual being created by God, then we must combine this
idea with the idea that God created man in a direct relation with
himself, in the direction of himself. There can be no objection to
describing this freely affirmed direction as morality and religion.
The person, then, as a freely created spiritual being, can be
defined as the unity of a self-conscious and spontaneously active
spirit.1 This concept of the person, in contrast to the ethical,
may be termed the universal-spiritual-metaphysical. Clearly
the person is considered as a structural unity, so that there is no
possibility of absorbing the structures in sociality. We have
already seen that the person is willed by God as the ultimate
unity, purely as a concrete person in absolute uniqueness and
separation from other persons, as the creation of God. To this
we now add the structural closed entity of this metaphysical
concept, so that we reach a pure concept of the person, in which
sociality is based purely on persons. The relation of sociality
and persons will be discussed in the socio-philosophical section.
The reason why we cannot define the person solely in the uni-
versal-spiritual sense is that while this definition is necessary, it is
insufficient. All that we have said did presuppose the person in
the sense of this definition, but it is insufficient because it is
formally so universal that it includes man in his original state, in
his natural state, as well as in his sinful and redeemed state. In
other words, from the Christian standpoint it is irrelevant, and
does not penetrate to the sphere of reality. It lifts man out of the
animal world, makes it clear that he is not to be regarded as a

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truncus ; but the definition is possible only when the limits are
seen which are set to it by the Christian concept of the person.
Our aim is to present the concept of the person which holds true
within history, that is, after the Fall. This aim is justified because
(i) in a real sense history only begins with sin, in that the factor
that makes history possible, namely death, is bound up with
sin, and (2) if our chief question concerns real Christian com-
munity then the metaphysical concept of the person yields noth-
ing; we need a definition of the person which has a Christian
content. The whole of idealism is unaware of any cleft between
the primal state and the Fall, or of the significance of this cleft
for the person and the view of community. It is this recognition
of the inner history of the concept from the primal state to sin,
that is, in the depths where we ascribe to sin a qualitative reality
in connection with history, that we make a fundamental separa-
tion from idealism. Origin and telos are an unbroken continuum
for idealism, and are synthesised in the concept of 'essence'.
All that interferes with this, on the one hand sin, on the other
hand Christ, cannot disturb this essential and necessary con-
tinuum. This straight-line conception of the history of the spirit
abolishes anything specifically Christian. Neither sin nor
salvation can alter the essence of this history.

To return : if the metaphysical concept of person is taken in
a positive Christian sense, that is, in the direction of God, then
we have the concept of person which belongs to the primal state.
Is there any connection with a concept of community ? Undoubt-
edly man in the primal state must be thought of as being in
immediate community of service with God, as we find in Genesis
1 and 2. It is the concept of the church which first makes it clear
that this immediate community means something more than the
ontic I-Thou relation. This community is a real connection
of love between an I and an I. In the Christian concept of God,
known to us from the revelation in Christ, but also from the
church of Christ, the community of God and social community
belong together. We shall have to give our reasons for this
assertion later. So we maintain that the immediate community
of God demands also the immediate community of man, that the

THE PRIMAL STATE AND COMMUNITY

latter is a necessary correlate of the former, and that it is no

accident that we read in Genesis 2.18: 'It is not good that the

man should be alone.' The immediate community of God is

documented in the immediate community of man. But what

does immediate community mean ? In the community of God it

clearly means, first, the absolute identity of purpose of the divine

and the human will, within the relation of the creative to the

created, that is, the obedient will. In other words, within the

relation of ruling and serving. The idea of a community of love

and of this connection of ruling and serving appear together here,

in this image of the primal state, anticipating their connection

and distinction in the ideas of the kingdom of God and the rule of

God. In religious language, certainly, this community is built

upon immediate and mutual love; but because love rules when it

serves we have the problem here of a pure association of authority

(Herrschaftsverband) : by limitless serving God rules limitlessly

over men. In that God establishes this law for community, man

serves him limitlessly in fulfilling it, and God rules over men.

Among men, therefore, immediate love must take other forms,

since the absolute ruling character of a creative will over a

created will falls away, and mutual service is a common service

under the rule of God. But since all persons are created unique,

even in the community of love the tension between wills is not

abolished. This means that conflict as such is not the consequence

of the fall, but arises on the basis of common love for God, in that

every individual will strives to reach the one goal of serving the

divine will, that is, serving the community, in its own way. Let

this suffice for the present. When we consider the concept of the

church we shall be able to disclose the wealth of relations in this.

In the last resort we can speak of these things only because we

know the church of Jesus Christ. In the logic of a complete

dogmatics the source of these ideas is to be found in the concept

of the church, whereas in the logic of the doctrine of the primal

state they are a necessary consequence of man's religious and moral

disposition in relation to God.

As a supplement to these findings we attempt a biblical
exegesis. This must not be regarded as the source for what we

THE COMMUNION OF SAINTS

have said, which in the last analysis comes from the revelation in
Christ, and is valid even if the biblical exegesis is faulty.

It is certain that the chief motif in the story of Genesis 1-3 is
the individual perfection of Adam in his primal state. But we
think we find traits which indicate the basic social relations of
this state: Adam is created as the crown of creation. He is lord
of the beasts and of all created things. But he does not come to a
full development of his spiritual nature. So the woman is created
as his companion : 'it is not good that the man should be alone'
(Genesis 2.18). We learn only indirectly, from the Fall, some-
thing of the nature of this community. The woman is seduced to
disobedience by the serpent, and the man by the woman.
Scarcely has the step been taken to the conscious act of dis-
obedience when the man and the woman realise their sexual
difference, and are ashamed in one another's presence. A
cleavage has entered their hitherto unbroken and childlike
community of obedience and innocence. With the loss of im-
mediate communion with God the immediate social community
is also lost. Between man and God, as between man and man,
a divisive power has come, the power of sin. The medieval
symbolism for the Fall puts a tree in the centre, with the serpent
coiled round it, and on either side the man and the woman,
separated by the tree from which they disobediently ate.

That the narrator sees sexuality as the power which now
stepped between human beings, had a devastating effect upon
the doctrine of original sin. But this result is not our immediate
concern. What is important is that the narrator sees some kind
of separation arising through the Fall, that is, through the moral
act of rebellion against God, by which the original community
of God and man is lost to man. Nor is this separation removed
by the following sentence : 'And they became one flesh.' Rather,
we perceive here the extremely complicated dialectic of human
community, of which more later. The narrator thinks of divine
and human community as in some way belonging together;
since this community is destroyed by moral failure it clearly has
moral character originally, and is part of the divine image in
man in the narrator's view. It is sufficient to note that divine

THE PRIMAL STATE AND COMMUNITY

and human community are in some way part of the original
moral and spiritual life of man, and that means, part also of his
future life, in accordance with the parallel between Adam and
Christ, the primal state and the last things. And this points us to
the church.

It has always been recognised that man in his primal state
must be thought of in communion with God. But it has very
seldom been noted that this belongs with social community. In
speaking of the church in Adam's time there was no thought of
any communal relation, but only of the preaching of the divine
word at mankind's beginning, in the sense of Augustine's words,
ecclesia, quae civitas Dei est, cui ab initio generis humani non defuit
praedicatio (De Civ. Dei. xvi.2). So far as I know, Schleiermacher
was the first to speak of the communal relation in the primal
state (The Christian Faith, para. 60.2). But even he says only that
'the inner union of the race-consciousness and personal self-
consciousness' forms part of man's original perfection. This is
intended to ensure the possibility of mutual communication and
of the communal relation in religion ; for it is only in the race-
consciousness that men meet one another, and without it they
could not have a communal relation. This must be an original
relationship, since outside community we are not given any
'living and vigorous piety'. But the idea disappears after
Schleiermacher. So far I can see, it was not till Reinhold Seeberg,
in his Christliche Dogmatik (1, para. 22.1), in his teaching about
man's innate spirituality, that the idea of sociality was suggested
as belonging to man's original nature, thus restoring to dog-
matics an important doctrine, without which the ideas of original
sin and of the church cannot be fully understood.

This brings us to the second problem of the doctrine of the
primal state, to the question of the connection between original,
innate human spirituality and sociality. Our attention must be
directed not to the Christian and moral fulfilment of empirical
community, but to the meaning of the proposition that it is not
good for man to be alone, to the meaning of the creation of
woman, that is, of life in sociality. It will appear that all
Christian and moral content, as well as the entire spirituality of

THE COMMUNION OF SAINTS

man, is possible and real only in sociality. Not only do the
concepts of sin and of the church become more profound, but a
way opens up to a Christian evaluation of community life.

C. THE SOCIO-PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEM:
HUMAN SPIRITUALITY AND SOCIALITY

The problem of this section is the relations between man's
spirituality and sociality. We shall show that man, as spirit, is
necessarily created in a community, and that his general spiritu-
ality is woven into the net of sociality. This is extremely im-
portant in providing a clarification of the relation between the
individual and the community, and the right background for the
typology of community ; on this basis we can clarify the problem
of the religious community and the church.

i . Personal being as structurally open

First a general matter. In speaking in what follows of I and
Thou and their relations we shall be using the words in a basic-
ally different sense from that of the preceding chapter. T is not
the person summoned up or awakened by the Thou. 'Thou' is
not the unknowable, impenetrable, alien other. But we are
now moving in a different sphere. Here we have to show that
man's entire so-called spirituality, which is presupposed by the
Christian concept of person and has its unifying point in self-
consciousness (which must also be discussed in this context), is so
constituted that it can only be seen as possible in sociality. If
we have also to show that self-consciousness arises only with the
other, we must not confuse this with the Christian I-Thou
relation. Not every self-conscious I knows of the moral barrier
of the Thou. It knows of an alien Thou — this may even be the
necessary prerequisite for the moral experience of the Thou —
but it does not know this Thou as absolutely alien, making a
claim, setting a barrier; that is, it does not experience it as real,

THE PRIMAL STATE AND COMMUNITY

but in the last resort it is irrelevant to its own I. It is in this
sense that I have now to speak of this general spiritual pre-
supposition.

There is no empirical social relation of a specifically human
kind which does not have a community appropriate to its nature.
Thus the typology of social structures, too, is based upon a
phenomenology of sociality which is established in spirit. Our
first question, therefore, is not about the person with a social
will, but about the spiritual person as such, and the way he is
bound up in sociality.

Material spirituality in each person is bound up with self-
consciousness and self-determination as the authentication of
structural unity, and these can be formally defined as the prin-
ciples of receptivity and activity. Material spirituality is effective
in the acts of thinking, self-conscious willing and feeling.2 These
acts are only conceivable as resting on man's sociality, arising
from it, and also with it and in it. So this first section deals with
the structural openness of the personal unit to sociality, while
the following section will analyse the structural closedness of
personal being, showing the basic relationship of person and
community.3

Man is embedded in an infinite abundance of possibilities of
expression and understanding. By a million arteries a stream of
spirituality has entered him, before he was aware of it, and he can
only notice it when he is in the midst of it.

He knows that he understands, expresses, and is understood.
The three experiences go together. They are present, potentially
at least, in every spiritual act, and all spiritual acts are thus
potentially bound up with sociality. In the life of feeling, too,
where man thinks he is most isolated, he is certain of being able
to express — if not fully, at least to some degree, which provides
the limit to any expression — what he feels. This means that he is
also certain that he can be understood and can understand the
feelings of others. Thus sociality is involved here too.

At this point the concept of basic relations, and the supple-
mentary concept of interaction, are in danger of being confused
with empirical theories. It is only in interaction with other spirits

THE COMMUNION OF SAINTS

that self-conscious thinking and willing are possible and meaning-
ful. This we shall have to verify. First, the social phenomenon
of speech, which is so closely connected with thought that it may
well be said that it largely makes thinking possible, and has been
given precedence over thought, the word over mind.4

Speech unites within itself the intention of objective meaning
and subjective disposition, as well as empirical objectifying
(acoustically and graphically), in which latter the mind simul-
taneously acknowledges and overcomes nature in speech. This
affirmation of nature (that is, of the sense- world) , by means of
which communication between persons is made p ..sible (cf.
'the new body', 2 oof.), does not imply that nature is the con-
stitutive element in the social character of our impulses to speak
and write. But it is the material which the formative spirit,
which is given in social intention, makes fruitful objectively and
subjectively. And there is such a close connection between the
two that spirit is inconceivable without nature, and human
nature inconceivable without the social spirit. The phenomenon
of language would be meaningless if the understanding of the
hearer or reader were not potentially co-ordinated with every
word.5 With language a system of social spirituality is set within
man; in other words 'objective spirit' has become effective in
history.

Will must not here be regarded as will to communion, but
purely phenomenologically, if serious misunderstanding is not to
arise.

In contrast to impulse, will is the united activity of self-
determination and self-consciousness. Will is always self-
conscious ; that is, in carrying out an act I myself am the centre
and the unity of the act. This act of the individual person is
possible and real only in sociality. There is no self-consciousness
without community, or rather, self-consciousness arises together
with the consciousness of being in community. And the will is
by its very nature dependent on other wills. The first proposition
has been maintained frequently in recent philosophy, and I
should say has been essentially solved by Paul Natorp.6 It is an
unsolved riddle just how and when self-consciousness arises,

THE PRIMAL STATE AND COMMUNITY

genetically, since a study of one's own person is in this case
excluded by the nature of the problem. All we can do is try to
interpret aright the fact of self-conscious spirit, and this seems
possible only within spiritual sociality. In knowing myself as
'I', I lift myself out as a unity from the vegetative spiritual state
of the community ; and simultaneously the being of the 'Thou'
as the other self-conscious spirit rises up for me. We could turn
this round and say that in recognising a Thou, an alien conscious
spirit, separate and distinct from myself, I recognise myself as an
T: I become aware of my self-consciousness.7

The consciousness of the I and the consciousness of the Thou
arise together, and in mutual dependence. 'Self-consciousness,
and with it self-conscious willing, develops solely in and with the
communion of one consciousness and another.'8 Thus the will,
too, as an activity arising from self-consciousness, is possible only
in sociality. Further, it is of the nature of the will as an activity
that it is effective in community. Will arises where there are
'oppositions'. And strictly only another will can be an opposition
of this kind. When it is a matter of removing a natural obstacle,
it is not really the will which experiences opposition, but one's
natural strength (or the will's means of organisation) . The will
itself experiences opposition only in the will of a person who wills
something different. It is only in the struggle with other wills,
in overcoming them and making them part of one's own will, or
in being oneself overcome, that the strength and wealth of the
will are deployed. Such a struggle takes place in miniature
wherever man lives in the community of the I-Thou relation.
For where person meets person, will clashes with will, and each
struggles to subdue the other. Only in such encounters does the
will reach its essential determination. As an isolated phenomenon
the will is without meaning. Here again we come upon the basic
significance of sociality for human spirituality.

A brief glance at man's emotional life shows that here too,
where he is most isolated, there is a certain consciousness that
expression is both possible and required, that is, that under-
standing by others plays a part. In addition, there are certain
acts of feeling, experiencing, and rejoicing along with others,

THE COMMUNION OF SAINTS

which direct the individual's life to that of others. Acts of pleasure,
of sympathy, and of erotic love have also this social direction.

To sum up, man's entire spirituality is interwoven with social-
ity, and rests upon the basic relation of I and Thou. 'Man's
whole spirituality becomes evident only along with others: the
essence of spirit is that the self is through being in the other.'9
The I and the Thou are fitted into one another in infinite near-
ness, in mutual penetration, for ever inseparable, resting on one
another, in inmost mutual participation, feeling and experienc-
ing together, and sustaining the general stream of spiritual inter-
action. Here the openness of personal being is evident. But the
question arises: is there any point in still speaking of I and
Thou, if everything is now apparently one ? Is not every appar-
ently individual phenomenon just a participation in the one
supra-individual work of the spirit ?

2. Personal being as structurally closed

The idea of personal openness threatens to turn into that of an
a-personal spirit. With the beginnings of spirituality the I
plunges into a sea of spirituality. It awakens and finds itself
existing in the midst of this sea. It can only live in this context,
and it knows that every Thou it meets is borne along by the same
stream. But the characteristic form in which all this takes place
is the form of the Thou. That is, man knows that his I is real
only in the relation with the Thou. Clearly, then, he is not just
the reservoir for a certain amount of objective spirit, a receptive
organ, but an active bearer and member in this whole context of
relations. Otherwise there would be no I-Thou relation, and no
spirituality. The more the individual spirit grows the more it
plunges into the stream of objective spirit,10 sustaining it; and
out of this movement the power for individual spiritual life is
increased.

Thus the person's openness requires closedness as its correlate,
if we are to be able to speak of openness at all. So the question
whether there is an individual being which is untouched by social

THE PRIMAL STATE AND COMMUNITY

links must in a certain sense be answered affirmatively, if the idea
of the I-Thou relation is not to be abandoned. On the other
hand there is a danger that in trying to save the idea of an a-
social core of personal being we might be thinking atomistically.
A basic change of this kind would matter a great deal for our view
of the church.

The tragedy of all idealist philosophy was that it failed to
break through to personal spirit. But its tremendous merit (and
that of Hegel in particular) was its recognition that the principle
of spirit was something objective, reaching beyond everything
individual, and that there was an objective spirit, the spirit of
sociality, which was something in itself as opposed to all indi-
vidual spirit. It is our task to affirm the one without denying the
other, to keep the insight without joining in the error.

That the personal unity is closed is attested by self-conscious-
ness and self-determination : in both there is complete separation
from everything social, and both consist of introversive acts. The
structural unity of the I is established as an experience in the
experience of the Thou ; it cannot be constituted by acts ; acts
rather presuppose it, and are directed towards it. We recall the
distinction of principle we have made between structure and
intention.11 Here the basic synthesis between social and indi-
vidual being comes to light. The individual personal spirit lives
solely by virtue of sociality, and the 'social spirit' becomes real
only in individual embodiment. Thus genuine sociality leads to
personal unity. One cannot speak of the priority either of per-
sonal or of social being. We must hold firmly to the fact that
alongside those acts which are real only in sociality there are also
purely introversive acts. It is clear that the latter are also
possible only in a person living in full sociality — than which there
is indeed no other kind of person. So far as experience is con-
cerned these acts isolate the I from the Thou completely;12 but
on the other hand it is not the intimate act which constitutes the
person as structurally closed. Rather, no social intention is con-
ceivable without this structural closedness, just as no intimate act
is conceivable without the corresponding openness. On the other
hand, the social intention is directed towards openness of the

THE COMMUNION OF SAINTS

person, and the intimate act towards his closedness. But it is
wrong to distinguish in the person an inaccessible, completely
isolated core and a completely open layer surrounding it. The
unity and the closedness of the whole person are presupposed
together with sociality. No Thou can be experienced except by
an I, which means that the Thou can never be experienced in a
purely epistemological context. Thus the only question asked in
idealist philosophy concerning the I and the Thou — the question
of Fichte concerning the synthesis of the world of spirits — is
wrongly put. For it proceeds from the assumption that I and
Thou can be thought of as entirely unrelated, and then questioned
about the point of unity, which somehow must exist. The ques-
tion about the other soul, about being with the other, is not
sufficiently filled with the knowledge of the unity of all spiritual
happenings. The question starts with the individual, thought of
as isolated and somehow seeking connection with others.13 So we
hold to our conclusion about the equilibrium between personal
and social being.

Does the social unity, then, extend beyond the personal inter-
actions? In what way is this conceivable? Or is it completely
contained in them ? In theological language, does God mean by
community something that absorbs individual man, or is God
solely concerned with the individual ? Or are the community and
the individual both willed by God as having their own signifi-
cance ? Is objective spirit nearer to God than subjective spirit, or
is it the other way round ? Or do both stand side by side beneath
God's will?

If the equilibrium between social and personal being is to be
maintained, what meaning does the community acquire as a
metaphysical unity in relation to the individual? We maintain
that the community can be understood as a collective person,
with the same structure as the individual person. To think of
the community as man on a larger scale, rather in the style of
modern organology,14 that is, with the aim of subordinating the
individual to the whole, is an idea known since the time of Plato.
This subordination must be rejected, as contrary to the equil-
ibrium we have spoken of; but the question remains whether,

THE PRIMAL STATE AMD COMMUNITY

besides the individual, there is not an individual collective person
in which the individual participates, which goes beyond the
individual but is incomprehensible without the correlate of
individual personal being.15 The question is the metaphysical
possibility of such an assumption, the idea of equilibrium or of the
monadic image in sociality. With the concrete application we
shall deal later. In my empirical consciousness I myself represent
the community, and I do not hypostatise the community in this
way: my consciousness does not wish to ascribe to the com-
munity any being outside myself. But this empirical view must
be overcome. Social unity is experienced as a centre of acts from
which the social unity operates. It is self-conscious, and has a
will of its own, though only in the form of its members. To
conclude from this that the collective person is impossible is a
typically empirical objection. A community is a concrete unity.
Its members must not be thought of as individual : the centre of
action does not lie in each member, but in all together. This
unity is the starting-point for our thought, for one does not reach
the one from the many, and an individualist starting-point
precludes understanding of the situation. It is not that many
persons, coming together, add up to a collective person, but the
person arises only through being embedded in sociality. And
when this happens, simultaneously the collective person arises,
not before, yet not as a consequence of the arising of the indi-
vidual. That is, the collective person exists only where individual
persons exist. But since the collective person as a centre of acts is
possible only as a concrete purposive community, it can only be
possible where the individual person is a real part of the concrete
community. The question of the 'body' of this collective person,
and whether the ascription of a body to it has any meaning, will
be discussed later. Litt's objection that in inter-personal relations
one cannot jump from individual to collective persons, and that
all social being is exhausted in I-Thou relations, is not in my
opinion conclusive. I-Thou relations are also possible between a
collective person and an individual person. For the collective
person is in fact also an individual person. It is only when
collective persons are included in social intercourse that the

THE COMMUNION OF SAINTS

richness of this can be properly grasped. To grant the collective
person, then, does not limit the basic sociological category of
I-Thou relations; rather, in the eyes of God, the all-embracing
Person, collective and individual persons have the same structure,
both closed and open, with mutual completion, and social and
introversive intentions within a structural unity. Yet we still
shrink from asserting the reality of the collective person. As the
problem of reality can be solved only from the ethical standpoint,
the question must first be discussed how far ethical, personalist
categories are applicable to a collective person. Clearly this will
be important for the idea of the church.

We now have the basis for a theory of the formation of empirical
communities. They must all be built on those basic relations
which are given with the personal life of every man. This net of
sociality in which man lives is prior to all will for community:
the real relations in this sociality are still to be found even if
empirical community is consciously and entirely rejected.
Clearly, Leibniz's doctrine of the monad will be of help in
understanding these basic social relations: individual beings,
completely closed — 'monads have no windows' — and yet
representing, reflecting and individually shaping the whole of
reality, and so finding their own being.

What is the theological significance of these observations?
Man is not conceived of by God, the all-embracing Person, as an
isolated, individual being, but as in natural communication
with other men, and in his relation with them not satisfying just
one side of his otherwise closed spiritual existence, but rather
discovering in this relation his reality, that is, his life as an I.
God created man and woman, each dependent on the other.
God does not desire a history of individual men, but the history
of the community of men. Nor does he desire a community which
absorbs the individual into itself, but a community of men. In
his sight the community and the individual are present at the
same moment, and rest in one another. The structures of the
individual and the collective unit are the same. Upon these
basic relations rests the concept of the religious community and
the church.

THE PRIMAL STATE AND COMMUNITY

D. THE SOCIOLOGICAL PROBLEM

I . Social community as community of will

Where men are brought together by sheer impulses it is not
possible to speak of human society. The impulses of imitation,
subordination, sociability, and in particular of hunger and
sexuality, man has in common with the animals. Specifically
human community is present only when conscious human
spirit is at work, that is, when community is based on purposive
acts of will. Human community does not necessarily arise from
such acts of will, but it has its being in them.16 Human com-
munity is by nature a community of will, and as such it gives
meaning to its own natural form. Sociology may therefore be
defined as the study of the structures of communities and the
acts of will that constitute them; it is a phenomenological and
systematic science. The subject-matter is not the origins of the
state, of marriage, the family, or religious community, but the
acts of will at work within them. Human community is a com-
munity of self-conscious beings who have wills.17

We must first describe the nature of social grouping in general,
and then the concrete types of social acts of will and 'structures'.

It is characteristic of communal acts of will that they are not
necessarily directed towards an object outside the person, but that
they all point in the same way, that is, towards one another. The
one man must in some way intend and will the other, and be
intended and willed by him, whether purely for their association
with one another, or for some purpose beyond them both.
'Agreement' which lacks this reciprocal relation is simply parallel-
ism, and this is not overcome by the knowledge that the other will
is running the same course.18 The agreement must have this two-
way traffic, and only then can we speak of 'unity' of will: it
rests upon the separateness of persons. Community is not having
something in common — though formally this is found in every
community — but it is constituted by reciprocal will. Gommun-

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ities which are founded on merely formal agreement (an audience
in a lecture-room, etc.) are not communities of will, but come
into the category of the mass or the public (see below). 'Unity'
of will means that the content which is intended and willed is
identical for all. Here a further distinction arises. 'Unity' must
exist absolutely in the will of the community, that is, as formal
unity in the sense of 'agreement' ; at first it will exist as absolute
unity in regard to content as well, that is, in regard to the aim
which is beyond the pure will to community. But in the historical
development of every community differences of opinion arise
concerning the realisation of the aim. These differences often
lead to differences regarding the content of the aim, so that the
unity of content can only be described as relative. So, too, the
formally absolute unity of the empirical community of the church
shows in regard to content only a relative unity.

One must never conclude, however, from the unity of will,
whatever its nature, that there is some kind of unity of persons,
that is, some fusion of persons. Community of will and unity of
will are built upon the inner separateness of I and Thou. We
have already rejected the idealist argument that the identity of
what is willed demands the homogeneity and unity of persons.
The man who is united with me in what we intend is structurally
just as separate from me as the man who is not so united with me.
Between us there is the boundary of those who have been created
as individual persons. Only with this conception of community
is the Christian idea of a divine community possible. Otherwise
such a communion with God becomes unification in the sense of
overstepping the boundary of the I-Thou relation, a mystical
fusion.

To see the individual person as an ultimate unit, created by
God's will, but as real only in sociality, is to see the relations of
one with another, built upon difference, as also willed by God.
This means that strife is the basic sociological law. Concretely
this means that in every social relation there must be an element
of partisanship. Only in the conflict of wills does genuine life
arise, only in strife does power unfold. This insight is by no
means new.19

THE PRIMAL STATE AND COMMUNITY

Since the Fall there has been no concrete strife in the genuine
sense. Hence the very idea of it has been condemned as evil. But
even in the strife that has become unholy through evil, will the
inmost social links of the human spirit be visible. For it does not
mean that the other will is ignored or denied, but it is forced
into one's own will and so overcome. Only in the co-operation
of wills is their opposition dissolved. This is the 'social synthesis
which triumphs over all antitheses of the will and of nature', in
which 'the sociality of the human spirit is revealed as a primal
force ... a tremendous reality, which teaches us to understand
the mystery of mankind and its history, and to have hope for its
future'.20 This truth is valid not only for the relation between
man and man, but also for that between God and Man. Man's
sinful will is forced in this struggle into the will of God, and thus
community is established.

Community is community of will, built upon the separateness
and the difference between persons, constituted by reciprocal
acts of will, with its unity in what is willed, and counting among
its basic laws the inner conflict of individual wills. This definition
is incomplete until we have discussed the theory of objective
spirit. But first we must consider the content of what con-
nects one will with another. Only then can the nature of
concrete community and the concrete form of objective spirit
be clarified.

2. Typology of social communities

Bonds between wills can be regarded from the standpoint of the
relation between the goal that is willed and the will to com-
munity, that is, the direction of the wills. This analysis provides
us with an understanding both of the closeness and the looseness
of the bond. The other way of looking at the matter is to study
the relative strength of the wills. From these two approaches it
seems to me that we can get at the nature of every bond between
wills, even though in any particular case the analysis may be
made more difficult by the presence of a combination of several
types.

THE COMMUNION OF SAINTS

We begin with the first approach. Every will strives to reach
a goal. There are two possibilities for the relation between this
goal and the will to community, and in each the will has a
different form.21

Wills may be 'with', 'beside' and 'against' one another. Only
the first leads to empirical social formations. The second is
sociologically irrelevant (but see below on the sociological con-
cept of the mass) . The third, when developed in a completely
pure form, does create real social vitality, but cannot form a
social structure. We are left, then, with the first form. When
wills are willing with one another, what is willed can be two
things. To be with one another can be willed as an end in itself
(and this would include willing for one another) ; or it can be
willed as a means to an end. The first we call the 'will for a
meaning', the second the 'rational purposive will'. The first we
describe in this way because its form of community has no
material rational purpose, but it is meaning that is willed and
affirmed. Corresponding to these two concepts of will are a
'structure of meaning' and a 'structure of purpose'. Com-
munity can therefore be constituted either as a means by a
rational will with a pure purpose, or by a will for meaning which
acknowledges the value of community as such. In the structure
of purpose the unity of what is willed establishes the reciprocal
movement of the wills ; in the structure of meaning the unity of
what is willed is itself represented in this movement. The latter,
too, can throw out certain purposes, but they are not constitutive
of the structure. When Aristotle says, in the Politics, -dcra.
KOLvoiVLo. aya9ov rtvds eveKz (TvvecrTrjKev, he is expressing the tele-
ological character of all social structures, for clearly ayiOov here
means the good, and a good which is outside the community
itself. We dispute the proposition in this form, since it corresponds
to a eudaemonist ethic and mistakes the natm*e of the meaning
of community as such. A structure of meaning is not constructed
with a purpose, nor can it be explained by means of a purpose.
We shall speak of this later.22

According to modern terminology — in Tonnies's creative
definitions — the first would be called 'community', and the

THE PRIMAL STATE AND COMMUNITY

second 'society'. We shall keep his terminology. It would be
easy to identify this distinction with the genetic one of associations
which have 'grown' and those which have been 'made', between
those already existing and those which are willed.23 The family,
the nation and the church would be among the first, limited
liability companies, clubs, and perhaps sects (as in Weber and
Troeltsch) among the second. But this identification is basically
false. A nation is a community in the special sense, but it has
not grown, but has been willed, moreover as an end in itself,
having its own value, for every community is a community of will.
The task of a sociological inquiry is not to disclose the thousands
of motives which give rise to a social structure — one may recall
von Wiese's chart of relations — but to study the acts of will of
which this structure consists. Of course associations which have
grown do often coincide with the type of a community, but both
methodologically and logically it would be incorrect to identify
them. In discussing the psychological differences between the life
of a community and the life of a society, we shall discuss the close-
ness and the looseness of the bond between wills. That is to say,
we do not think that the psychological differences actually con-
stitute the types, but that the different acts of will have different
psychological consequences.

Scheler is to some extent right to call all communities life-
communities, not because the whole of life necessarily runs its
course in them, but because man can live in them in the form
proper to his vital personal being. The first act of affirmation
that he belongs to a community is usually set within a concrete,
living, non-formal act, say, conscious participation in the work
of the community. Thus children, in love, or trust, or obedience,
can belong in this way. For a community, unlike a society, can
carry children too. This is not the genetic concept of a com-
munity, but the children are in the community as a piece of
their parents' will, until they have their own will — an idea which
would be meaningless in a society. This is important for the
sociological concept of the church. Common feeling, willing and
responsibility are the forces of inmost cohesion. The basic
attitude is mutual inner interest.

THE COMMUNION OF SAINTS

If community is essentially life-community, a society is an
association in rational action. It appeals to man to make the
greatest possible use of his intelligence, as we see in the search
for the most suitable means for the end desired, and the use of the
society itself for the man's own ends. This procedure is not un-
ethical only because it is agreed, and mutually applied. More-
over the other man has to be treated with the great consideration,
precisely in order that he may be exploited. This is the basis of
the inner self-preservation of a society. The act of will by which
a man enters a society must be explicit, and contractually agreed.
There is no intimate personal element in this. Along with the
communication between purposive wills in a system of means,
there is complete spiritual isolation. Each man makes himself
responsible for the society only in his own interest. A society has
in principle no tradition. The basic spiritual attitude is mutual
inner indifference, strictest caution towards the other, leading to
reserve and self-assurance, and finally to a conventional amia-
bility, so far as this consorts with your purpose. The organised
structure of purposes is based on contract as the origin and
criterion of the association, and develops into a comprehensive
system of means, which are fixed in records and agreements.

From this it is clear that the directness of the bond between
persons is expressed in a community by closeness, and in a society
by looseness, both in the form of their life and in their psycho-
logical attitude. It must, however, be emphasised that no pure
type actually exists. There is no community without acts of will
which are those of a society, and no society without acts of will
which are those of a community, because society is by nature
based on community.24

So far we have spoken of the way in which the direction of the
will is determined, about its purposive intention and its intention
of meaning. The question now arises of the relative strength of
wills. This can appear as a relation of power and as a relation of
authority. In the former the dominated will is activated mechani-
cally by the will in power, whereas in the latter there is pre-
supposed an understanding of the command by the one who
obeys. This is sociologically significant in so far as in an associa-

THE PRIMAL STATE AND COMMUNITY

tion of power there can be no community, whereas in one of
genuine authority community is not only present, but for the
most part realised. This is most important for the concept of the
church.

Corresponding to the disbalance of strength in an association
of authority there is the balance in the 'co-operative association'.
This brings us to Otto von Gierke's famous distinction.25 The
concept of a 'co-operative' is applicable only to relations of
strength, and is not identical with the concept of community. A
co-operative is in this sense a legal and not a sociological concept,
since what it expresses is the legal equality of its members. It
cannot be applied to living social relations. Concretely, as has
been often shown in sociological studies, there is no pure balance
of strength between the members of a social structure. In every
community which seems to rest upon the dynamic co-ordination
of wills there is in fact subordination. We should agree, but with
the qualification that where there is an absolute authoritative will
there is real co-ordination with those who are ruled. This co-
ordination is included in the idea of equality before the law, as
in the idea of the rule of God, as we shall show later. But this
transforms the concept of the co-operative. It has no socio-
logical significance as a necessary correlate of the concept of
authority. The only sociologically new structure is therefore the
association of authority. This means that the scheme of com-
munity and society is joined to the concept of this association,
which may be either a community or a society.26 The relevance
of this for the concept of the church will be discussed later. A
discussion of the closer relations between these three sociological
types belongs to a detailed sociological study. Empirical social
structures such as the army, the school, etc., are to be under-
stood as combinations of these three types.

There is still another social structure which does not fit into
the general concept of community, and which can be described
as human only because it is formed of conscious beings : namely,
the concept of the mass. 'The mass is not real' (Rosenstock) . In
the mass there is no real social bond between wills, but the wills
are regarded as mechanical forces, as it were reacting to stimuli.

THE COMMUNION OF SAINTS

That is, they are not bound together by their direction or
strength, but in an objectively operative relation, in which their
reaction to stimuli is necessary, while their bond with one
another is accidental.

Thus the 'mass'27 in the sociological sense is not just any
aggregate of men, but the structure, called into being by external
stimuli, which rests upon the parallelism of will of several persons.
In the mass the boundary of the personal disappears, the indi-
vidual ceases to be a person, and is only a part of the mass, drawn
along with it and led by it. The mass is a unity which is not
supported by the differences between persons and which there-
fore cannot have any duration. It is the simplest social structure
and it gives rise to the most powerful experiences of unity.28

What Vierkandt means by the invisible church expresses some-
thing that the church to-day has often become — a religious
theatre and auditorium. The congregation are the audience, the
'public', they are pleasantly elevated by music and sermon,
everyone is pleased to see many others who feel themselves
exalted by the same spiritual enjoyment. And of course this feel-
ing of shared joy is invisible, an idea which would be superfluous
if it did not intend to say more than this. Vierkandt goes on to
quote Goethe in the Urmeister: 'Where is there a more pleasant
bond in society, where else must men confess that they are
brothers, than when they hang on the lips and the features of a
single man, and they are borne aloft in a common feeling?' But
a common feeling, and knowledge of it, do not make a 'com-
munity'. This can be present, but sociologically it is sui generis,
and the public is no more than a subordinate concept which
refers to the mass with its parallelism of wills. The other socio-
logical structures, with their basis in meaning and purpose, are
in the midst of temporality.

This gives rise to a new problem. Is the reference to time or
duration for these basic sociological concepts something new?29 Is
there a new principle of order here ? Basically, the question here
is the relation of eternity to the temporal community. This is
most important for the idea of the church, though it also goes to
the heart of the social structure we are now considering. We

THE PRIMAL STATE AND COMMUNITY

have distinguished between a will for meaning and purposive
will, a structure of meaning and a structure of purpose, between
community and society. The meaning of society is clear. But
why should we speak, in connection with community, of 'a will
for meaning' and 'a structure of meaning'? Because in this
kind of bond the will is not self-establishing, but recognises
something established, it is not related to a purpose but to value,
because what demands acknowledgment is a structure of values
which cannot be grasped rationally or teleologically.30 Or, to
put it from another angle, because community by its nature does
not point purposively beyond itself. Unlike many sociologists, we
do not consider that it is possible to elaborate the telos of a
community, a family or a nation, however delicate our insights.
A community may have a rational telos, but it is not contained
within it, the community itself is not this telos. It is its very nature
that this should be so. Rather, community is permeated with
value, as history is, and as value itself lies beyond intramundane
limitations. As history by its nature finds its telos at the boundary
of history (regarded as the end of time, and beyond time) , that
is, in God, so community is founded in God, and willed by him.
History has no rationally perceptible purpose, it comes from God
and goes to God, it has meaning and value as such, however
broken its origin and its destiny may be. So, too, genuine com-
munity, in marriage, the family, the nation, is from God to God,
and its telos lies on the boundaries of history. This means that the
concept of duration, whose boundary lies on the boundary of
time, is given with the concept of community. The 'duration'
of a community is identical with the duration of history. We are
thinking of community as an idea, not as an empirical fact.
Concretely, one may think of the communities of blood, such as
family and race, or of historical communities, such as the people
and the nation, or of communities of destiny, such as marriage
and friendship — in their nature as communities they are all from
God to God. Nor is there any essential difference between the
communities which are found and those which are made, so far
as they are communities in the sense defined above.

In contrast, a society as a structure of purpose is purely within

THE COMMUNION OF SAINTS

history. For the realisation of its purpose it is constituted in
history. Its purpose can be the purely personal desire of each
individual (earning money, or connections), and with the
satisfaction of the individuals the duration of the society is,
ideally, at an end. If a society's purpose goes beyond the indi-
vidual, say over a whole generation, then the duration corre-
sponds to this purpose. If the purpose of the society is the dream
of many people to establish the kingdom of God on earth, then
its purpose lies at the end of history, which is thought of as the
end of time. The category of 'development' appears, which is
not found in a community. But the idea of society never goes
beyond the idea of the purpose which constitutes it. A purposive
association which tries to reach beyond what is temporally possible
for it, ceases to be an association. Here the end of history is the
end and not a boundary. Thus the idea of a concrete society
as purely teleological is necessarily intra-historical, and tempor-
ally conditioned.

This description cannot be refuted by an appeal to the
empirical difference in duration. For we are speaking of the idea
of society, not of its empirical duration. If wills have joined to-
gether for the sake of their joining, if a community has been
affirmed, irrespective of rational purposive tendencies, then the
intentionality in these acts reaches to the limits of time, i.e. to
the limits of history, to God : it is 'from God to God' . Here is the
entire 'holiness' of human life in community, the relation with
God which is found in friendship as in marriage and the life of a
people, and thus also the indissolubility of all these structures of
life.

Finally, in the sociological concept of the mass we saw that the
dynamic and mechanical stimulus on a great number of men was
constitutive. 'Stimulus' can only be conceived of in the category
of what is temporally conditioned, the temporal 'moment'. If a
community is at the boundary of time and a society is bounded
by time, then the mass is to be described as being within time.

An association of authority cannot be described here. For it
is to be categorised according to whether it is seen as a structure
of society or a structure of community.

THE PRIMAL STATE AMD COMMUNITY

So far we have analysed the structures of acts of will and the
possible types of social life. We can now consider the concept
which is of the utmost significance for social philosophy and
sociology, one whose use is very confused and yet can be service-
able for an analysis of the concept of the church, the concept,
namely, of objective spirit.

But before we do this we must give a brief historical excursus
on the patristic view, and the view of St. Thomas Aquinas, on the
natural forms of human socialisation.

The problem of social formations arose early in the history of
theology, as both a philosophical and ethical problem. It was
natural that it should arise in the communal life of the state
rather than of the church. Is the state a consequence of the Fall,
that is, is it sin; or is it willed by God?31 The answer can be
seen as flowing from the two concepts of the world32 which run
through early Christian literature, the one seeing the world as
good, as created, the other seeing it as evil, made bad by the evil
will. We therefore find the concepts of primary and secondary,33
of absolute and relative,34 or of ideal and concrete35 natural right.
The state in itself is willed by God, and good, and it is the con-
sequence of sin that the power of punishment and of compulsion is
necessary. In their primal state men would also have founded a
state. It is noteworthy, however, that the state in patristic
literature has essentially social character. Its task is to care for
order and welfare. Ideals of state in Hegel's sense are quite
absent.36 The existing state is therefore good and sinful at the
same time. This twofold character is found in all social structures,
which would also have arisen in the primal state, but now bear
flaws. Man is by nature a social being. Sociale quiddam est humana
natural1 This is the general patristic view. The necessary pre-
supposition, for all empirical social structures, of the difference
and inequality between persons is acknowledged by the Fathers,
and moreover as belonging to man's primal state, and not as a
consequence of sin. Basic to this view is the acceptance of the
organic conception of society. If this was possible as a solution
of the problem of the church, as following St. Paul it was thought
necessary to believe, then it was also applicable to man s original

THE COMMUNION OF SAINTS

existence. Marriage and family are the most primitive social
structures, undoubtedly willed by God, which were depraved in
the state of sin by concupiscence and the punishment of patriarch-
alism, and then hallowed once more by Christ. Originally, neither
the continuation of the race nor the idea of subordination, as the
constitutive powers for the family, was connected with sin. Both
are good and necessary. In particular, 'equality' is not abolished
by subordination. The heavenly hierarchies provide an example
of this. Troeltsch's idea of primal equality in the sense of
absolute likeness of being does not hold for patristic literature.38
From the idea of organic equality there came into force the
philosophical and ethical justification of private property,
derived from Lactantius, Cicero, and Aristotle.39 There were
few who maintained that poverty and wealth are the consequence
of sin (Ambrose) . Since gainful activity was regarded as natural,
and therefore good, buying and selling, and profits and risk, were
approved, there arose an explicit acknowledgment of social
action in the sense of purposive rationality. The danger of self-
seeking was again and again mentioned by the Fathers.40 But
the necessity of commercial activity was not disputed. Thus there
was made explicit a basic estimation of all honourable work as
having a proper place in the organic social structure.41

These basic ideas were taken over and systematised by St.
Thomas.42 Here too his theological system of reason and
revelation may be plainly seen. With the help of Aristotle and
the idea of organism the life of the state and of society in its
Christian form was established and recognised as having natural
right. The purpose of the state is essentially the same as in pat-
ristic thought. The spiritual superstructure is given with the
concept of the church, to which everything is referred.43 The
balance between individualism and socialism is provided by the
conception of organism. How far this can be systematically
maintained cannot be examined here. It is enough for our
purpose to see that both social and communal activity were
recognised as belonging to primary ideal natural right, and that
social life as a whole was regarded as willed by God. If, as
Thomas maintains, mankind is presented as a unity (unus homo),

THE PRIMAL STATE AND COMMUNITY

then social life is necessary.44 It is the evil will which depraves
everything and introduces self-seeking into the organic common
life.

3. Objective spirit

Without being aware of it, people speak of objective spirit in a
double sense:45 (1) in the sense in which the spiritual is objec-
tivised in contrast to unformed spirit, and (2) in the sense in
which the spiritual is social in contrast to subjective. The basis
for both is the recognition that where wills unite, a 'structure',
that is, a third thing, previously unknown, arises, independent of
its being willed or not willed by the persons joining with one
another. This general recognition of the nature of objective
spirit was a discovery of qualitative thinking, which arose in
Romanticism and Idealism. It is only here that concrete totality
arises ; it is not a question of numbers, but depends on the way
people think of it, and experience it as a phenomenon. Two
wills encountering one another form a 'structure'. A third man
joining them does not see just the two men joined together, but
rather a third thing, the structure itself, opposes his will with a
resistance which is not identical with the will of the two indi-
viduals, but can be greater than the resistance of the individuals,
or — if such an idea were possible — of the sum of all individuals.
It is this 'structure' which is objective spirit. Not only does it
confront the third man, who is seeking admittance to a society of
friendship, as something independent and autonomous, but it
also intrudes as a third thing between the two who are bound to-
gether in however primitive a structure. The persons thus experi-
ence their community as something real outside themselves,
disengaging itself from them, and rising above them.

In community the individual is faced by his own objectivised
self. His own life has flowed into the community, and stands
before him daily as experienced content and form, as a regulative
principle for his conduct.

Thus the law of human community is an intermingling of being

THE COMMUNION OF SAINTS

that is continually moved and of objectivised being. Time fixes
every past moment in objectivity, so that the present moment
and the past are in conflict. In this conflict the victory is with
onward-marching time, which makes objective spirit into the
historical and social turning-point between past and future.
In objective spirit there is the element of historical movement
forward and the expansive element. The first is the reality of its
historicity, the second the reality of its sociality. Objective spirit
is thus the bond between the sense of history and the sense of
community, between the intention of a community in time and its
intention in space. Objective spirit is the will effectively operat-
ing upon the members of the community. It has individual form.
It leads an individual life over and above the individuals of the
community, yet it is real only through them. The more the
individuals are alive, the more powerful is the objective spirit. It
interacts with each individual, and with them all together. To
withdraw from it is to withdraw from the community. It has a
will for historical advance as well as for the social realisation of
its will.

What is objectivised, however, is completely irremovable,
whether by one individual or by all together. If the individual
cuts himself off completely from the community, then he no
longer experiences the objective spirit; but he cannot do more.
It must be generally admitted that this is not all that can be set
aside, if what is objectivised has been materialised. But what
cannot be shown is that there is a difference in principle between
the objectivisation in a work of art, so far as it is not experienced
as mere matter, and unmaterialised objectivisation.

Objective spirit is found in social as well as communal forma-
tions. The more members a community has, the less specialised
their awareness of standards will be, the less the inner power,
and the greater the outward power. It is easier to immerse one-
self in the spirit of a class of school children than in that of a
friendship. The difficulty of entering into the spirit of a social
formation is independent of the number of its members. Its
objective spirit bears none of the marks of personal aliveness.
That which in a society is a means to an end (advertisement) is

THE PRIMAL STATE AMD COMMUNITY

in a community a symbol, corresponding to the difference
between them : the society has an end or goal, whereas the com-
munity is self-representational. Objective spirit in a society is
not affirmed as a value in itself, but only as means to an end : it
is an objective structure of purpose. The productivity of objec-
tive spirit is here directed to a system of means. If the society is
dissolved, this system of means is left behind as materialised
spirit, but has lost its inner meaning, since the aim is no longer
there. An 'instrument' whose purpose is no longer understood,
or no longer of interest, is dead, because the objective spirit which
sustained it, and which was simply the means to an end, dis-
appears when the end is lost sight of. A work of art, on the other
hand, which bears fulfilment and understanding within itself, in
its intention, rests in itself, because the objective spirit which
sustained it was an end in itself, and has a life over and above the
will of its members.

From all this it follows that society and community have a
different view of time. In a community the intention reaches to
the bounds of time, in a society it is bounded by time. This
eschatological character, which a community shares with
history, contains its deepest meaning, as being given 'from God to
God'. This is the basis of the 'holiness' of human life in com-
munity, whether it is a physical community of blood and race, or
a historical community like the nation, or a community of destiny
like marriage or friendship. It is in virtue of this holiness that all
such human structures are in principle indissoluble. The idea of
society, on the other hand, does not go beyond the idea of the
goal which constitutes it; it is temporal, and intra-historical.
For a society the end of history is really an end, and not just a
boundary. (The temporal intention of the mass, as we have
already seen, is directed towards the moment.) That is why
only a community, and not a society, can become a 'church'.
Of this more later.

The most profound difference between the two social forms
lies in the fact that we can attribute personal character to the
objective spirit of the community, but not to that of the society.46
It is regarded as an achievement in sociology to have discarded

THE COMMUNION OF SAINTS

such a metaphysical hypostatisation.47 It is the fear of Hegel
which prompts this view. His idea of the 'spirit of a people'
makes the individualist feel uneasy. But we cannot accept the
criticism of his idea. This is based upon the empirical idea that
there would be no objective spirit without persons, that its
existence depends upon persons coming together and parting,
the spirit being constituted by the first movement, and destroyed
by the second. The interdependence of the individual spirit lives
in the objective spirit, but 'it is the triumph of the subjective
spirit that the objective structures which it can produce out of
itself, with their own value and duration, never win completely
free of it, but must always tend back to it in order to be quite
real.'48 It should not be necessary to repeat that the genetic
dependence of objective spirit tells us nothing about its ideal
autonomy. For subjective spirit, too, as we have shown, is
dependent for becoming personal on other spirits, but is never-
theless in principle autonomous. Objective spirit lives its own
life, but not in such a way that the life of the individual is ab-
sorbed into it, as Hegel suggests, when he says, 'It is mind that
has reality, and individuals are its accidents.'49

Rather we must say 'in principle everyone can say good-bye,
and go his own way.'50 Nevertheless there is a centre of action
which is proper to the experience of community (love, sympathy,
rejoicing, etc.) and a particular way of acting in community,
alongside other individuals, in the sense of social equilibrium
and the image of the monad.

Thus we do not have here the conception of a being of the
spirit, called the spirit of a people, rising up with power from
metaphysical depths. But in the dialectical movement, in which
persons arise, there also arise individual collective persons, and
only when this is seen does the richness of the monadic image of
social life become clear. Collective persons are self-conscious
and self-active.

But it is also clear why no personal character can be ascribed
to a society. Objective spirit is regarded only as a means to an
end, whereas a person can never be only a means to an end.

Can we speak of the collective person having a body? We

THE PRIMAL STATE AMD COMMUNITY

must not confuse this with a theory of organism. This would
once again bring us close to the theory of the spirit of a people.
Body is not the equivalent of the spirit's executive function, a
definition which is certainly false. 'Body' is not an objectively
establishable entity, but one which is experienced subjectively. It
must not be confused with physical body, the 'flesh' of the
Apostles' Creed.51 Objectively, a dead and a living physical
body have the same aspect, but only the latter is 'body'. 'Body'
is given in relation to the I ; it is the physical body experienced
by the I as its possession, with which it has an inner connection,
and which it has to some extent at its disposal. In this sense the
centre of action of the community experiences all its members,
which have affirmed it. The community takes this affirmation
seriously, and in this sense has its 'body' at its disposal. In
distinction from the idea of an organism there is here the idea of
a community of will. The concept of body is important for the
concept of the church, as we shall see later.

Those who have followed the course of the argument will
certainly now raise the objection that idealism has after all carried
the day. For the community of will which has been so em-
phasised, which is built upon the structural separateness and
diversity of individuals, has now become the unity, with its own
centre of action. What are we to reply? In fact, with the
collective person a new unity does arise, which is something else
than the absolute and relative unity found in the identity of
what is intended. But this new unity does not annul the specific
reciprocal movement of community. The individual persons
remain entirely separate from one another. Metaphysically the
collective person is autonomous in face of the individual persons,
even though genetically dependent on them. In the structure of
persons its position is no different from that of any individual
person. In the strict sense unity and community are not mutually
exclusive, nor are they identical; but they require one another.

In relation to the doctrine of the primal state, we may now say
that theologically all the relationships in community which we
have discussed can be represented in the integral state, that is,
within the community of love, both social and religious, which

THE COMMUNION OF SAINTS

was originally given, and that therefore the spiritual form (this
community of love) and the natural form (the empirical com-
munity) are so created that they rest in one another. From this
it is easy to draw conclusions about the character of the empirical
community.

We have now to show how, with the coming of sin, the spiritual
form takes a new shape, and how these altered ethical relation-
ships are related to the unchanged natural forms. The idea of the
collective person can then be fully elaborated.

CHAPTER IV

Sin and the broken community

The world of sin is the world of 'Adam', the old mankind; but
the world of Adam is the world for which Christ atoned and which
he turned into a new mankind, into his church. This did not
happen, however, in such a way that Adam was completely
overcome, but in such a way that the mankind of Adam still
lives on in the mankind of Christ. Thus a discussion of the prob-
lem of sin is indispensable to an understanding of the sanctorum
communio.

Our essential task in this chapter is to reveal the new basic
social relationships, between the I and the Thou and equally
between the I and mankind, which are postulated by the con-
cept of sin. The argument will bear extensive reference to the
concept of the Christian person presented in Chapter Two.
The question of the connection of these relationships with
natural forms can be treated very much more briefly.

Whereas the previous spiritual form had grown up upon the
basis of love, the Fall changed this to selfishness. This gave rise
to the break in immediate communion with God, as it did to that
in immediate communion with man. This alteration in direction
brought about a change in man's whole spiritual attitude.
Morality and religion in their true sense are lost to his nature;
they are still visible only as forms in legal order and natural
religion.

Whereas the primal relationship of man to man is a giving one,
in the state of sin it is purely demanding. Every man exists in a
state of complete voluntary isolation; each man lives his own
life, instead of all living the same God-life. Each man now has
his own conscience. Conscience did not exist in the primal state ;
it was only after the Fall that Adam knew what good and evil

THE COMMUNION OF SAINTS

were. Conscience can just as well be the ultimate prop for self-
justification as the point at which Christ strikes home at man
through the law. Hearing the divine law in solitude and recog-
nising his own sinfulness man comes to life again as an ethical
person, though in ethical isolation. With sin ethical atomism
enters into history. This is essentially applicable to the spiritual
form. All the natural forms of community remain, but are
corrupt in their innermost core.

But man's perception of utter solitude in his responsibility
before God, of the utter particularity of his guilt, encounters
another perception, which, even though it seems to run directly
counter to the first, does not cancel it out, but rather deepens it
still further. The second perception is based upon an insight into
the qualitative nature of sin, that the misery caused by sin is
infinitely great; this means that it must have not only an
individual but also a supra-individual significance. Sin must be
imagined as a supra-individual deed, though of course as an
individual deed too ; it must be at the same time the deed of the
race and of the individual. Thus the perception that in sin one
is to the highest degree alone leads to the other perception that
one's sin is to the widest extent shared, so that of inner necessity
we are once again directed from the one to the others, without
whom the existence and nature of the one could not be under-
stood.

Two problems force themselves upon us here. How should the
universality of sin be understood from the point of view of logic
and theology? It is not enough simply to suppose it as a fact.
Secondly, how should we conceive of the empirical spreading of
sin throughout mankind ? The idea of the social significance of
sin has been developed dogmatically in the doctrine of original
sin.

A. ORIGINAL SIN

The doctrine of original sin assumes that sin is spread through-
out mankind, and inquires concerning the manner of its spread-

SIM AMD THE BROKEN COMMUNITY

ing. It then gives an account of the way mankind belongs to-
gether, is bound together, in the status corruptionis . But joined
with the account of the spread of sin there are ideas which aim
at proving its universality, and it is for this reason that the
doctrine of original sin presents some of the most difficult logical
problems of all dogmatics.

Theology has suggested various answers to the problem. We
give a brief outline of the biblical material.

Throughout the Bible there is reference to the universality of
sin (Gen. 8.2, Ps. 58.5, Ps. 14, Job 14.14, Rom. 3.24), but none
to original sin (not even Ps. 51.7 or Ex. 20.5, cf. Ezek. 18.2, 20
and Jer. 31.29). Nor does Paul make use of a doctrine of physical
original sin. The translation of Rom. 5.12 e<p'J)—in quo is
wrong: this should be rendered 'by which'. The line of thought
here is therefore 'through one man sin comes into the world,'
i.e. into the human race. When Adam sinned, he sinned as an
individual and as the race. From eternity God lays upon his sin,
as an individual sin and as a sin of the race — i.e. upon mankind
from Adam to Christ — the condemnation of death. For with the
one sin there is given the 'objectively effective principle' (Seeberg)
for all men's further sins. No man will act differently from Adam.
That is, as a result of this 'objectively effective principle' the
universality of sin is established in principle. Paul does not dis-
cuss the empirical form of this, which is the very question of
the doctrine of original sin. From Paul we receive no more than
the general thought that God imputes to all men the one sin of
Adam, and that this is derived from the universality of the con-
demnation of death. The first question, then, concerns the con-
nection in principle between the one man, Adam, and the whole
race; and the second question concerns the empirical nature
of the spread of sin — to which latter question Paul gives no
answer, a fact which has its reasons.

A brief historical survey will show how these two basic socio-
logical and ethical problems have been dealt with in the history
of theology. This will give us a starting-point for a systematic
presentation.1

We begin with Augustine. The essence of original sin is the

THE COMMUNION OF SAINTS

guilt of all mankind, introduced by Adam and continued by
physical propagation ; it is shown in the corruption of the natural
state of all men, in concupiscence, which is deserving of punish-
ment. Concupiscence is regarded as the punishment consequent
upon the primal sin. Sin must somehow be man's own act, for a
moral view presupposes that there is an identity, however
brought about, between the guilty and the punished. Thus, in
line with Rom. 5.12, it is maintained that all men were 'in
Adam'. Being 'in Adam' is a necessary but an inadequate basis
for punishment. The guilt which occurs 'in Adam' must be
'reckoned': this is the meaning of the 'imputation'; and the
punishment which is the consequence, namely, concupiscence, is
simultaneously given. But original sin and original evil go
together so closely that Augustine can describe original evil as
the reason for the reckoning of guilt : that is, he calls concupi-
scence itself a sin, and not just the punishment and the place
where further sins can arise. Original sin and original evil
continue by physical propagation. A question arises here con-
cerning Augustine's view of mankind's basic social relations.
The social and philosophical concepts which give significant
help here seems to me to be (1) original evil, (2) man's 'being in
Adam', and (3) imputatio.

When Augustine considers the whole of mankind, his first
feeling is that he belongs to a race which has been struck by a
terrible and overwhelming fate, and is distorted and corrupted
in every element of its life, in its very nature. A fearful punish-
ment has been imposed upon it. As conceivers and as conceived
the members of the race are indissolubly connected to one
another, and at the very nearest point of this connection the most
terrible fate is also to be found. For it is sexual concupiscence
which Augustine regards in this way. Its very naturalness
assures the universality of the fate. With terrific intensity of
feeling Augustine recognises the power of the natura vitiata, of
original evil. In that unbridled age he shudders before the
immense power which concupiscentia has in the world. This
power, which not even the will can command, which again and
again brings even the saints low, and leaves not a single man

SIN AND THE BROKEN COMMUNITY

untouched, must have some special religious and metaphysical
significance. Mankind lives in its endless thrall. Thoughts of this
kind are the devastating utterance of a man who ascribes to the
powers of nature a significance which is at once metaphysical
and borne by destiny. These thoughts lead logically to the con-
ception of the massa perditionis, the mass which endures a tragic
destiny, seen as a natural happening.2

But in this pessimistic, almost Manichaean view there are
also to be found the means for overcoming it. In the bodily
consciousness of every man, which is given with sexuality, he is
aware both that he possesses something quite personal, and that
he is a natural being beyond his life as a person. Augustine,
thinking the first along with the second, is able not only to relate
natural corruption to personal guilt, regarding the corruption
as the punishment for the guilt, but he actually makes con-
cupiscence the reason for the ascription of guilt: for con-
cupiscence itself is guilt.3 Concupiscence is still a power, but not
like an earthquake or a thunderstorm. It is connected with man's
bodily nature and thus with the person ; and yet again, it is quite
independent of the person. This twofold nature of Augustine's
thought is clearly expressed in the image borrowed from Rom.
5.12, that we were all 'in Adam', that is, in a purely biological
and natural sense, but at the same time this expresses the guilti-
ness of each man. The contradiction here is to our way of
thinking extreme. Augustine's strongest words for the purely
personal and spiritual reference are 'we were all that Adam'
{pecc. mer. et rem. 1, 10, 11). That is, our will is like Adam's, and
thus we ourselves have done what Adam did. The thought of
personal guilt is strongly emphasised, but at the same time the
idea of original sin seems to have disappeared. Although
Augustine constantly strove to understand personal guilt as truly
personal, he was always led astray, by the thought of infant
baptism, to false biological views of the human race. Yet we
must acknowledge that besides the concept of the mass we have
another, which we can describe as the concept of the kingdom of
ethical persons. The cleft between the two ideas is most clear in
his doctrine of the imputation of Adam's sin. Here Augustine

THE COMMUNION OF SAINTS

suggests a middle position between the two views already
described. It is joined to the first view, so far as mankind is
regarded as a biological unity, and to the second view, so far as
it tries to express the idea of personal guilt. Its problem is how
to derive personal guilt from the biological unity of mankind in
Adam. It cannot solve this problem, for it is a view which
contains inner contradictions. Adam is regarded in a twofold
way, as primal father and as representative of mankind : first as
the conceiver, and second as the one in whom the will of all
mankind reposed : as caput seminale and morale, to use terminology
from a later age. Adam's willed deed is imputed to man as his
own. So biological and ethical views of mankind struggle vainly
with one another. But for Augustine the dominant interest is in
the universality of sin rather than individual guilt : the biological
view prevails over the ethical.4

It was Luther who put all the weight on man's ethical guilt,
and overcame the biological view of the race which had been
derived from the notion of physical reproduction. In the 'willing
of the F he found the essence of original sin, that is, in a personal
ethical act. He thus maintains simultaneously that sin is both
inexcusable and universal. In orthodox teaching this view has
not been preserved.

It was Schleiermacher who saw once more the significance of
original sin as a social and philosophical problem. He brought
to the problem a new biological view. He thought it was easy to
regard sin as inherited, but in that case the concept of sin was
misleading (The Christian Faith n, para. 69). Original sin is on
the one hand the sinfulness which is present in man, but beyond
his actual life (para. 70), and on the other hand it is the guilt of
each man towards the other, and thus to be described as the total
deed and the total guilt of the human race (para. 71). Sinfulness,
in the form of sensuality, is innate in every man, and he actualises
it by free self-confirmation 'in real sins'. The first man possessed
this innate sinfulness as something original (para. 72.5). Real sin
increases the 'disposition', that is, of sinfulness, and so becomes
the 'effective original sin', which impels others, as well as itself,
to real sin (paras. 71.1, 72.6). The individual should see himself

SIN AND THE BROKEN COMMUNITY

as the subject of original sin only in actual sin. But since actual
sin necessarily happens, it is clear that every man would have
acted as Adam did, so that Adam's sin can rightly be called the
sin of every man. No one can regard sin as something individual,
but rather it arises as something communal from the self-
consciousness which is extended to the consciousness of the race.
Everyone knows his sinfulness as dependent on the guilt of others,
but he also knows that his own real sin is the basis for the sin-
fulness of others. Therefore not only has every man made
himself guilty, but everyone also lives in a total life of guilt,
which both relieves him and weighs upon him. So on the one
hand everyone is 'the representative of the whole race' (para.
71.2), and on the other hand the concept of original sin is cor-
rectly applied only when it is related to 'the entirety of the race',
in which it 'cannot likewise be the guilt of the individual' (para.
71.2). This means that the individual is relatively relieved of
the burden by the totality. It is the race which is the subject of
original sin, as at first it was the individual in his actual sin who
was regarded as the subject. Schleiermacher undoubtedly saw
correctly that the concept of sin is fulfilled in a social and col-
lective understanding. But in place of an ethical and social
category he has introduced a biological category, with a partial
metaphysical foundation. Sin is sensuality, a hindrance to the
consciousness of God, that is, something negative, and not an
ethical category. The emphasis lies on a theory of heredity
interpreted as a physical fact. Thus Schleiermacher concentrates
on establishing the inheritance of sin — the part of the problem
which is unbiblical; he loses touch with the biblical content.

Partly in opposition to Schleiermacher, partly in dependence
on him, Ritschl developed his doctrine of the kingdom of sin.
On his view the subject of original sin is mankind as the sum of all
individuals.5 The biological view, but also sin as original, dis-
appear from this teaching. Moreover, we may, as I think, find a
substitute not in Ritschl's idea of a sum of individuals, but only
in the idea of a collective person (see below) .

In the twentieth century the tendency is to set aside the
problem of how sin is inherited. The most recent justification of

THE COMMUNION OF SAINTS

a doctrine of original sin is to be found in the Roman Catholic
philosopher Scheler, with whom we shall have to deal briefly.

We take up the threads of our systematic presentation, and
must attempt to understand in ethical terms some basic socio-
logical concepts, such as the race, ascribing or imputing, and
collective person, before we attempt to understand the meaning
of the church.

The guilt of the individual and the universality of sin should be
conceived of together. The individual's guilty act and the guilt
of the race must be joined in our thinking. So far as we mean by
'race' the concept of the biological species, we weaken the ethical
seriousness of the concept of guilt. We must therefore find a
concept of the species which is suitable to Christian ethics. We
have to understand the human species in terms of the concept of
sin. Hitherto it has only seemed possible to understand what the
human species is, in terms of nature. Children, idiots, and nor-
mally developed people had all, it seemed, to be included
equally. But this necessarily led to a view of sin, of sacraments,
and of the church, that was ethically indifferent. From this it
follows that the Christian concept of guilt is incompatible with a
biological concept of the species. So the concept of guilt must not
be understood in terms of the concept of the species, but vice-
versa. In this way we reach an ethical collective concept of the
race, which is able to meet the requirements of the idea of the
race's sin. The individual is then established as the self-conscious
and self-active person, which is the presupposition for ethical
relevance. And the race is understood as consisting of such
persons.

The idea of the sin of the race and the individual must be dis-
cussed from the standpoint of the Christian concept of the race, of
mankind. How is it possible to conceive of the individual's act
of guilt and of the guilt of the race together, without making the
one the basis for the other, that is, excusing the one by the other ?
Augustine evidently thought that it was the sinful general act
which formed the basis for every individual act, and basically
Anselm and St. Thomas Aquinas do not advance beyond this
position. Ritschl's thought takes the directly opposite course,

SIN AMD THE BROKEN COMMUNITY

proceeding from the sum of individual sins to the concept of the
kingdom of sin, and thus not finding a sufficient basis for the
universality of sin. Everything clearly depends upon finding the
general act in the individual's sinful act, without making the one
the basis for the other. An ethical category must be related to the
individual as an individual person. This, however, is not to
exclude the social element, but to postulate it together with the
individual person. Man is the race precisely in being an indi-
vidual. This is the definition which is adequate to man's spirit in
relation to the basic social category. If the individual spirit
rebels against God in the sinful act and thereby rises to the utmost
height of spiritual singularity — since this is its very own deed
against God, occasioned by nothing outside it— the deed the man
concerned is doing is at once the deed of the human race (no
longer in the biological sense) in his person. In acting thus he
lapses not only from his personal destiny but also from his destiny
as a member of the race, so that with every sin it is the whole of
mankind which falls, and in principle none of us is distinct from
Adam — which also means, however, that each of us is the 'first'
sinner. This relation between the individual and the race also
corresponds to the monadic image presented in the section on
social philosophy, the image in which every single monad
'represents' the whole world. If we recognise this state of things
then the awareness of the deepest personal guilt is linked with that
of the universality of our deed. We cannot take refuge behind
carrying the guilty burden of an empirical and temporal first sin,
for this would mean falling back upon the biological concept of
the race. But we are to connect our individually general deed
with the universal guilt. And it is clear that this leads not to an
unburdening but to renewed burdening. Every act is at once an
individual act, and one in which mankind's general sin is brought
to life again. In this way we have established the universality of
sin as necessarily given along with and in individual sin.

From this recognition of the bond between the individual and
the race there emerges what has been called the experience of
common sinfulness. T am a man of unclean lips, and I dwell in
the midst of a people of unclean lips,' Isaiah cries, as, in the

THE COMMUNION OF SAINTS

utmost loneliness, he confronts the holiness of God. In speaking
thus he is not divesting himself of his personal guilt, but rather
positing it together with the awareness that in him the sin of the
whole people comes to life, and that his sin stands in the closest
connection with it. The experience of ethical solidarity and the
recognition that one is the peccator pessimus belong together. But
the experience does not in any way constitute sociality; but
sociality is present before and apart from it. It is necessary to
bear this carefully in mind (see below on 'Experiencing the
Church', 1 94ff.) . The experience of ethical solidarity is built upon
the uncompromising singularity of the person, so that even in
the awareness of the closest belonging together the ontic and
ethical separateness of individual persons on account of sin can
never cease, nor fade from the consciousness. There is no over-
leaping the limits of the I. Here we once again meet the I -Thou
relation presented above (realised in the guilty sense), the 'aboli-
tion' of which is possible only in the concept of the church. We
now add, however, to complete the picture, that it is not only the
Thou which is essential to the I, but the race too. The 'experience'
of the peccatorum communio in its relation to the basic ontic re-
lationships paves the way for the experience of the church, as we
shall later present it.

Further, the I which has become a person experiences the
bond only with other individual I's which have become persons,
and it is only to these I's that the concept of community can be
applied. All others belong only in possibility to community.
(Note how the basic outlines of the concept of the church are
already emerging.) With these considerations all empirical
objectification of the universality of sin is rejected, and we have
consciously turned aside from the Augustinian doctrine of
original sin.

The defence of the idea of original sin recently suggested by
Max Scheler is based on the proper recognition that our ethical
concepts do not keep pace with our social insights, but are one-
sidedly individualistic. Guilt, he says, is necessarily connected
with autonomous personal action, but not with concrete indi-
viduality. It is perfectly possible for a person to act guiltily

SIN AMD THE BROKEN COMMUNITY

without being individually guilty. The basis for this view is the
Platonic conception of good and evil as substantial entities, with
the consequent weakened concept of autonomy. For Christian
thinking good and evil are qualities of the will, and this destroys
Scheler's argument. I think we have shown that nevertheless we
are not driven to think in sheerly individualistic terms.

But since we are bound to accept some kind of historical spread
of sin, we must now face the question of the nature of this
empirical spread. First, we must say that basically nothing can
be known about this. Sin is on every occasion an unfathomable
and inexcusable contradiction of God, arising out of the free
will. The psychological motivation of sin can be analysed right
up to the deed, but the deed itself is something entirely new,
done in freedom, and psychologically inexplicable. All explan-
ations whether in the psychic or the mental realm are historicis-
ings, excuses, weakenings of the fact of sin. If we remember this,
then we avoid fundamental error, and can at the same time recog-
nise the relative justification of our question. At least we must
try to analyse the motivation of sin up to the actual doing of it.
We look for these motives not in sexuality, as is done in tradi-
tional teaching, but in spirituality bound up in sociality. The
original community of love, as the repose of wills in mutual
action, is destroyed when one will exchanges the movement of
love for an egocentric movement. And it is of the nature of the
situation that the one who sees everyone around him abandoning
the unbroken community and adopting an egocentric direction
should himself take the same direction, for he sees that his own
movement towards community is empty, and without response.
This begins in the smallest circle and extends ever farther, so
that one can say that the reason for general egoism is to be found
in sociality.6

Is this development identical with the shift from community to
society? Clearly not. For in practice both community and
society continue, though no longer in their purity, but in
'relativity'. There is now no community without sin, but on the
other hand a 'society' is not just a 'sinning community'. A
'contract' as such is not evil (see above). It is only evil when it

THE COMMUNION OF SAINTS

consciously exploits or destroys the other. Nor is the will to self-
preservation as such evil. Therefore sin in the community is
not the newly-added individual will to self-preservation — which
in fact makes community possible — but the sin is the will to
affirm in principle oneself and not the other as a value, and to
acknowledge the other only in relation to oneself. But it will be
objected that this is precisely the nature of a society. Not so. A
society is not built upon self-seeking, but on the instinct to self-
preservation ; and thus it is no more built upon the evil will than
a community is. By a relative life of community we mean that
the community is a necessary form of human activity in general,
and that it is not completely bound to the ethical content of the
will. Even when the will takes an evil direction there is still
community, though it is hollow. In contrast to a society the value
of the common life, without defined purposes, is acknowledged,
though the individuals in this community are fundamentally
separated and isolated from one another. But the evil will at
work in a society turns it into an institution for the systematic
exploitation of its members. It would be misguided to try to
understand the real nature of communities and societies in
terms of this state of affairs. For we see here the degeneration of
their real nature through sin. A solution of this problem can
only be found in the Christian concept of community.

B. ETHICAL COLLECTIVE PERSONS

If the subject of sin is at once the individual and the race, what
is the form of sociological unity suitable for the mankind of
Adam ? This reintroduces the question of the ethical personality
of collective persons which we previously left open and which
determines whether there is any meaning in the idea of a col-
lective person. Is it possible to regard the collective person as an
ethical person, that is, place it in the concrete situation of being
addressed by a Thou? If so, then we shall have proved that it is a
centre of action.

The meaning and reality of such a call can be comprehended

SIN AND THE BROKEN COMMUNITY

only by one who, as a part of an empirical community, has
experienced it. It is the Israelite concept of the people of God,
which arose solely through being thus challenged by God, by
the prophets, by the course of political history and by alien
peoples. The call is to the collective person, and not to the
individual. It is the people that is to do penance as the people of
God. It was the people, and not the individuals, who had sinned.
So it was also the people who must be comforted (Isa. 40.1).
When peoples are called, God's will is seen shaping history, just
as when the individual is called, he experiences his history. There
is a will of God for the people, just as there is for the individual.
When a people conscientiously submits to God's will and goes to
war, to fulfil its history, its mission in the world, thus entering
completely into the ambiguity of human sinful action, it knows
that it is summoned by God, that history is to be made ; here war
is no longer murder. God does not only have eyes for the nation ;
he has a purpose for every smallest community, for every friend-
ship, every marriage, every family. And in this same sense he has
a purpose for the church too. It is not only individual Germans
and individual Christians who are guilty; Germany and the
church are guilty too. Here the contrition and justification of
individuals is of no avail ; Germany and the church themselves
must repent and be justified. The community which is from God
to God, which bears within it an eschatological meaning — this
community stands in God's sight, and does not dissolve into the
fate of the many. It has been willed and created, and has fallen
into guilt; it must seek repentance, it must believe in and ex-
perience grace at the limits of time. It is clear that this can happen
only 'in' the individual. Only thus can the hearing of the call be
concretely comprehended, and yet it is not the individuals, but
the collective person (Gesamtheit) who, in the individuals, hears,
repents and believes. The centre of action lies in the collective
person. Thus the collective guilt of a community is something
else than guilt as a social phenomenon in the community. The
'people' is to repent, but it is not a question of the number who
repent, and in practice it will never be the whole people, the
whole church, but God can so regard it 'as if' the whole people

THE COMMUNION OF SAINTS

has repented. Tor the sake of ten I will not destroy it' (Gen.
18.32). He can see the whole people in a few individuals, just as
he saw and reconciled the whole of mankind in one man. Here
the problem of vicarious action arises, which we deal with later.
When the collective person is addressed ('He who has an ear, let
him hear what the Spirit says to the churches' — Rev. 2 and 3),
the conscience of each individual person is addressed. Each
person, however, has only one conscience, which is valid for him
both as a member of the collective person, and as an individual.
For there are not two strata in man, one social and one private;
a man is structurally a unity, and it is only the directional in-
tentions which can be in conflict in him. He must know himself
and make decisions as an inner unity, must not therefore blindly
subject himself to the concrete claims of the collective person, but
struggle through to an integrated decision of the will. Only
upon such integrated persons is the ethical community built.
Our conception of collective guilt is thus not that of a fault de-
riving from certain contents or parts of the soul ; but the con-
crete form of collective guilt is the total guilt of the integrated
person.

These insights now have to be applied to the concept of man-
kind. Mankind is the universal community comprising all
communities. The participation in its life as a community is
authenticated by the affirmation of life lived in fellowship with
others. For this always exists within the collective human person.
It too, like every person, is capable of receiving the ethical call, as
it can be heard for the whole of mankind in the story of Jesus
Christ. The collective human person has a heart. The indi-
vidual authenticates his participation in this in its ethical
aspect, that is, by every act of repentance and recognition of guilt.
The collective person's heart beats at the point where the indi-
vidual recognises himself both as an individual and as the race,
and bows to God's demand. Here is the seat of its moral unity;
it has in reality one conscience, in so far as every man is Adam.
It is a structural peculiarity of the mankind of Adam that it
breaks up into many isolated individuals, even though it is
united as mankind, which has sinned as a whole; it is 'Adam',

SIN AND THE BROKEN COMMUNITY

a collective person, which can be superseded only by the col-
lective person, 'Christ existing as the church'. The sign of be-
longing to the old mankind, to the first Adam, lies in sin, and the
individual's awareness of guilt reveals to him his connection with
all those who have sinned ; in recognising that he belongs to the
mankind of Adam, the individual places himself within the
peccatorum communio. 'The mankind of sin' is one, even though it
consists throughout of individuals ; it is a collective person and
yet subject to endless fragmentation; it is Adam, as every indi-
vidual is both himself and Adam. This duality is its nature,
annulled only by the unity of the new mankind in Christ.

CHAPTER V

Sanctorum Communio

A. BASIC PRINCIPLES

I . Conclusion of the discussion in the concept of the church : retrospect

and prospect

So far our whole theological inquiry has not only had the dis-
cussion of the sanctorum communio as its aim; but it has been pos-
sible at all, and significant, only in the light of the sanctorum
communio.1 Only through the sanctorum communio can we justify
the introduction of philosophical discussions into the framework
of theology. It is not that in the idea of the sanctorum communio all
that has been said about the peccatorum communio has no substance ;
it is rather precisely in the sanctorum communio that the significance
of the peccatorum communio first becomes immediate. It is true
that the man who has been justified, who belongs to the church of
God, has 'died to sin'; 'no one who abides in Christ sins'; 'the
old has passed away, behold, the new has come'; 'for as in
Adam all die, so also in Christ shall all be made alive' — but the
life of those who are justified, namely, the new life, is 'hid in
God', and 'I do not do what I want, but I do the very thing I
hate.' Nullum umquam extitisse pii hominis opus, quod si severo dei
judicio examinaretur, non esset damnabile.2 The reality of sin has
remained in the church of God too; so Adam, the peccatorum
communio, is really superseded by Christ only eschatologically,
namely en-' eA-tSi (in spe3) ; so long as sin persists, the whole of
sinful mankind persists in every man. Thus everything we have
so far discussed is gathered together in the idea of the church,
in which it culminates and is overcome.

Until now we have been pursuing two, or rather three, different

SANCTORUM COMMUNIO

lines of thought, which we now have to bring together in our
minds; or better, whose union, which is already present in the
reality of the church, we now have to explore. On the one hand
there was the line of thought about men being basically related
to one another by ontic personal relationships. On the other hand
there was the discovery of the human spirit's pre-volitional
sociality, and the consequent investigation of the forms of
empirical real community relationships, which always require
volitional social acts to authenticate themselves as personal
social relationships. The basic ontic-ethical relationships in the
state of sin not only form the basis for all personal social relation-
ships, but are requisite, even, for their empirical formation.
When they are changed, or re-created, in the concept of the
church, the concrete form of the community must also change ;
indeed it is this which makes the development of a special
empirical form of community possible and necessary. We
recognise certain basic forms as in accordance with creation, and
consequently the question now arises, to what extent the form of
the church enters into them, and whether in it we shall be able
to find the synthesis of them all. This, however, can be dealt
with only later.

Since even when the basic ethical relationships are changed
sin remains, which means that the old ontic relationships are not
radically annulled, every empirical formation will necessarily
be subject to the ambiguity inherent in all human actions.
What is unprecedentedly new, however, is that the new basic
relationships have their own form; that the meaning of these
relationships is that they produce such a form. In this we can
perceive a special will of God which it is not open to us to belie
by condemning everything that has taken on a form as the handi-
work of man. It is in the necessary bond between the basic
relationships and the empirical form of community as a special
form that the nature of the church, formally speaking, resides.

There are basically two ways of misunderstanding the church,
one historicising and the other religious. In the first, the church is
confused with the religious community; in the second, with the
kingdom of God. In the first, the character of reality which is

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possessed by the new fundamental relationships based on God is
overlooked in favour of the 'religious motives' which in fact lead
to empirical community (the urge to do missionary work, the
need to impart one's faith, etc.). This outlook, however, receives
its plain judgment in the words of John : 'You did not choose me,
but I chose you' (John 15.16). The second misunderstanding
springs from not taking seriously the fact that man is bound by
history; that is, historicity is either deified as an object, as in
Roman Catholicism, or it is simply evaluated as accidental,
subject to the law of sin and death. This, however, is not to
accept but to circumvent God's will, which is to reveal in the
church as he did in Christ everything which he reveals by con-
cealing it in the guise of historical events. To put it differently :
the 'seriousness' which is so much talked about is carried so far
that it loses its real character and becomes formalistic. The first
misunderstanding is almost unavoidable in the study of the
church from the historical or sociological point of view ; but it is
equally at home in the religio-romantic circles of the Youth
Movement. The second is met with in theology. Both are
dangerous, for both can be nourished by solemn and earnest
religious feeling. In neither, however, is there any grasp of the
reality of the church, which is at once a historical community
and established by God. Thus the lines of thought we have pur-
sued so far are justified and blended in the concept of the church.
Upon the new basic ontic relationships there rests a communal
being which, viewed from outside, cannot be characterised other
than as a 'religious community'. Now it is certainly possible for
us to confine ourselves to the empirical phenomenon 'church'
qua 'religious community' or religious society, to analyse it as a
'corporation subject to the law applying to public bodies' and
describe it in terms of sociological morphology. In this case all
theological discussion of the subject would be superfluous. Or
on the other hand — this is the second possibility — we can take
the church's claim to be God's church seriously, when it regards
the fact of Christ, or the 'Word', as constitutive. This means,
further, that we must look at the new basic social relationships
which are here presupposed, and which in the deepest sense make

SANCTORUM COMMUNIO

possible a social formation like the church. In this case one of our
premises will of course no longer be susceptible of further justific-
ation, namely, that we take the claim of the church seriously,
that is, not as historically comprehensible, but as having its basis
in the reality of God and his revelation. We do not want to bring
standards forjudging the church from outside; the church can
be fully understood only from within itself, from within its own
claim; only thus can we suitably acquire critical standards for
judging it.

Here, however, we apparently fall into logical inconsistencies
from the very outset. We said we were taking the church's
claim to be the church of God seriously, but in the first place,
this, of course, is not to say that we may accept this claim un-
tested. The question is only as to what criteria we should take
to test the assertion. In principle the way is indeed open for the
discovery of outside criteria, that is, for deducing the correctness
of the proposition from outside. This way does not in principle
take us farther than the category of possibility. Proceeding from
this, however, one necessarily arrives at the concept of religious
community. The concept of the church is possible only in the
sphere of reality based on God ; that is, it is not deducible. The
reality of the church is a reality of revelation, part of whose nature
it is to be either believed or denied. So if we want to find an
adequate criterion for justifying the church's claim that it is the
church of God, this is possible only if we place ourselves within it,
if we submit in faith to its claim. Belief, of course, is not a possible
method of arriving at scientific knowledge, but as the belief which
accepts the claim made in revelation, it is the given premise for
positive theological knowledge. It would be completely wrong,
too, to 'establish' from the belief in Christ the belief in the
church as a conceptual necessity. What is conceptually necessary
is not for that reason real. Rather there is no relation to Christ in
which the relation to the church is not necessarily presupposed.
Thus logically the church presupposes its basis within itself; it
can be judged only through itself, like all revelations. It pre-
supposes what is to be found. Before one can begin to talk about
the church there must be knowledge and acknowledgment of its

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reality. This is precisely what proves that it is a reality which
has been revealed not to those outside, but to the man who be-
lieves its claim. Only the man who is already in the church can
admit that these theological methods are justified; but in them
he will have abandoned the objective outside position. It is this
very thing which provides the logical stumbling-block for the
entire question of the church. People ask whether the religious
community — which is then also called the church — necessarily
has its basis in the Christian religion, or whether the attitude of
the religion itself is individualistic ; they go to much trouble to
derive the power to form communities from a concept of the
'Holy', to show by means of Christian ethics that men are
ethically dependent upon one another, to arrive at a socio-
logical category from the nature of revealed religion. But they
never seek the point of departure in the recognition of the
church of God as a reality which has been revealed, and so it is
certain from the outset that the concept of the church is something
they will never arrive at. Further, it is impossible to prove by
means of a universal concept of religion the necessity of the
concept of religious community. Two outstanding examples,
taken from the most recent Protestant and Roman Catholic
works on religious philosophy, may help to illustrate this.

Max Scheler,4 in his Wertethik, develops a system for placing
values in order of rank. The value accorded highest place is the
religious one of the 'Holy'. Now there are certain a priori laws
within this order of values, one of which can be expressed in the
proposition: 'The higher the values, the less they are divisible.'
If several persons wish to partake of a pleasure of the senses, then
the value of the sense-object, of a loaf of bread, for instance, is
divided among the number of persons. Half a loaf has half the
value of a whole loaf. But with works of art, for instance, the
situation is quite different. Works of art are in principle in-
divisible. The most pronounced contrast, however, is offered by
the value of the Holy, which 'is in principle proper to every
being', but which by its very nature does not even allow of any
material bearer. As the sense value divides the partakers, so the
function of the spiritual value is to unite, in a superlative sense.

SANCTORUM COMMUNIO

The deduction is very illuminating, but the thought behind it is
thoroughly formalistic. It is certainly true of a sense pleasure that
the pleasure can only entirely profit one man; but what does
Scheler mean by 'to unite' ? Clearly the possibility of simul-
taneously assembling several persons round one object. For he
cannot be thinking either of bringing several persons together
empirically, or of community in the strict sense, since both ideas
would clearly be wrong here. (Cf. the phenomenon of the mass
and egocentric mysticism.) The thought that by its nature the
Spiritual or the Holy presents such a possibility sooner than do
the things of the senses is correct, but devoid of content. For one
could just as well say that the value of the Unholy or Diabolical
as a spiritual value was of incomparable unifying power. Like-
wise Scheler would be unable to demonstrate any difference in
principle between the unifying effect of the Holy and that, for
instance, of the Beautiful or Good. The correctness of the deduc-
tion lies in the perception that the immaterial value has an
essential unity setting it above all material things, but that unity
only potentially guarantees a certain wider partaking of that
value. It is the applied logical proposition: 'The smaller the
content, the greater the compass of a concept.' The flaw in
Scheler's argument lies in the fact that in the idea of the Holy he
proceeds from a metaphysical concept of value which in its
absoluteness remains for ever inaccessible to us, instead of argu-
ing, as he might have done, from the historically positive revela-
tion of the Holy in Christ, the 'material bearer of the value', and
arriving from the factors determining the content of revelation
(which are not only a 'symbol') at the reality of community as
established by the Holy. It is only upon the ground of concrete
revelation that we can overcome the empty concept and poten-
tiality and arrive at the real community relationships, which are
present in virtue of the 'historical' reality of the Holy.5

This, it seems, is exactly what Heinrich Scholz6 was trying to
do. Proceeding from the idea of revelation he seeks to break
through indirectly to the concept of community. First, he says,
religion is one of the ponderables of the human spirit, and
secondly it is not a priori, but revelation, these being mutually

THE COMMUNION OF SAINTS

exclusive concepts. From this it follows that education in re-
ligion is necessary. Education in revealed religion is possible,
however, only upon the ground of a tradition, which is in turn
unthinkable without a community. We first dispute the idea that
the categories of a priori and revelation are completely opposed in
the sense in which Scholz uses the concept of revelation, namely
as synonymous with the consciousness of revelation. Further, we
must ask what educating someone in revelation is supposed to
mean. Clearly only the subject-matter of religious knowledge
can be imparted. But this does not seem to be specific education
in or for religion, and the bearer of such an education, the
community preserving the tradition, is not as such qualified as a
specifically religious community, let alone as a church. It is just
as true of science that it bears within it such 'sociological cate-
gories' ; basically Scholz does not tell us anything more than that
religion can be handed on to others (and even this he cannot
show to be something necessary in principle — one has only to
think of mysticism), and to this extent exercises certain social
effects. This, however, does not tell us anything new, nor even
anything essentially relating to religion. It is something historic-
ally self-evident.

Our problem was to decide to what extent the reality of God's
revelation in Jesus Christ also postulated the reality of the
revelation of the church. We see a decisive difference between
the community as the guardian of the Christian tradition and the
Christian church. Scholz should at least have asked why re-
ligion is handed down, whether such a phenomenon means
more with religion than with science, whether community was
inherent in the intention of his general concept of religion, or
whether it lay in the accidental inclination of men. Scheler
thought too formally ; Scholz seeks to think more concretely, but
falls into the opposite error of historicising and becoming too
empirical. He himself admits that he does not derive the concept
of community directly from the nature of religion, and is in
doubt as to whether such a derivation is at all possible. There is
in fact only one religion from which the concept of community
is essentially inseparable, and that is the Christian religion. Thus

SANCTORUM COMMUNIO

in my view the two interpretations just described do not demon-
strate the nature and necessity of religious community, let alone
the necessity of the church. This does not mean that we repudiate
the problem of the connection between religion and community
as such, which belongs to the philosophy of religion. But in
order to master it we must make more distinctions.

The general concept of religion has no social intentions. The
idea of the Holy in its general sense as a religious category is not
fulfilled in relation to society, but in the soul's solitariness with
God. The mystic too has a religion. If it is nevertheless a fact
that religion is for the most part social in character, this is pri-
marily accounted for by various psychological factors of a more
or less accidental nature (e.g. the need to communicate —
Schleiermacher, the receptive-active nature of man — Seeberg).
These factors indicate that religious community is possible, but not
that it is necessary. This leads us back from the general idea of
religion to its concrete form, which for us means the concept of
the church. Here, however, a universal necessity for the com-
munal form of the church cannot be proved. In what follows we
shall briefly discuss this. We must note, however, that this
problem can be treated not in terms of the church, but of the
philosophy of religion, which means that only the basic ideas
can be discussed

First, we must consider the general connection between
religion and community, the concept of religious community,
and secondly a typology of religious communities. Our first
thesis is that, from the standpoint of its genesis, the concept of
religion as a whole is taken from social life : if man were not a
social being he would not have any religion.

All man's spiritual life has at least a mediate basis in society,
and this holds true also for religion. The I-Thou relation of God
and man, or God and community, which is as old as religion
itself, is psychologically conceivable only in terms of social
experience.7 There is no religious content which does not have
its counterpart in the purely social process : from total dependence
to free action, from rebellion to conquest, from repentance to
reconciliation, from mistrust to the most complete trust, from

THE COMMUNION OF SAINTS

insolence to reverence (pietas) , from the greatest possible distance
from God to the utmost absorption in him— demanding and
obeying, giving and receiving, everything has its place. Every-
thing spiritual presupposes community, which means that even
the original community cannot be derived from the spirit. But
this original and archetypal connection of religion and com-
munity does not imply any social and communal intention in
religion. Certainly the communal intention is directed to God,
and without this there would be no religion. Religion must be
defined here as the touching of the human will by the divine, and
the overcoming of the former by the latter with resultant free
action.8 Religious community would then be a community
which makes itself the object of divine action, and is itself active
in communal terms. From this it is clear that in religion an
intention directed to religious community is not established in
principle, and this must be so : for the value of the Holy is not
fulfilled, like that of righteousness or love or equality, and so on,
in social terms, but also in solitary communion with God. The
mystics too had their religion. So our second finding is that in the
general concept of religion social community is not given, though
made possible — community, that is, in the twofold sense, both in
its empirical form and in its collective basis. These two concepts
of community must be strictly distinguished in what follows.

But it is a fact that religion is a social matter. It may be un-
certain whether in its first beginnings religion is a slow dawning
of 'another' in the most primitive stirrings (horror, fear, longing,
sexual desire) in the individual's soul, or whether the biological
social form of the family, the gens, is experienced as the subject
of religion. But it is certain that where we find worship of
divine or demonic beings, even in the crudest style, it is carried
on by a community, which so to speak 'keeps' this private god,
and from which it expects protection for its communal life.

And it is also certain that in the cultic life there arise very
early, alongside the acts of the individual (the paterfamilias, the
sorcerer, the priest) communal practices, in dance and song and
prayer9 (the latter being either a chaotic mass prayer or a series
of responses from the congregation). To this sphere there also

SANCTORUM COMMUMIO

must be added the sacred meals,10 the sexual orgies of the
fertility cults, and sacred prostitution, and indeed the orgy, 'the
social form of ecstasy', can be regarded as the primal form of
religious community.11 Thus with these considerations the
earliest beginnings of religion are closely bound up with social
life. On the one hand the subject of religion may be seen as
basically in the community, with the individual as a member of it,
and on the other hand the community as a whole is religiously
active.

But if, as we have shown, there is no essential connection
between religion and community, nevertheless most concrete
religious forms must have some affinity with the concept of
community in the two senses.

What is the nature of this affinity ?

We recognise four different modes of relation between religion
and community. First, a radical rejection of outward and
inward community, as is characteristic of mysticism. Second,
there are free religious communities, which are held together by
purely rational and purposive elements, by some common re-
ligious practice which is the means for attaining a specific goal.
Such communities are individualistic cultic societies, and have
the character of an association (see below) . Distinct from these,
there are, third, religious groupings based on physical com-
munities. In this category the family, the tribe, etc., are so
firmly regarded as the subject of religion that the individual
takes part in the religions of the cult only as a part of the whole ;
and here we have a definite inner collectivism. To this group
there also belong the historically conditioned religious com-
munities. The people of Israel, who are also the 'children' of
Israel, combine both types. It is true that in such communities
the collectivist basis can be destroyed, and become individualist.
Such an instance would belong to the second type. Fourthly,
there are free communities which are held together by divine
services, without which each individual would wither away
religiously, and which see the essential significance of religion as
fulfilled in the communal element.

From this analysis we may discern some motives which lead

THE COMMUNION OF SAINTS

to the formation of empirical communities. Utilitarian con-
siderations, including the pattern of needs (need for com-
munication and so on), the power of a thought or of an experience
which has a concrete communal intention, all lead to religious
groupings ; physical and historical connections are regulated and
sanctioned by religion. From this we see that the motives for
empirical grouping are various and accidental. It is impossible
to show an objective or a psychological necessity for the con-
nection between religion and community. Whether we take
Schleiermacher's idea of the individual's need to communicate,
or Seeberg's idea of the receptive-active nature of human
spirituality, we must conclude that first there is no sign of a
psychological necessity of community, and secondly a com-
munity which rested only on its members' need to communicate
is a purely individualistic association. A collectivist basis and a
corresponding motivation for empirical grouping is to be found
only in actual religions, but the general concept of religion
knows nothing of specifically social intentions. It is only when we
look at actual religions that we may see some relation with
community. Now it is not the task of the sociology of religion to
study the arising of religious communities, just as no genetic
problem is essentially sociological. The task of the sociology of
religion is rather to investigate the general structure of religious
communities. This is not our task here. We can only indicate
briefly that such an investigation would deal with the two basic
types of community, the free charismatic community character-
ised by the 'sorcerer', and the normative uncharismatic type
characterised by the priest, both being overcome by the third
type, the prophetic, with its specifically religious form of com-
munity.12

In recognising that we can understand what a community is
only from a study of the concrete religious form, we are thrown
back upon the problem of the church. It is possible to discern
certain communal intentions from a study of the actual contents
of Christian faith, as these are found in empirical groupings. But
in this way we cannot reach the concept of the church. (Schleier-
macher even thought that he could reach the concept of the

SANCTORUM COMMUNIO

church from the general concept of religion) . This can only be
done when the Christian revelation is believed, that is, taken
seriously. The Christian concept of the church is reached only
by way of the concept of revelation. But once the claim of the
church has been accepted, it is as superfluous as it is impossible
to prove its general necessity. The situation is the same as with
the Christological attempts to prove the necessity of redemption,
after its reality has been comprehended. Only by first believingly
making the meaning of redemption one's own can one clearly
see what makes this reality necessary. Only from reality can we
deduce necessity in dogmatics. This is basic to the concept of
revelation.

When works on dogmatics end by presenting the concept of
the church as necessarily following from the Protestant faith,
this simply indicates the inner connection between the reality of
the church and the whole reality of revelation. Only if the con-
cept of God is seen to be incomprehensible unless it is joined to
the concept of the church, can the latter be 'derived' from the
former, for technical reasons of presentation. It would be a good
thing, in order to establish clearly the inner logic of the structure
of dogmatics, to begin the subject, for once, not with the doctrine
of God but with the doctrine of the church.

In order that we may stand on firm ground in the positive pre-
sentation which follows, we now give a short outline of the New
Testament teaching on the church, in particular as a social
phenomenon.

2. A brief outline of the New Testament view of the church

We can only give a general outline. The New Testament has two
different concepts of the church, that of Jerusalem and that of
Paul.13 The former, the Jewish-Christian, is the basis for the
Roman Catholic view, the latter, the Gentile Christian, is the
basis for the Lutheran view. On the first view, there was in the
church 'from the beginning a proper hierarchy, a divinely
established order, a divine church law, a church as an institution,

THE COMMUNION OF SAINTS

into which the individuals were taken up. A clearly defined
group, the "apostles", that is, James and the Twelve, possessed
a lasting divine pre-eminence, unattainable by any others,
and were therefore marked out for the leadership.'14 Paul over-
came this view of the church on the basis of his understanding
of the gospel. We give a brief account of his views.
eK/<:A>/o-ia15 is the Septuagint translation for 'edhd, and in
Paul also for qdhdl, which elsewhere is translated by cruvaywy^.
The concept iKKXtjcria originally signified gathering, the
congregation of the people, and is not essentially different
from crvvctywyrj. Later, crvvaywyj) signified the individual Jewish
congregation, while eK/cA^/cna signified the religious community
as such. The Jews retained eKK\rj<rla to describe themselves. The
Christian adoption of this term was to this extent a happy usage,
that it was already to be found in Greek, though exclusively in
the sense of a political assembly. The Christian congregation,
ecclesia, is not limited by national or political boundaries, it is
universal; though still a 'people', it forms, along with heathen
and Jews, the 'third race.'16 To help the Greeks to understand
this, Paul speaks of the eKKkrjo-la. tov Oeov,11 though mostly in
order to describe the whole Christian people (I Cor. 10.32 — 15.9;
Gal. 1 . 1 3) . But Paul also uses ecclesia for the local congregation (I
Cor. 1.2, II Cor. 1.1, I Thess. 2.14, Gal. 1.2, and in the plural I
Cor. 1 6. 1, etc.). His reasons are not only linguistic, they are also
theological. The local church is the concrete form of the whole
church of God (I Cor. 1.2). But it is also itself the church of God.
It is 'the form in which the whole church appears in one place.'
The whole church is real only in the local church. By ecclesia,
therefore, Paul always thinks of what God has established on earth,
even when he speaks of the local church. The church exists18 by
the work of Christ and the work of the Holy Spirit, which have
to be distinguished. The church has been chosen by Christ from
eternity (Eph. 1.46°., II Thess. 2.13, John 15.16 in the Diates-
saron). The new mankind lives in him, it has been created by
his death (Eph. 2.15). It is the second, the new Adam (I Cor.
15.45). Thus mankind is really redeemed in him, for he gave him-
self for the church (Eph. 5.25), and the building-up of the church

SANCTORUM COMMUNIO

means exclusively the actualising of what has been accomplished
in Christ. In the church Christ is the foundation (I Cor. 3.1 1,
Rom. 15.20), the corner-stone (Eph. 2.2off. I Pet. 2.4), he is the
beginner of a new mankind (I Cor. 15.27), the first-born among
many brothers (Rom. 8.19, I Cor. 15.20, Col. 1.15, 18, Heb. 1.6,
Rev. 1.5). On the other hand, the church is the Body of Christ,
and men are members of this Body (I Cor. i2.2ff, Rom. I2.4ff.
Eph. 1.23, 4.i5f, Col. 1. 1 8) or of Christ himself (I Cor. 6.15,
Rom. 6.13, 19). There are thus two different ways in which
Christ is shown as being related to the church, but they are dog-
matically logical. There follow descriptions of Christ as the Head
of the Body, as the Head of the church (Eph. 1.22, 4.15, 5.23,
Col. 1. 1 8, 2.19). Finally, the idea of Christ as the Head leads to
the thought of marriage, where the man is the head of the
woman, and the relation of Christ to the church is described as
analogous to the Old Testament image of Jahveh and Israel as
married to one another (Eph. 5.23ff.). Christ's relation to the
church is twofold : he is the creator of its whole life, which rests
on him, the master-builder of the church, and he is also really
present at all times in his church, for the church is his body, he
rules over it as the head does over the body. The body, again, is
ruled throughout by the Holy Spirit (I Cor. 12.13, Eph. 2.18,
4.4), and here again we have to distinguish between the Spirit of
Christ and the Holy Spirit, which are not identical in their
power.19 What Christ is for the whole church, the Holy Spirit is
for the individual. The Holy Spirit impels the individual to
Christ, he brings Christ to them (Rom. 8.14, Eph. 2.22), he gives
them community (II Cor. 13.3, Phil. 2.1),20 that is, his power
extends to man's social life, and makes use of man's social bonds
and social will, whereas the Spirit of Christ is directed towards the
historical nature of human life together.

If we now look at the church not in terms of how it is built up,
but as a unified reality, then the image of the body of Christ must
dominate. What does this really mean? In the church Christ
is at work as with an instrument. He is present in it ; as the Holy
Spirit is with the individual, so Christ makes himself present in
the congregation of the saints.21 If we take the thought of the

THE COMMUNION OF SAINTS

body seriously, then it means that this 'image' identifies Christ
and the church, as Paul himself clearly does (I Cor. 12.12, 6.5);
for where my body is, there too am I.22 Thus when the church is
split, Paul can ask 'Is Christ divided?' (I Cor. 1.13). From this
conviction that Christ himself is the church there arises the idea
of an organic life in the church, in accordance with the will of
Christ, from this image of a living organism. It is clear that both
ideas conflict with the reality of sinfulness, and that there is need
of systematic work at this point. Thus Christ is really present
only in the church. The church is in him and he is in the church
(I Cor. 1.30, 3.16, II Cor. 6.16, 13.5, Col. 3.9, 2.17), and 'to be
in Christ' is the same as 'to be in the church'.23

This touches on another idea. Schmidt quite rightly places
alongside the image of the body of Christ the idea of the total
personality of the church. The church has become a person in so
far as it is in Christ (Gal. 3.28). In Col. 3. n it is even said that
Christ is 'all things' in the church, that is, once more Christ
and the church are identified (similarly Eph. 1.23).24 All the
references to 'putting on the new man' (Col. 3.10, Eph. 4.24)
belong to this range of ideas. So also 'putting on the Lord Jesus
Christ' (Rom. 13.14, Gal. 3.27), and the words about 'the new
creature' (II Cor. 5.7, Gal. 6.15), and Eph. 2.15, 4.13. Yet one
thing is still not clear — -just why the plain identification of Christ
and the ecclesia is so seldom made (I Cor. 1.13, 12.12, 6.15,
Col. 3.1 1, Rom. 13.14), and why quite often the total personality
of the church and Christ are seen as being in some kind of re-
lation and yet not as identical. Schmidt's interpretatic 1 by
means of Paul's mysticism is not satisfactory.25 The total person
of the church can only be conceived of in Christ, that is, in his
person. But Paul does not wish to make this complete identifica-
tion because Christ for him is also with God. He has gone to
heaven (Eph. 4.8ff., I Thess. 4.16, I Cor. 15.23). We await his
coming (Phil. 3.20). Paul did not raise this dogmatic problem.
Nor do Schmidt, Kattenbusch etc. discuss it.

The problem becomes more complicated when we add, as we
must, the idea oipneuma. For clearly the Holy Spirit is personally
at work in the creation of the church. He gives community (see

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above) and is also the principle of unity (I Cor. I2.4ff., especially
w. 1 1- 1 3, Eph. 4.4, though this is not very clear in Paul: for the
body as such is also a unity) . The church is the body of Christ,
but only under the gathering and uniting influence of the Holy
Spirit. So once more the identification of Christ and the church
is made difficult, and yet it has to be made, and it is made.

The social significance of Christ is decisive. He is only present
in the church, that is, where the Christian community is united
by preaching and the Lord's Supper for brotherly love. The real
presence of Christ is also decisive. The relation of this presence
to the problem of the Word and of preaching is only indicated by
Paul. The sole content of the church is in any case the revelation
of God in Christ. He is present to the church in his Word, by
which the community is constituted ever anew. The church is
the presence of Christ, as Christ is the presence of God.

The dogmatic difficulties that arise here must be discussed
later. There can be no thought of a second incarnation of Christ
(say in an individual man, see below), but rather we must think
of a revelatory form in which 'Christ exists as the church.' Only
then can we grasp that Paul can speak in the indicative: 'You
are the body of Christ' (I Cor. 3.16, 6.19, 12.2, II Cor. 6.16,
Eph. 5.30). What is meant is the actual local church, in whose
midst there lives a fornicator (I Cor. 5.6), and this is the body of
Christ. Christ is present to this visible community. It is the
basic error in pietism and in religious socialism to look on the
primitive community as 'pure'. There has in fact never been a
kingdom of God on earth, of which one could have said 'lo, here
it is' (Luke 17.21). The church is and was and remains an
ecclesia militans in history, not triumphans. The theological signific-
ance of Paul's indicative does not consist in its description of
empirical facts — even considered well-meaningly as somewhat
idealised — but in the hard contradiction of the actuality and
reality of human holiness.26 Every misunderstanding of the early
Christian idea has led from early times to a sectarian ideal of
holiness in the establishing of the kingdom of God on earth.

In the body of Christ there prevails a communal life in accord-
ance with the laws of organic life (I Cor. 1.12). The body is

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attached to the head, and the whole is held together by joints;
but the bond of the community is love (Eph. 4.16 and Col. 2.19).
The Pauline idea of organism is neither the Roman Catholic nor
the biological, nor is it the organological view of a philosophy of
the state. In all these views the actual whole is superior in value
to the individual, the individual becomes a part of a whole body
and loses his own being. Paul is speaking of the church of God,
which as such is the revelatory reality of God, and the individual
is really only a part of this, but a part as a whole, as one who
is chosen by God in the community. But the church can in
principle make no absolute claim over the individual; this
would involve the Roman Catholic view of the church. So by this
organic view Paul means on the one hand all belonging to the
body of Christ, who is the unity of all members, and on the other
hand he means the belonging to the community of God, in which
alone the individual can live. But from this there follows the
demand, or rather there follows as a matter of course, that one co-
operates in the whole. It is not the empirical church as such
which is the organism — the empirical sociological view of
organism is untenable sociologically, if it tries to be more than a
partial image, and superfluous27 if it does not try to be more —
but the community of God. The organism of the community
is the function of the Spirit of Christ, that is, it is the body of
Christ in the sense we have already described, of the body as a
collective person. We may now understand how Paul can say
that we are the body which is ruled by the head. 'Body' is always
a functional concept (see below), and on the other hand where
Christ rules human wills he is himself present. He is the 'body',
he is 'Christ existing as the church'.

From all this it follows that the sociological structure of the
church in the New Testament view involves a multitude of
persons, a community and a unity, all belonging together,
analogous to the structure of communities of will.

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B. POSITIVE PRESENTATION
LEADING TO THE BASIC PROBLEMS AND THEIR DEVELOPMENT

The church is God's new purpose for men. His will is always
directed towards actual historical man, and therefore has its
beginning in history. At some point in history it must become
visible and comprehensible. But since the primal community, in
which God speaks and the Word becomes deed and history
through men, is rent asunder, now God himself must speak and
act, and because his Word is always deed this means that he
simultaneously accomplishes a new creation of men. Thus his
will is at the same time fulfilled, that is, revealed. So just as the
church has its beginning in Christ, so it is fulfilled in him. He is
the corner-stone and foundation of the building, and the fullness
of the church is his body. He is the first-born among many
brethren, and yet all are one in him — Eph. i.$. : 'According
as he hath chosen us in him before the foundation of the world,
that we should be holy and without blame before him in love;
having predestinated us unto the adoption of children by Jesus
Christ to himself . . . (verse 1 1 ) in whom also we have obtained an
inheritance, being predestinated according to the purpose of him
who worketh all things after the counsel of his own will' (cf.
II Tim. 1.9, John 15.16 — Diatessaron). Note the use of ev
throughout;28 'not merely by him but in him are we reconciled;
hence also rightly to discern his Person and his history is the right
discernment of our reconciliation.' If we, the members of the
Christian church, are to believe that God in Christ has reconciled
us, the Christian church, with himself, then in the Mediator of
our reconciliation there must be combined not merely the love
of God that reconciles, but at the same time the humanity that is
to be reconciled, the humanity of the new Adam.29

If the church consummated in Christ is to build itself up in
time, the will of God must constantly be realised anew, no longer
acting as a general principle for all men, but in the personal
appropriation of individual men; and this appropriation is

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possible only upon the ground of God's action in Christ, and pre-
supposes both the being of mankind in the church (which is
consummated in Christ) and the bringing of the individual into
the church, that is, into the humanity of Christ, by the act of
appropriation. The refractoriness of the ideas of revelation and
time, consummation and becoming, cannot be overcome logically.
Revelation enters into time, not only apparently but in reality,
and in doing so bursts the time-form asunder. If, however,
we sought for this reason to understand revelation only as a
beginning (potentiality) and not as at the same time con-
summation (reality), we should be depriving God's revelation
of its decisive quality: the fact that his Word has become
history.

In order to carry out the temporal building of the church as his
community, God reveals himself as the Holy Spirit. The will of
God which brings individual human beings together in the
church, maintains it, and is effectual only within it, is the Holy
Spirit; and only by being personally appropriated by the Holy
Spirit, by standing in the actual church, do we experience our
election in the Church, which is based on Christ.

Thus our study falls naturally into the following parts : first, we
have to inquire into the consummated church established in
Christ through God's action, the church of God; or, as we
expressed it earlier, into the life-principle of the new basic
relationships of social existence. We have therefore to discuss the
analogy with the basic relationships established in Adam, and
their abolition. The new relationships are completely estab-
lished in Christ, not ideally but in reality. Mankind is new in
Christ, that is, new when seen in the light of eternity, but it also
becomes new in time. Thus the second part will be the study of
the action of the Holy Spirit as the will of God for the historical
actualisation of the church of Jesus Christ. Only we must take
strict note that the opposition here is not between actualisation
by the Holy Spirit and the potentiality in Christ, but between
the actualisation by the Holy Spirit and the reality in the
revelation in Christ. That is the basis for the whole understand-
ing of the problem of the church. The 'possibility' that the church

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will not be made actual by the Holy Spirit simply no longer
exists. But it is the church which is completely established in
Christ as a reality which is necessarily made actual. It is a great
temptation to apply here the category of potentiality in Christ.
But this category destroys the character of redemption as real;
the reconciliation and justification of the world is, with regard
to revelation, really based on Christ — for the faith which,
admittedly, is possible only within the actualised church. The
church is not first made real by assuming empirical form, when
the Holy Spirit does his work; but the reality of the church of
the Holy Spirit is one which is founded on revelation, and it is a
matter merely of believing in that revealed reality in its empirical
form. As Christ and the new mankind now necessarily belong
together, so the Holy Spirit too is to be seen as effectual only
within this mankind. This makes evident the misunderstanding
which consists in regarding the objective action of the Spirit as
independent of the church. The Holy Spirit is solely in the church
and the church is solely in the Spirit. Ubi enim ecclesia ibi et
Spiritus; et ubi Spiritus Dei, illic ecclesia et omnis gratia.30 And yet
Troeltsch thought it necessary to maintain that in the Protestant
conception of the church it was not a question of the congre-
gation, but solely of the Word, that is, of the objective action of
the Holy Spirit; that where the Word is, there the church is,
even in the complete absence of hearers. This is a complete mis-
understanding of the Protestant tenet of the significance of the
Word, of which we have yet to speak.

It will then, thirdly, be necessary to determine the relation
between the Holy Spirit ruling over the church and the human
spirit of the community which the action of the Holy Spirit
brings about. This raises the problem of the empirical church.
In this connection the difference between the Idealist and the
Christian concept of objective spirit will become plain.

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I. The church established in and through Christ — its realisation

The reality of sin, we found, places the individual in the utmost
loneliness, in a state of radical separation from God and man. It
places him in the isolated position of one who confesses that he
committed the 'first' sin, that in him the whole of mankind fell.
But at the same time it brings him both objectively and subject-
ively into the closest bond with the rest of mankind, precisely
through the guilt involved, which, while it cannot, it is true, take
on empirical form as a bond of guilt, is nevertheless experienced
in every concrete bond. Now since in the individual act of guilt it
is precisely the humanity of man which is affirmed, mankind
itself must be regarded as a community. As such it is at the same
time a collective person, which, however, has the same nature as
each of its members. In Christ this tension between being isolated
and being bound to others is really abolished. The thread be-
tween God and man which the first Adam severed is joined
anew by God, by his revealing his love in Christ. He no longer
demands and summons, approaching mankind purely as Thou;
but gives himself as an I, opening his heart. The church is
grounded in the revelation of the heart of God. But as, when the
primal communion with God was rent asunder, human commu-
nity was rent too, so likewise when God restores the communion
of mankind with himself, the community of men with each other
is also re-established, in accordance with our proposition about
the essential connection between man's communion with God
and with his fellow-man.

In Christ mankind is really drawn into communion with God,
just as in Adam mankind fell. And yet in the one Adam there are
many Adams; but there is only one Christ. For Adam is 'man',
but Christ is the Lord of his new mankind. Thus each man
becomes guilty through his own strength and guilt, because he
himself is Adam ; but each man is reconciled without his own
strength and merit, because he himself is not Christ. Whereas the
old mankind consists of countless isolated units of Adams which

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are conceived as a unified entity only through each individual,
the new mankind is completely drawn together into the one
single historical point, into Jesus Christ, and only in him is it
comprehended as a whole; for in him as the foundation and
body of the building of his church the work of God is accom-
plished and consummated. And in this work Christ has a function
which sheds clear light on the difference in principle between
Adam and Christ; his function is vicarious (this we shall discuss
more fully later). Adam's action is not deliberately vicarious
but is on the contrary extremely egocentric. The fact that its
effect looks very similar to that of a deliberately vicarious
action must not deceive us as to its completely different basis
from that of the action of Christ. With the old mankind it is as if
mankind falls anew each time one man incurs guilt, whereas in
Christ mankind is placed — and this is the very essence of real
vicarious action — once and for all in communion with God.

As history begins with death, which is the wages of sin (Rom.
6.23), so life lived in love breaks the continuity of history, not
empirically but in reality. Death can indeed still fully separate
past and future for our eyes, but it cannot any longer separate
them for the life lived in the love of Christ. That is why the
principle of vicarious action can become fundamental for the
church of God in and through Christ. Not 'solidarity',31 which
is never possible between Christ and man, but vicarious action, is
the life-principle of the new mankind. I know, certainly, that I
am in a state of solidarity with the other man's guilt, but my
dealings with him take place on the basis of the life-principle of
vicarious action.

Since now Christ bears within him the new life-principle of his
church, he is at the same time established as the Lord of the
church, that is, his relation to it is that with a 'community' and
that of a 'ruler'.

But because the whole of the new mankind is really established
in Jesus Christ, he represents the whole history of mankind in his
historical life. His history is qualified by the fact that in it the
mankind of Adam is transformed into the mankind of Christ, by
the fact that, as Jesus Christ's human body became the resur-

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rection-body, so the corpus Adae became the corpus Christi. Each
equally leads through death and resurrection; the human body,
the corpus Adae, must be broken, so that the resurrection-body, the
corpus Christi, might be created. The history of Jesus Christ is,
however, closed to us without his Word. Only if we take both
together shall we be able to read mankind's past and future in
that history.

Jesus Christ places his life under the law (Gal. 4.4), he sets
himself within God's community of Israel. The clearest evidence
for this is his baptism (Matt. 3.15). What was God's community
of Israel ? It was the people which God had chosen as a collective
person; it was constituted by God's law. For Israel God's law
is the right hearing of the call. The law and the call belong
together. The fulfilment of the law is the obedient realisation of
the call. Because the people is called as a collective person,
the fulfilment of the law is the fulfilment of God's call to be a
people of God, his holy community. That is why communion
is intended in the idea of the call as it is in that of the law. To
play off the call against the law is to distort the meaning of the
law, and thus not to fulfil it. This shatters the community, which
is constituted by the genuine correlation of call and law. When
a man dominates the law, it becomes a claim of each individual
upon the God who calls him. But then the law reveals its living
quality by becoming, for the man who thus misuses it, a wrathful
power, showing him the incurable rift in the community, and
completely isolating him. That is in brief the history of the
community of Israel.

Christ, in setting himself within this community, does not
declare himself to be at one with it, but vicariously fulfils the law
for all men through love, thereby overcoming the Jewish con-
ception of the law. Whereas until then it was only the wilful
transgressor of the law who was excluded from the community,
Jesus now declares that essentially the whole community has
fallen away from God; hence, far from being itself God's com-
munity, it is part of the mankind of Adam, and must be reconciled
with God, that is, remoulded into a new community. Whereas
until then each man had been isolated in the community in his

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relation to the law, now the person of Christ is to bring together
all individuals in himself and stand vicariously for them before
God. The transformation of mankind into a new community is
possible only if men are aware of the deficiency of the old. To
create this awareness Jesus calls to repentance ; that is, he reveals
God's ultimate claim and, in so doing, makes man's past and
present subject to the reality of this claim. Man, when he recog-
nises his guilt, feels his solitariness before God; he begins to
perceive the state in which objectively he has long been living,
his state of isolation. Thus the old community of God, which
-had its standard and constitutive strength in the law, is broken.
The law does not establish communion, but loneliness — by
reason, of course, of man's guilt, for the law is holy and good,
and was intended to be the standard and form of life of a holy
people of God. The law can be spiritually fulfilled only through
the Spirit, that is, in an integral will to obey God in complete
love. Once man recognises that he lacks the strength for this,
the way is prepared for Jesus's gift, for the message of love and of
God's reign in his Kingdom. Thus from the utmost isolation
concrete community arises ; for in the preaching of the love of
God we hear of the communion which God has entered into
with each and every man who in his utter loneliness knows that
he is separated from God and his fellow-man, and who believes
this message. It was not fitting, however, that Jesus should
create the church of God anew during his lifetime. His love had
to become complete by his fulfilling the law, that is, the claim of
God and man, unto death. The revealed fellowship of love had
to be shattered once again by the free act of him who had
founded it, though this was not done before Jesus, at the last
hour, had encircled it with a close bond. This took place at the
Last Supper. Jesus says: 'As I break this bread, so to-morrow
my body will be broken, and as you all eat and are filled from the
one loaf, so too you will all be saved and brought together in me
alone.' The Lord of the church gives his disciples communion
with him, and thus with one another. This has been regarded as
the scene representing the founding of the church (Kattenbusch),
and with some reason. Jesus has now openly expressed his will

THE COMMUNION OF SAINTS

to found the church; but dogmatically the moment of the
formation of the church is to be sought in another event.

The service of the law leads Jesus to the cross, leads him into
the most profound loneliness which the curse of the law brings
upon man. When he is taken captive all the disciples forsake him,
and upon the cross he is quite alone. The community seems to be
shattered. This has its theological significance, and is not simply
to be dismissed as the result of the disciples' weakness or dis-
loyalty. It is a happening with an objective meaning; things
had to fall out thus — so that 'all might be fulfilled', one should
like to add. In Jesus's death upon the cross God's judgment and
wrath go forth upon the whole selfishness of mankind, which had
misinterpreted the law. This misinterpretation has brought God's
Son to the cross. At this the burden assumes immeasurable
proportions, and each individual is Adam, is himself wholly
guilty; here each man stands alone before God: here all hope
is gone, for the community existed only so long as men knew
Jesus to be living. Jesus himself, however, in going to the cross,
in surrendering to the law and taking upon himself the curse of
the law for us, had apparently admitted that the world was right.
The old 'community of God' seemed to have triumphed. That
was why Jesus died in loneliness, because he was made to be sin
for us, accursed through the law for us; and that was why the
disciples, for whom the present was without a future, were also
doomed to loneliness.32 For us, to whom Easter forms part of the
past with all the rest, Jesus's death is conceivable only in the light
of the triumph of love over the law, the triumph of life over death.
The death of Jesus as something absolutely present is no longer
given us, so that for us there has arisen the paradoxical reality of a
church of the cross containing within, it the contradiction of
utmost loneliness and closest fellowship. And this is the specifically
Christian community. But it is only through the Easter message
that there is a church of the cross: in Christ's resurrection his
death is revealed as the death of death, and thereby the limit
upon history imposed by death is removed, the human body
has become the resurrection-body, the mankind of Adam the
church of Christ. The church as an empirical church could

SANCTORUM COMMUNIO

indeed be created only by the Holy Spirit. In the resurrection
it is 'created' only so far as it has now run the course of its
dialectical history. It has been made real, but not actual. In
the resurrection the heart of God has pierced through guilt and
death and has truly conquered his new mankind, subjected man
to his lordship.

It is true, the empirical community could not yet be the church
made actual, for Christ had not yet ascended. The time be-
tween the resurrection and the ascension and the time after
Pentecost are different in that in the first case the church lived in
Christ as its Lord and life-principle, whereas in the second
Christ lives in the church. Previously the church 'represented'
Christ, but now it has him as revelation, as Spirit. Thus the day
of the founding of the church made actual remains Pentecost;
as human community first became such when it became spiritual
community of will, and as the human spirit is operative only in
sociality, so the church originates with the pouring out of the
Holy Spirit, and so too the Holy Spirit is the Spirit of the church
of Christ. But where the Spirit is operative only in the church,
this church cannot be derived simply from individual spirits.
Hence for systematic sociology the problem of the church cannot
consist in the question of the empirical gathering of its members
and their psychological motivation, but only in showing in
connection with the idea of spirit the essential structure of the
social formation, in its acts of will and in its objective shape, in
accordance with our earlier definition of sociology.

The relation of Christ to the church can now be stated as fol-
lows: essentially Jesus Christ was no more a founder of the
Christian religious community than he was the founder of a
religion. The credit for both these things belongs to the primitive
church, that is, to the apostles. That is why the question whether
Christ founded a church is so ambiguous. He brought, established
and proclaimed the reality of the new mankind. The circle of
disciples about him was not a church ; but they simply sketched
out the church's inner dialectic. This was not a new religion
seeking adherents, which is a picture drawn by a later time. But
God established the reality of the church, of mankind pardoned

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in Jesus Christ. Not religion, but revelation, not a religious
community, but the church: that is what the reality of Jesus
Christ means. And yet there is a necessary connection between
revelation and religion, as there is between religious com-
munity and the church. Nowadays that connection is often
overlooked, and yet it is only because it exists that Paul can call
Jesus the foundation, the corner-stone of the building of the
church. As a pioneer and model Jesus is also the founder of a
religious community, though not of the Christian church (for
this only came into existence after Pentecost — Matt. 16.18 and
the Lord's Supper give expression to this fact). And then after
the resurrection Christ restores the shattered fellowship, in the
case of Peter by appearing to him, as presumably the first to whom
this happened (I Cor. 15.5), and perhaps expressly entrusting
him with his new office (John 2i.i5f), and then in the case of the
Twelve by appearing in their midst (I Cor. 15.5; John 20.19).
Thus Christ is the sole foundation upon which the edifice of the
church rests, the reality from which the historical 'collective
life' arose. Thus the relation of Jesus Christ to the Christian
church is to be understood in a dual sense. 1. The church is
consummated in him and time is annulled. 2. Within time the church
is to be built up on him as the foundation. He is the church's historical
principle. The vertical direction, time, belongs, as it were, to
him.33 These statements correspond to a truth long since known
from the New Testament concerning the presence and the coming
of the kingdom of God, but they are not identical with it, for the
church is not identical with the kingdom of God, any more than
the iustus peccator is actually perfected, although he is essentially
perfected. The kingdom of God is a purely eschatological
concept, which from the point of view of God is present every
moment in the church, but for us remains an object of hope,
whereas the church is an object of faith here and now. The
church is identical with the kingdom of Christ, but the kingdom
of Christ is the kingdom of God which has been realised in
history since the coming of Christ.34

Upon what principle, then, does Christ's efficacy in relation
to the new basic social conditions rest? The crucified and risen

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Christ is recognised by the church as God's incarnate love for
men, as his will for the renewing of the covenant, for the setting
up of the divine lordship, and thus for community. Two things
still oppose this: time and the will for evil. The second is self-
evident. The first signifies that what has happened has happened.
That is the burden of time, a burden we have had to bear so long
as there have been death and guilt. If man is to have com-
munion with God then both must somehow be removed. Man's
sins must be forgiven, and what has happened must by God's
decree be judged as not having happened. Now man's guilt can-
not be regarded by the God of truth 'as if' it did not exist; it must
truly be made 'unhappened', that is, eradicated. This cannot
come about by a reversal of time, but by divine punishment and
the recreation of the will for good. God does not 'overlook' sin;
otherwise it would mean that he was not taking man's personal
being seriously in its very guilt, in which case there could not be
any recreation of the person, or of community. But God takes
man's guilt seriously, and for that reason only the punishment
and overcoming of the sin can avail. Both must be accomplished
at a point in time, and they happen in a way valid for all time in
Jesus Christ. He takes the punishment upon himself, obtains
forgiveness for our sins and, to use Seeberg's expression, goes
surety for man's renewal.35 Thus Christ's vicarious action can
be understood from the situation itself. In him concrete action
within time and its being 'for all time' really coincide. There is
vicarious action for guilt and punishment. Here the one demands
the other, for 'punishment' does not mean to take the con-
sequences of sin upon oneself, but to judge these consequences
to be a 'punishment' for sin. The idea that the Passion of Jesus
was in the nature of a punishment has frequently been disputed.
Luther laid all possible stress upon this. It is conceivable that
someone might take the consequences of sin upon himself even
in the moral life of society. The unique quality of the Christian
idea of acting vicariously is that this action is strictly vicarious
with regard to guilt and punishment. Jesus, being himself
innocent, takes the others' guilt and punishment upon himself,
and as he dies as a criminal, he is accursed, for he bears the sins

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of the world and is punished for them ; but on the felon's cross,
vicarious love triumphs; obedience to God triumphs over guilt,
and thereby guilt is in fact punished and overcome. Such,
briefly, is our way of seeing Christ's vicarious action. It contains
deep problems of social philosophy.

Can this Christian view of vicarious action with regard to guilt
be upheld morally? The moral person clearly wishes to be
responsible before God for his own good and evil actions. How
can he lay his guilt upon another, and himself go free? Certainly
the doctrine of vicarious atonement embraces a wider sphere
than that of man's moral conduct, but man ought to let his guilt
be taken from him, for he cannot carry it alone ; he ought not to
reject this gift of God. It is God's love which makes the gift, and
only for this love's sake man ought to abandon his standpoint of
moral self-responsibility, which — and this shows the necessity
for vicarious action — counts for nothing in God's sight. Thus
the idea of vicarious atonement is possible only so long as it rests
upon an offer from God, that is, it is in force only in Christ and
his church. It is not a moral possibility or standard, but solely
the reality of the divine love for the church ; it is not a moral
but a theological concept.36 Through the Christian principle of
vicarious action the new mankind is brought and held together.
In it the material particularity of the basic Christian relation-
ships consists. To what extent this principle not only brings
together the new mankind and Christ, but also links men with
each other in fellowship, is something that will be discussed later.
Thus much, however, is certain, that human community is
established where communion with God is real.

Thus the Church is established in and through Christ in the
three basic sociological relationships already known to us: his
death isolates the individuals, each bears his own guilt, each has
his own conscience ; in the light of the resurrection the church
of the cross is vindicated and sanctified as one in Christ. The new
mankind is focused together in one point, in Jesus Christ ; and as
the love of God through Christ's vicarious action restores com-
munion between God and man, so the human community too
once again becomes a living reality in love.

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2. The Holy Spirit and the church of Jesus Christ — the actualisation of
the essential church

The church is established in reality in and through Christ — not
in such a way that we can think of the church without Christ
himself, but he himself 'is' the church. He does not represent it,
for only what is not present can be represented. But in God's
eyes the church is present in Christ. Christ did not make the
church possible, but he realised it for eternity. If this is so, Christ
must be accorded central significance in the temporal actualisa-
tion of the church. This place is given him through the Word,
impelled by the Spirit, of the crucified and risen Lord of the
church. The Spirit is capable of operating only through this
Word. If there were an unmediated operation of the Spirit then
the idea of the church would be individualistic, and thus be dis-
solved at its very source. In the Word, however, the most pro-
found social relationships are established from the outset. The
Word is socially determined not only in its origin, but equally in
its aim. The linking of the Spirit with the Word expresses that
the Word is intended for a plurality of hearers, and a visible sign
is set up, by which the actualisation is to be brought about.

The Word, however, is qualified by being the Word of Christ
himself, brought by the Spirit to the hearts of the hearers as an
active force. Christ himself is in the Word; the Christ in whom
the church is consummated seeks through his Spirit to win man's
heart, in order to fit it into the actualised church of Christ. But
in the Word of Christ the actualised church is also present, just
as every Word of Christ comes from the church and exists only in
it. If anyone should ask how the actualised church could be
present at the time of the first preaching of the Word of Christ,
before the individuals who were moved by that Word joined
together to form a church, he would be forgetting the ideas we
previously presented : that the Spirit is solely the Spirit of the
church, of the community, and that there were thus no indi-
viduals moved by the Spirit before there was a community.

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Communion with God exists only through Christ, but Christ is
present only in his church, hence there is communion with God
only in the church. This fact destroys every individualistic
conception of the church. The individual and the church are
related in the following way: the Holy Spirit operates solely in
the church as the communion of saints; thus each man who is
apprehended by the Spirit must already be a part of that com-
munion. No one, on the other hand, whom the Spirit has not
yet apprehended can be in the communion; whence it follows
that the Spirit, by the same act whereby he moves the elect, who
are called into the communion established by Christ, brings them
into the actual church. Entry into the church forms the basis for
faith, just as faith forms the basis for entry.37

The church does not come into being through people coming
together (genetic sociology) . But it is in being through the Spirit
which is effective in the community. So it cannot be derived
from individual wills. The individual will can at most express
that the individual concerned belongs to the church. Thus the
individual is possible only as a member of the church, and his
membership of the church is not only a historical preparation
for the higher individual life; but it is only in the church that
personal life is possible. A man who is not in the church does not
live in communion with Christ ; but a man who is in Christ is in
both the perfected and the actualised church. A man, however,
is in Christ through the Word proclaimed by the church. Thus
in the Word which comes to the individual both the perfected
communion of saints and the communion of saints developing
itself in time are equally present. For Christ and the Holy Spirit
are active in the Word, and both are inseparably connected ; the
Holy Spirit has no other content than the fact of Christ. Christ
is the measure and the goal of the Spirit's operation, and to this
extent Christ himself also participates in the actual building of
the church in time, though only in the action of the Holy Spirit.

The Word is active in three different ways; the Holy Spirit,
that is, acts in a three-fold way upon his church, analogous to the
three basic sociological relationships which we found were in
force in the church established in Christ: as multiplicity of

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spirits, as community of spirit and as spiritual unity. These
three forms are thus analogous also to the basic sociological data
which we saw formed the essential structure of every community.
Both analogies are of the greatest importance.

a. Multiplicity of spirits

The Holy Spirit of the church is directed as personal will towards
personal wills. It approaches each person in that person's singul-
arity, and leads him into 'loneliness'. The Holy Spirit makes the
members of his community lonely not only by what he claims,
but also by what he gives. Each one believes and experiences his
justification and sanctification in loneliness, each one prays in
loneliness, and each struggles through in loneliness to the cer-
tainty of his eternal election; each one 'possesses' the Holy
Spirit, and in him also Christ, completely by himself. This
loneliness, however, is none of faith's doing,38 but is willed by
God.39 It is the individual's loneliness, which remains every-
where preserved, inherent in man's structure as a creature.

The recognition of the person's structural singularity as a
creature and his ethical singularity finds expression in that idea
of the church which takes as its point of departure the deepest
individual Christian perception; namely, the predestinarian
idea. From outside, the consequences of this idea seem to be the
dissolving of the church into a plurality of single predestined
persons. Scheler40 is quite right in saying that from this view-
point the primal 'way to God' is that of the inmost person's inter-
course with him. This idea seems to contain a permanent
dissolvent of the idea of the church, for clearly the individual
person perceives himself as something ultimate in God's sight;
all community seems to be shattered into its individual com-
ponent parts, and it is solely to these that God's will seems to bear
any relation.

Viewed logically, the concept of the numerus praedestinatorum
can define the range of this individualistic dissolution of the
concept of the church. But it has no content (it is the counter-

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part of our concept of mankind expressed by means of the concept
of sin). On the other hand it is in fact impossible to define the
church's range in any other way,41 whence it follows that
nothing essential about the concept of the church can be ex-
pressed by a definition with an individualistic starting-point.42
The problem takes a completely different turn, however, if the
idea of predestination is understood not from the human view-
point, but as a way from God to man. Here too no doubt all the
attention is directed towards the individual, but in so far as it is
the Word about Christ which realises the predestination in man,
the individual is intended and elected only as a member of the
church. In this sense the idea of predestination is the necessary
basis for any concept of the church; God sees the church of
Christ and the individual in one act; thus he really sees the
individual, and his election really extends to him. For this
reason recent dogmatics recognises the concept of predestination
as a necessary basis for the concept of the church,43 and it was in
fact already taken up by Luther.44 Hence the predestination
concept is only a part of the whole concept of the church, and is
Christian and meaningful only in connection with this whole.
It needs to be supplemented, and the supplement springs just as
much from the action of the Holy Spirit as does the predestinarian
concept itself.

b. Community of spirit

In the Word the Holy Spirit brings the love of God which has
been revealed in Christ's crucifixion and resurrection to the
hearts of men. He places them within the divine community.
The church is based, however, on Christ himself. If Christ comes
'into' man through the Holy Spirit, then the church comes
'into' him too. But the Holy Spirit moves man in such a way that
in putting Christ into his heart he (the Spirit) creates faith and
love. The faith in Christ which the Spirit effects, however,
involves faith in the church in which he reigns; but love, as the
love or heart of Christ in man, is given to man as a new heart, as

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the will for good. Faith recognises and receives God's lordship;
love makes the kingdom of God actual. Thus it is a question of
love making concrete not the metaphysical but the moral social
relationship, which we saw could be perceived in the sinful state
only as a broken relationship, but one which could be shown
actually to exist in the fact of moral personality and sin, having
its basis, as a dogmatic testament, in the doctrine of the primal
state. In every human socialisation there is an actualising of the
metaphysical social relationships. What is peculiar to the actual-
ising effect of the Holy Spirit is that it links both basic relation-
ships. In every previous formation of a social unit the basic
moral relationships remained broken. Here, by their renewal
and actualisation, a concrete form of community is established.
The man living in the fellowship of the I-Thou relation is given
the certainty that he is loved, and through his faith in Christ
receives the strength to be able to love in return, in that he, who in
Christ is already in the church, is led into the church. He no
longer sees the other members of the church essentially as a
claim, but as a gift, as a revelation of his love, that is, of God's
love, and of his heart, that is, of God's heart, so that the Thou is
to the I no longer law but gospel, and hence an object of love.
The fact that my claim is fulfilled for me by the other I who
loves me — -which means, in fact, by Christ — humbles me, frees
me from the bonds of my I and lets me love the other — once
again, indeed, in virtue of faith in Christ — lets me give and reveal
myself entirely to him.

This makes it certain that new social relationships have been
created, and that the rift of sin has been closed, but both things
have come about through the revelation of the divine heart in
Christ, through God's putting his heart, will and Spirit into man
in order to realise his purpose for the formation of the church.
Now we must try to grasp how 'love' can bear within itself this
social significance, and what is evidently expressed in the Chris-
tian idea of agape. This will clarify the Christian concept of
community, as it is given both in the relation of men with God,
and in that of men among themselves.

It is remarkable how this decisive concept of Christian love45

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gives rise to a great diversity of views and a consequent divergence
about this concept of community. It will be well to hold fast
to the New Testament, otherwise we shall scarcely avoid the
greatest danger, that namely of arguing from the humanitarian
standpoint, with its fatal confusion of eros and agape.

We have two infallible points of reference for what the New
Testament calls love: the first, defined positively, is the love of
God revealed in Christ, the second, defined negatively, is our love
of ourselves. Thus our point of departure must not be our love
for God or for men. Nor do the dangers of war, the sacrificial
death of our brethren or personal experiences of love shown to us,
tell us what love essentially is. Instead we know it solely from the
love of God which reveals itself in the cross of Christ, in our
justification and in the founding of the church, and from our
egoistic attitude towards ourselves. The former shows us love's
foundation, its depth and meaning, but the latter shows us the
hardness with which that love turns against ourselves. The moral
command to love is not specifically Christian, but the reality of
love is nevertheless present only in Christ and his church; thus
the Christian concept of love must have a special meaning. And
this supposition proves to be true.

i. Christian love is not a human possibility. It is nothing to do
with the humanitarian idea or feelings of liking, with eroticism or
sympathy.

2. It is possible only through faith in Christ and through the work
of the Holy Spirit. It has its basis in obedience to the Word of
Christ who, in ministering to our needs, demands that we should
make absolutely no claim upon God and our neighbour. But it
is only possible for us to be without any claim, to surrender our
own will in face of the divine will, if we have faith in Christ; if
we are far from him, all our love is self-love. Only through faith
in Christ do we understand our love as the love of God which has
been put into our hearts by the Holy Spirit, only thus do we see
our will as subdued by God and obedient to his will for our
neighbour.

3. Love, as an act of the will, is purposive. It is not mere baseless
inclination, but, bearing within it the strength imparted by the

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complete absence of any claim, it is just as much a matter of
rational reflection as of the empathy possible to human beings.
The aim of love is exclusively determined by what God's will is
for the other man. This will seeks to subject the other to his lord-
ship. The means for accomplishing this are infinitely varied,
and cannot be formulated as a set of principles. Each man is
left, or rather it is his duty, to perceive them for himself. But it is
the whole man who must give himself, with all his strength, to be
a means for reaching this aim. This makes it seem as if we are
caught up in general definitions of aim which can never be the
conscious motive of active love. The good Samaritan does not
help the man 'fallen among thieves' in order to realise through
him the aim of subjection to God's lordship. He helps him because
he sees that he is in distress. He positively helps his neighbour
through love for him. Thus it is not true to say of Christian love
that it loves, 'in everything it does, as it were the dormant or
dawning possibility, that the others will become members of its
own (the Christian) community, but does not love the reality of
the Thou.'46 But the reverse is true.

4. Christian love loves the real neighbour, not because of any
pleasure it might take in his individuality, but because as a man
he invokes the other man, that is, because he acts as a Thou and
makes the other experience God's claim in this Thou. The other
does not, however, love God in his 'neighbour', but loves the
concrete Thou; he loves him by placing his own self, his entire
will, at his service. In the earlier discussion of the basic moral
relationships there was only the perception of the barrier, that is,
the claim of our neighbour; love supplies the strength which
makes possible the real fulfilment of this claim through the
Spirit, that is, the 'overcoming' of the claim. Then does this love,
which makes us love only our neighbour, have no definite aim ?
Does it arise simply from the moment? It does both. God
wants from the man who loves him real love for his neighbour.47
This love, however, is nothing else but the realisation of the aim
of establishing God's lordship over men. Not that men through
their active love can bring about God's lordship — this 'glance
aside' would merely sap the power of the deed — but that God

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uses the obedience exercised in our love of our neighbour to
carry out his will. This, however, implies that.

5. Christian love knows no limits. It seeks the realisation of God's
lordship absolutely everywhere. Its limits are only where God
himself has set them. Man is forbidden to love where he knows
that God has condemned. 'Even if I could make the whole
world blessed in one day, if this was not God's will, I should not
do it' (Luther). The hard saying in I John, 5.16 goes further than
this, seeking to warn us against praying for someone God might
have condemned. It sees human weakness and divine severity
clashing and calls out a warning of danger. But man does not
know where God condemns, and the command that we should
love our neighbour, that is, obey, is given without any reservation
so that his love is boundless.48 Love of one's neighbour is man's
will for God's will for the other man; God's will for the other
man is characterised for us by the command that we should un-
reservedly surrender our own will to our neighbour, and thus
neither love him in God's place, nor love God in him, but set the
other in our own self's place and love him instead of ourselves;
'homo diligit se ipsum perverse et solum quae perversitas non potest
dirigi nisi loco suo ponat proximum.,i9 This attitude, however,
cannot be wrung from man, but is 'poured out by the Holy
Spirit into our hearts'. It is a part of the intentional nature of
love as will directed towards the other man in his concrete being,
that it should seek to form community, that is, to kindle love in
return. The entire Christological school which followed Abelard
built unconsciously upon this insight. In recent times Scheler50
has examined it in its various aspects and presented it in clarified
form. While love certainly does not aim at receiving love in
return, it nevertheless lies in love's intention to seek reciprocation.
We must distinguish between spiritual communion, which is of
necessity entered into between the one loving and the one loved
(irrespective of the latter's attitude of mind) in order to make
God's will work upon him — a communion both of understanding
and expression — and the communion based on mutual love which
love deliberately seeks. Most misunderstandings on the subject
can be explained as the result of a confusion between the two,

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as for instance in Schleiermacher's definition that 'love is the
tendency to unite with others and to want to be in others.'51 This
definition still carries a vestige of egoism. The fact that love
brings about a community based on love does not make this
definition any more correct.52

Does all that we have said also hold good under the reality of
God's love in Christ? God loves men; as this is so we would
expect him to place himself at man's service as a means. But
since his will is an end in itself, this gives rise to a seeming
contradiction. The meaning of the fact of Christ is, however, in
very fact 'that God organises his rule to be a means for achieving
his own ends.'53 It is in Christ that God loves men and makes a
gift of his heart, and because he makes a gift of himself to sinful
man he renews him at the same time, and thus makes the new
community possible and real. This means that God's love wants
community. Once again there is the threat of contradiction : we
said in speaking of love of our neighbour that love surrenders
itself completely, without any self-will. But surrender to the
other man means obedience to God; in other words, it is based
upon surrender to God's will. Hence God's love is both surrender
and will for community. The question of the nature of God's
communion with men, based on love, and of communion based
on love in general, is linked with the problem of the Word.
Man has communion with God only in the Word of Christ. But
all conscious communion is communion of will. It is based upon
the separateness of persons. Hence communion is never 'being
at one', nor is it a final 'being One' in the sense of a mystical
fusion ; it is real only when the will is constantly creating it anew.
It can be affirmed as an end in itself, or it can be organised solely
for the achieving of an end. Communion based on love is based
upon each person's complete surrender for his fellows. The
fact that man can surrender himself completely to God consti-
tutes God's complete surrender to man. God has a purpose for
man ; thus man can have a purpose for God : communion is an
end in itself. God wants his way with man, and this is the only
reason why he wants communion; and man wants God's will
as the end of communion, so that it is even possible for man, in

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order that he might satisfy this will, not to will communion with
God any more, that is, to will his damnation, if God so wills :
communion is not an end in itself. But it is precisely in man's
so willing that his communion with God becomes unshakeably
firm, and the deepest reason for this is simply that God wills
communion for its own sake, but this is the same as to say, for
his sake. His will seeks communion, and the human will, sur-
rendering itself completely, enters into communion precisely
because it is God's surrender that makes this human surrender
possible.

Now the new man who is drawn into communion with God is
hidden not only from the world, but even from himself.54 Man
enters into communion with God only through faith, that is,
through the Word. He does not 'behold' his 'new man' in the
will for good, but believes his will is good, because God says so,
that is, because Christ has fulfilled for him what he himself
would never have been able to fulfil; such is the Protestant
position, as opposed to the Roman Catholic view of the signa
praesentis gratice. The reality of the 'experience' of justification
and sanctification, that is, the reality of man's being presented
with a new will, is not disputed. The safeguarding of this reality,
however, lies exclusively in the 'objective' event through the
Word and the faith brought about by God. Thus we arrive at
the result, important in principle, that there is communion with
God for us only in faith, that it is not experienced like any
spiritual communion based on friendship or shared experience.
We believe that, through Christ, God has entered into a com-
munion of love with man. And this faith is simply that the
true faith brought about by God is present — that is why it
cannot be an experiential proof that man has communion with
God.55

From this, however, there follows the equally important further
conclusion that my communion of love with my neighbour can
subsist only in faith in God, God who in Christ fulfilled the law
for me and loved his neighbour, and who draws me into the
church, that is, into Christ's love and into fellowship with my
neighbour. Only this faith allows me to understand what I do

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to the other man as love, and bids me believe in our communion
as the Christian communion of love.

We must now ask whether the church in which God's love is at
work is really 'communion'. It was the great conception of
Augustine to represent the communion of saints, the core of the
church, as the communion of loving beings who, stirred by God's
Spirit, pour out love and grace. It is not the organised church
and the ministry which give forgiveness of sins, but the com-
munion of saints.56 He who has received the sacraments must
first be drawn into this spiritual stream of life; all that was
promised to the church is promised to the communion of saints ;
it is the communion of saints that has the power of the keys, that
can forgive sins; it alone endows all the undertakings of the
official church with God's spirit. This provides the pattern for
all thinking about the sanctorum communio. The Christian com-
munion of love means that men should surrender themselves
completely to each other, in obedience to God's will. This
communion is possible only through the work of the Holy Spirit.
When several persons wish to surrender themselves completely,
the constitutive element in the concept of communion, namely,
the affirmation of communion as an end in itself, is also present ;
and yet communion is not consciously intended; rather, the
surrender of the I is an act willing the Thou, but this very act
proves and establishes the new I in accordance with God's will.
Thus it is precisely in several persons' complete surrender to
each other that their new person becomes real and there arises a
'community of new persons'. Love finds communion without
seeking it, or rather precisely because it does not seek it. Whoever
loses his life will preserve it. Only thus does the surrender of the
individual person to God's will for his neighbour really lead to
the communion of saints, for whose realisation each man serves as
God's instrument. Hence the Christian community of love shows
a sociologically unique structure ; in the mutual love of the saints
'communion' is in fact established as an end in itself. There is
nevertheless a repetition here of the difficulty arising from the
idea that communion is after all not an end in itself in so far as its
sole aim is that God's will should be realised. But as it is precisely

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this communion of saints that the divine will purposes, the
difficulty is resolved; the position therefore is not that this com-
munion has a further aim outside itself — which, sociologically,
would be possible — but that communion (in the broader sense)
is in fact organised exclusively towards a specific end, namely,
the achievement of God's will. But, as the community itself
represents this realisation it is an end in itself.57 This makes it a
completely new structure sociologically.58 In order to under-
stand this fully we must note further that the communion of
saints knows that it is organised on the basis of authority. It is
communion only by virtue of the rule of the divine will within it.
The paradoxical nature of this relationship of authority between
God and man in revelation has its basis in the fact that God rules
by serving; this is postulated in the concept of God's love. He
commands, and, in commanding, he himself — and this dis-
tinguishes the relationship of authority from that of power, with
its idea of the incomprehensible paradox of the divine revelation
— puts the will to obey and the understanding of what is com-
manded into our hearts, he establishes, that is to say, man's
communion with God and with his fellow-men. God's will to
rule is his will to love his church. The ideas of God's lordship
and kingdom are thus intimately connected, but are nevertheless
to be distinguished logically and materially, and, as we can now
add, sociologically. And if we speak here of 'communion' —
as we have a perfect right to do — let it be said at once that later
this idea of communion will have to yield to an even deeper
understanding of the term (see p. 180).

We must now ask what the concrete acts are of the communion
of saints acting as a community of love. The question shows that
we are not concerned with the function of the church in general,
with preaching, the sacraments, etc. — we shall speak of these in
another connection — but solely with the social acts constituting
the community of love, which tell us in more detail about the
structure and nature of the Christian church.

Two groups of ideas summarise these acts :

I. the God-appointed structural 'togetherness' (Aliteinander)
of the church and each of its members ;

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2. the fact that the members act for one another (Fureinander) ,
and the principle of vicarious action.

In fact, of course, it is only through each that the other is
possible; each has its basis in the other.

The structure of the church is such that where one of its mem-
bers is, it is there too, in its strength, in the strength, that is, of
Christ and the Holy Spirit. It is conceived of as one life, in such
a way that none of its members could be imagined as separated
from it. But within the church each member is constrained by
the Holy Spirit; again, it is within the church that he has his
God-appointed place, and his will, moved by the Spirit. The
man whose life is lived in love is Christ in respect of his neighbour
— but, of course, always only in this respect. 'We are God
through the love that makes us do good to our neighbour.'59 Such
a man can and should act like Christ. He should bear his
neighbour's burdens and sufferings. 'You must take other men's
want and infirmities to heart as if they were your own, and offer
your means as if they were theirs, just as Christ does for you in
the sacrament.'60 Luther calls this 'being transformed into one
another through love.'61 Without in any way linking this with
any mystical ideas about the vanishing of the frontiers between
the concrete I and Thou,62 Luther is simply saying that now I no
longer want anything but the Thou, and the one loving me does
not want anything else but me; and that there is a reversal — as
it were, a transformation — of the attitudes imposed by sin. In
this event I am bound to reach the point where the want,
infirmities and sins of my neighbour afflict me as if they were my
own, just as Christ was afflicted by our sins.63 'Behold, as you
bear them all, so you are borne by them in turn, and all things
are a good or an evil shared.'64 'Bear ye one another's burdens'
(Gal. 6.2). What makes this state of being 'with one another'
possible is not something willed by men; it is given only in the
communion of saints, in a sense which is higher than men's
profane state of being with one another; it belongs to the
sociological structure of the church. In the Tesseradecas65 Luther
has given us his thoughts upon this in terms of incomparable
beauty. My burden is borne by the others, their strength is my

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strength ; when I falter and fail the faith of the church comes to
my aid. And even when I come to die, I should be assured that
not I, or at least not I alone, am dying, but that Christ and the
communion of saints are suffering and dying with me. We go the
way of suffering and death accompanied by the entire church.66
'If I should die, I am not alone in death; if I suffer they suffer
with me' — Christ, that is — 'with all the holy angels and the blessed
in heaven, and godly men on earth.'67 Let us set against this the
famous words of Luther's sermon to the people of Wittenberg :
'We are each one of us summoned to death, and no man will die
for another, but each wrestle with death on his own account, in
his own person. We are fond of exhorting others, but at the
moment of death each man must be prepared for his own self;
I shall not then be with you, nor you with me.'68 Might one of
these assertions be nothing more than a daring hyperbole? We
must try to understand how Luther wants to apply here the idea
of the communion of saints. He is not trying to express the
platitudinous and doubtful wisdom that a sorrow shared is a
sorrow halved, a joy shared a joy doubled. He is seeking rather
to establish the communion of saints as the basis and strength for
all individual Christian life, in that God's will is related to the
communion of saints, whereas it is related to the individual only
if he is in this communion. The individual in death and suffer-
ing does in fact face God single and alone; his faith and prayer
are achieved in this separateness and loneliness. The whole
weight and seriousness of his relation with God is not taken from
his shoulders. Yet in spite of all that, he still remains in the
communion of saints, and no matter what strain or stress of life he
may be in, it is with him. For where he is it is too if he belongs to
it, since where it is he is also. It is thus that Luther can say that
the communion of saints dies69 and suffers 'with' him. He is not
necessarily thinking that even one member of it knows that
another member is suffering and dying, living in temptation and
desire : but even without this knowledge, by virtue of its being the
communion of saints, it is entirely present where even one of its
members is. Of course Luther is also thinking of conscious active
sharing of suffering, joy, guilt, affliction even unto death, and

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this empirical life of the communion of saints must be practised.70
This, however, is only a consequence of its being ; it does not
first constitute it. Now where the communion of saints is, Christ
is, and it is only with this foundation that all Luther's statements
become possible. 'I am the head, I seek first to be the one who
gives himself for you, I seek to share your suffering and mis-
fortune and bear it for you, so that you too will in turn do like-
wise, for me and among yourselves, and let all those things be
done in me and shared by me.'71 That is the meaning of the
sacrament of the Holy Body. The church could not bear any-
thing if it were not itself borne by Christ ; thus it is only in view
of Christ's meritum that Luther finds it possible to speak of the
merita of others, of those who help me. But just as Christ is always
there when distress and death cause men to stand in loneliness
before God, so too the church is always there. It is true that the
loneliness imposed upon the individual by God is not removed;
he is created as an individual, and he must live his own life and
die his own death as an individual, as a person. But the loneliness
of the basic moral relationship is overcome, in faith if not in sight,
and the sinner's lonely state is also overcome; it is thus that the
church is there. But where it is, there is also God's will and aim,
and thus his communion with man is there also. Even if the
individual does not feel anything of this, it is nevertheless really
so,72 so he should believe it, and as truly as he is a member of the
church he will believe it.

In this state, established by Christ, of being 'with one another',
which is shared by the church and its member, the being 'for one
another' is also given. This active 'being for one another' can be
defined from two standpoints : Christ is the measure and standard
for our conduct (John 13.15, 34f. ; I John 3.10), and our conduct
is that of a member of the body of Christ, that is, of one equipped
with the strength of Christ's love, in which each man can and
will become Christ for his fellow-man (I Cor. 12.12; Rom.
i2-4ff. ; Eph. 4.4, I2ff. ; Col. 3.15). Just as no man can live
without the church, and each owes his life to it and now belongs
to it, so his merits too are no longer his own, but belong to the
church too. It is solely because the church lives as it were one

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life in Christ that the Christian can say that other men's chastity
helps him in the temptations of his desires, that other men's
fasting benefits him, and that his neighbour's prayers are offered
for him. But with this are we now drawing suspiciously near the
Roman Catholic doctrine of the thesaurus, which is accorded a
central place in the whole recent Roman Catholic view of the
sanctorum communio? Indeed we are, and we are approaching it
quite consciously, as we are seeking, together with Luther, to
make sure of preserving, in Protestant dogmatics, the sound core
which is in danger of being lost. The decisive difference lies in
the fact that we do not recognise any overflowing deserts in one
man, which might then be used for another. The 'treasury of
merit' can be nothing else but God's love which founded the
church in Christ. The Roman Catholic doctrine of the thesaurus
is a rationalisation, moralisation and humanisation of the
irrational fact that man can never do more than he ought, and
that God nevertheless lets each man 'enjoy'73 the other in the
church, which in turn is to be accounted for by the fact that
Christ died for the church so that its members might lead one
life, with one another and for one another.

Our being for one another now has to be actualised through
the act of love. Three great possibilities for acting positively for
one another are disclosed in the communion of saints: re-
nunciatory, active work for our neighbour, prayers of inter-
cession, and lastly the mutual granting of forgiveness of sins in
God's name. With all of them it is a question of abandoning
oneself 'for' one's neighbour, for his good, but with the readiness
to do and bear everything in his stead, indeed if need be to sacri-
fice oneself for him, to act vicariously for him. Even if purely
vicarious action is seldom actualised, the intention to achieve
it is contained in every genuine act of love.

If a man devotes himself to renunciatory work for his neigh-
bour then he clearly gives up any claim to happiness. We are
required to intercede vicariously for the other man in everyday
matters, required to give up any claim to goods or honour, even
to the whole of life itself. Man is meant to be active in the
church with all the strength he owes to it. The 'strong' man

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does not have his qualities for himself, so that he can tell himself
that they raise him out of the church, but 'for the common good'
(I Cor. 12.7). Every gift of a material, spiritual or religious kind
fulfils its purpose only in the church. Love demands that we
should sacrifice our own interest. But this may include sacrificing
even communion with God itself. Here is manifested the love
which of its own free will is ready to incur God's wrath for its
brothers' sake, which even desires God's wrath if by this means
they will be enabled to have communion with him, which takes
its brothers' place as Christ took our place for us. The two great
examples of this are Ex. 32.32 and Rom. 9. iff. Moses wishes to
be blotted out of the book of life with his people,74 and Paul wishes
that he himself were accursed and cut off from Christ, not in
order to be condemned with his brethren, but to win communion
with God for them; he wishes to be condemned in their stead.
This is a paradox of love for God which it is difficult to resolve :
Paul loves his people, but loves God above all else. Moses'
conduct was heroic; he wanted to be accepted or rejected by
God with his people ; such a wish we can still rationally compre-
hend. Paul, however, wants to win, for the people whom he
loves, communion with God, which he loves above all things,
and curses himself away from communion with God and away
from his people, taking upon himself his brethren's condemnation,
precisely because he really loves both communion with God and
his people, that is, because he is obedient to the command that he
should surrender himself completely to his neighbour. But for
this very reason in wishing to be banished from God he remains
in the closest union with him. At the point where the most
terrible conflict with God seems to rage, the deepest peace is
established. Thus we should not see in this a moment of weak-
ness on Paul's part, a statement which is 'religiously and morally
impossible';75 instead of being disobedience it is on the contrary
a deed of the most profound obedience. This very deed, however,
gives us a clear proof that love ultimately seeks not communion,
but the 'other'; and also that the less it seeks communion the
more surely it will find it.

Fundamentally this describes the kind of abyss into which the

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individual can be drawn by his prayer of intercession. The
problem of the social structure consists in the question of how we
must conceive of the relationship between those who are praying
for one another, and here the universal basis must be sought in
the fact that the church leads one life, and that the individual has
communion with God only if he takes part in this life; that he
does not face God alone but is in the communion of saints,
where even the prayer which is most his own no longer belongs to
him, but to the church that made him and through which he
lives. 'No man is saved alone; he who is saved is saved in the
church, as its member in unity with the other members. Does
anyone believe? — he is in the community of faith. Does anyone
love ? — he is in the community of love. Does anyone pray ? —
he is in the community of prayer. Do not ask: "What prayer can
benefit the living or the dead, since my prayer is not even suffi-
cient for myself?" Since in any event you do not understand how
to pray, what is the purpose of your praying for yourself? The
spirit of love prays in you. ... If you are a member of the
church your prayer is necessary for all its members. . . . But the
blood of the church is the prayer of intercession for one another.'76
Every intercession potentially draws the one for whom it is
intended into the church; the ancient intercession 'for all men'77
necessarily does this too. If there is no possibility of making the
other man a member of the church, the intercession has no
object; it is ungodly. Its limit, like the limit of love of one's
neighbour, is that of God's love. The doubt as to whether
intercession is meaningful vanishes before such considerations
as Khomiakov presents, but it must be admitted that these
considerations do not explain the miracle of the church. It is
a mistaken individualism to rely only upon one's own prayer, as
if God could not just as seriously consider an intercessory prayer
as he does every other prayer; our thinking thus indicates that
we conceive of prayer merely as a good work of the individual
and lack understanding of the idea that in Christ the church
leads one life. God's will is sovereign over prayer too, so prayer
remains a 'waiting for God to draw near' (Nietzsche). The
extent to which a man doubts the value of intercession is the

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extent to which he is still self-righteous. And yet it matters who
prays; in the positive form of intercession there is a positive
meaning. Intercession should be seen from two aspects; as a
human deed and as the divine will. In the first the fact that the
members of the church belong together is made manifest. A
third person is drawn into my solitary relation with God, or
rather, I move in intercession into the other man's place, when
my prayer remains my own, but nevertheless springs from his
distress and his need; I really enter into the other man, into his
guilt and his distress ; I am afflicted by his sins and his infirmity.
It is not that I must by my gift of empathy feel his grief with him
or after him. If we had to do this there would be no intercession
for all mankind; then I could not pray for a man living com-
pletely shut off from the world. We must rid ourselves here of all
psychological thinking. The sins of the unknown sailor, for whom
intercession is made in the corporate prayer of the church, afflict
me just as much as those of my closest friend; for the basis for the
affliction is the recognition of our own responsibility for the
world's guilt, or, what is the same thing, of our own guilt in the
death of Christ. If this guilt is recognised, man can act upon men
as a Christian in praying for them. In his intercession he can
become a Christ for his neighbour. Thus in intercession a man
does not receive the cold comfort that others are in the same state
as himself, but, if God so wills and he himself accepts, his guilt
is forgiven him and his sins are taken away (James 5.15^ ;
John 5.i6f.). His guilt, however, is borne by the church —
Christ. The words of the Psalm, 'Truly no man can ransom his
brother, or give to God the price of his life, for the ransom of their
life is costly and can never suffice,' are only conditionally correct.78
Intercession, like every other form of prayer, cannot compel
God, but if he himself gives the final sanction then a man can
ransom his brother, by virtue of the church. This finally dis-
poses of man's moral self-assurance in face of his fellow-man.
As a Christian he cannot boast of his aloneness with God ; his
strength comes to him from the church, and he will never know
how much his own prayer did and what the fervent intercession
of people unknown to him contributed for him. He knows that

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he owes unending thanks not only to God but to the church
which prayed, and is still praying, for him. If his moral self-
assurance in face of God is first broken by Christ's vicarious
love upon the cross, it dies completely when he considers the
nature of intercession, that is, by the church.

If we now consider intercession from God's standpoint, it is
seen to be the individual's organisation of himself to realise God's
will for the other man, so that he may serve the realisation of
God's rule in the church. Here is where the meaning and
strength of the corporate prayer of the church resides, as Luther
speaks of it in the sermon on good works.79 In this corporate
prayer God possesses his strongest means for organising the whole
church towards his purpose. The church recognises itself in
prayer as an instrument of his will and organises itself accordingly
in active obedience. This provides the church with its chief
impulse;80 the devil fears a roof of thatch beneath which the
church is at prayer more than he does a splendid church in
which many masses are celebrated.81 Thus it is of decisive
significance for the church that it should give to corporate
prayer its proper, central place. The church that leads one life
must also have and practise one prayer. In this prayer it takes
upon itself the burden of the many individuals who already or still
belong to it, and bears it to God. In the church each man bears
the other's burden, and it is in knowing that intercession is a
means supplied by God for the realisation of his aim that we can
recognise and practise it with meaning. In intercession, too, we
confirm the nature of Christian love as making us act 'with',
'for' and finally 'in place of our neighbour, thereby drawing
him deeper and deeper into the church. Thus when a man is
interceding for another in Jesus's name the whole church is pray-
ing with him, but praying as 'Christ existing as the church'.
We thus modify Hegel's conception.

This has brought us already to the final problem, the one giving
us the deepest insight into the miracle of the church. This miracle
is that one man, by the prerogative of his priesthood, can forgive
another his sins. It was Augustine who recognised that this could
come about only in the communion of saints. The promise of

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John 20.23 refers solely to this communion, for it is only in the
communion of saints that the Spirit is to be found. No one can
forgive sins but he who takes them upon himself, bears them and
cancels them; thus Christ alone can do it. But this means that
the church, as the sanctorum communio, can forgive sins. The
individual can do it only if he is a member of the church, and as a
member he should do it. He relieves the other's conscience of its
guilt and lays it upon himself, but this he can do only by laying it
in turn upon Christ. His action is thus possible only in the
church. This does not mean that his action must be confined to a
member of the church, but that it is possible only because the
church exists. Luther revived Augustine's idea that the sanctorum
communio bears its members' guilt. But later in the same sentence
he says that it is Christ who bears it.82 'Thus in this sacrament
(Holy Communion) is given us God's immeasurable grace and
mercy, as we divest ourselves of all grief and temptation and lay
it upon the church, and especially upon Christ ... all my mis-
fortune is now shared by Christ and the saints.'83 The church is
thus able to bear the guilt that none of its members can. It can
bear more guilt than all its members together. This being so it
must be a spiritual reality extending beyond the sum of all
individuals. Not the sum of all the individuals, but the church
as a totality is in Christ, is the 'Body of Christ', is 'Christ existing
as the church'. It bears the guilt in experiencing forgiveness
through the Word and seeing its guilt cancelled upon the cross.
It lives in very fact solely by the Word ; but since it lives from it,
it has the Spirit ; it is the bearer of the Word, its custodian and
instrument. It has authority so far as it believes in the authority
of the Word; it can take the individual's sin upon itself if it is
built upon the Word of the cross and knows itself to be reconciled
and justified by the cross of Jesus. It has itself died and risen
with Christ and is now the nova creatura8i in Christ. It is not only
a means to an end but at the same time an end in itself; it is the
presence of Christ himself, and that is why 'being in Christ'
and 'being in the church' are one and the same thing, why the
individual's guilt, when it is laid upon the church, is borne by
Christ himself.

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The new basic social relationships can now be briefly sum-
marised. The basic moral relationships which were disrupted in
the corpus peccati (Bernard) are renewed by the Holy Spirit. The
community is constituted by the complete self-forgetfulness of
love. The relationship between I and Thou is no longer essen-
tially a demanding but a giving one. Each reveals his heart to
the other, as a heart subdued by the will of God, even though in
actual fact the former moral and social basic relationships
between the I and Thou remain so long as conscience, law and
the wrath of God exist, so long, that is, as we walk by faith and not
by sight. The Christian comes into being and exists only in
Christ's church. He is dependent upon it, that is, upon the other
man. Each man sustains the other in active love, intercession
and forgiveness of sins through complete vicarious action, which
is possible only in the church of Christ, resting as it does in its
entirety upon the principle of vicarious action, that is, upon the
love of God. But all are sustained by the church, which consists
in this action for one another of its members. The church and its
members are structurally together, and act vicariously for each
other, in the strength of the church. This constitutes the specific
sociological character of community based on love. In all this
the singularity and solitariness of each member are not abolished;
he must constantly struggle on his own responsibility to pray and
to achieve an attitude wholly determined by obedience. His
guilt is either entirely his own or not his own at all; he cannot
foist part of it on his neighbour. Either he still bears it, or he has
laid it upon the church and that means that it is now borne by
'Christ existing as the church'. So we are led to the problem of
the 'unity' of the church in which multiplicity and community of
persons acquires its comprehensive meaning. The concept of the
church as numerus praedestinatorum and as sanctorum communio — in
the sense of community, which sociologically still needs more
precise definition — has still to be made complete.

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c. The spiritual unity of the church — the collective person

The spiritual unity of the church is a primal synthesis willed by
God. It is not a relationship that has to be established, but one
that is already posited (iustitia passiva) , and remains invisible. It
is not made possible by concord, similarity or affinity between
souls, nor should it be confused with unity of mood. Instead it is
real just where seemingly the most intractable outward opposi-
tions prevail, where each man leads his quite individual life, and
it is perhaps absent where it seems to prevail most. It can shine
more brightly in the conflict between wills than in concord.
When two people come into collision the result may very well be
that they will be reminded of him who is One above them both,
and in whom they are both one. It was where Jew and Greek
came into conflict as a result of the completely different nature of
their psychological structure, sensibility and outlook that unity
was established by the divine will; 'There is neither Jew nor
Greek, there is neither slave nor free, there is neither male nor
female; for you are all one in Christ Jesus' (Gal. 3.28). He has
created in himself one new man in place of two, so making peace
(Eph. 2.15). But this peace is still a peace that passes all under-
standing. For the oppositions remain; they even become more
acute. For in the community everyone is made to tune his
individual perception to the highest pitch, to be completely in
earnest about it. This is in accordance with the basic socio-
logical laws of social vitality, but — to put it paradoxically — the
greater the dissimilarity brought to light by the conflict the
greater is the objective unity. The decisive passages in the New
Testament do not say: one theology and one rite, one opinion
upon all things both public and private, and one mode of conduct
in life.85 But they say: one body and one Spirit, one Lord, one
faith, one baptism, one God and Father of us all (Eph. 4.46°. ;
I Cor. 12.13; Rom. 12.5); varieties of gifts for all of us, but the
same spirit, varieties of service, but the same Lord, varieties of
working but the same God (I Cor. 12.4). It is not a question of

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'oneness in the spirit', but of the 'unity of the spirit', as Luther
puts it in his exposition of Eph. 4.3 ;86 that is, the objective
principle establishes the unity in sovereign fashion, unites the
multiplicity of persons into one collective person, without
abolishing individual persons and communion of persons.
Rather, spiritual unity, community of spirit and multiplicity of
spirits necessarily and factually belong together. This we have
already shown in our discussion of the basic ideas of social
philosophy.

The reason why Idealist philosophy did not realise this lies
deep within its system ; once again we note the basic lack of a
concrete concept of the person.87

The picture is everywhere the same. The spirit is the one, is
everlastingly identical, supra-personal and immanent in man.
It destroys the concrete person and thus makes any concept of
concrete community impossible, sacrificing this to the unity of
immanent spirit. The Idealists have fallen victim to the perils of
'imagining, by means of a short-circuit, that community is
unity'.88 We acknowledge their unanimous emphasis upon the
idea of 'community', their perception that individual life is real
only within the life of a group. But we mean by 'group life' and
'real' something very different. For us, both are moral categories,
whereas for the Idealists they are partly biological, partly meta-
physical in nature.

The unity of the Christian church is not based upon the one-
ness of human spirits, but upon the unity of the divine spirit, and
the two are not identical. In our discussion of the sociological
type of community we showed that its ultimate unity was its
being as a collective person. This knowledge must be applied to
the Christian religious community, as well as to the concept of the
church ; in the first case the course of the presentation would be
from below upwards, whereas with the concept of the church it
runs from above downwards. The personal unity of the church is
'Christ existing as the church'. Paul could even say that Christ
himself is the church.

A man is in Christ if he is in the church.89 The unity of the
church as a structure is established 'before' any knowing or

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willing on the part of its members; it is not an ideal, but a reality.
It is a reality as truly as the church is the church of Christ and as
truly as the Body of Christ never attains to perfect representation
in history. In Christ all are one ; there are no more distinctions ;
there is not even any more multiplicity. All men are one, 'one
cake', as Luther puts it.90 It is only all men together who can
possess Christ entirely, and yet each man possesses him entirely
too. This unity arises from the fact that Christ 'is the One beyond
every other' (Barth). It must be believed, and it will always be
invisible. This unity does not exist because the members in the
body have the same intentions ; but they have the same intentions
only as members of Christ's body, if indeed they have any in-
tentions at all ; for they remain members even if they sin (cf. the
indicative sense of I Cor. 6.15). And yet there is no divine will
for men that is not realised in men, at least in its first beginnings ;
thus the objective unity subsisting in Christ is realised in the
persons, and it is only in being thus realised that it is objective
unity.

In Eph. 4.5 together with the 'one Lord' the 'one faith' is
mentioned — the faith in which the Lord declares himself and in
which he is present. The unity of faith is a unity 'without which
no oneness, be it of the State, of time, person, work or any other
thing whatsoever, makes a Christendom'.91 Seen from below, it
is the very constituent of the church's unity, and this leads to
some important consequences about the necessity for a creed in
the worship of the congregation. The Christian congregation can
only assemble as a unity before God, and give practical proof by
its faith of the spiritual unity of Christ's church — 'Christ existing
as the church' — which is established by God and beyond our
sight. If it is the will of God that there is one Spirit, one Lord,
one God, constituting the church (constitutio — cives, see pp. i84f.),
then the creed is the congregation's affirmation of this constitu-
tion. Indeed, seen purely from without, it is this constitution
itself in which the religious 'community' focuses its objective
knowledge of its own foundation, meaning and purpose, and
by which it is held together. It is another question altogether,
which we shall not discuss, whether the Apostles' Creed does

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justice to this element of confession in the Christian congre-
gation.

It is as the church standing in the unity of the Spirit, living
from the one life, that it offers the great corporate prayer and
bows to the prayer which, according to ancient tradition (Luke
i i.i iff.), Christ gave his church, the Lord's Prayer.92 It is one
of the serious signs of our times that we must constantly feel how
little the congregation understands that during divine service it is
praying as a church. We must make every effort to see that our
congregations learn to pray again. The prayer of the congre-
gation, as Luther never wearied of saying, is one of the main
sources of its strength, concentration and unification. We are
accustomed to call the Christian church a community of faith.
Sociologically at least this is a shortened form of speech. The
Christian community rests solely upon the fact of faith, that is,
upon the acceptance of the divine Spirit. But in its concrete
determination as a 'community' it is not a community of faith,
but one of love and of the Spirit. Faith is not identical with
communion, any more than God's rule is identical with his king-
dom. Faith is the acceptance of the divine rule as the will of
God; it is subjection to divine truth. Love is the activation,
brought about by the Spirit, of this faith. Faith, by its nature, is
solely orientation upon God; between several believers, as far
as it is purely a question of their being believers, there only exists
unity of faith. Even though, in faith in God, faith in his rule in
the church is also presupposed, this faith is nevertheless something
which only indirectly contributes to the establishment of com-
munion. It is possible only in the church, in the unity of the
church; it is activation of this unity. Christian community in
its full sense, however, is formed only by love acting in virtue of
faith. Thus, opposing one another, we have unity of faith as an
idea correlative to the idea of God's lordship, and communion
based on love as an idea correlative to the idea of the kingdom of
God. Both belong indissolubly together, but sociologically they
should be distinguished. Concretely however, the positive unity
of faith is sustained by communion based on love. Unity, in so
far as it is not already present, must be fought for. But the

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weapon of the Christian church is love ; thus Christian love will
always press towards, and demand, unity. We must not, in our
church, lose sight of Augustine's great conception that carilas is
the bond of church unity. But this idea presupposes unity based
on God, and it is only upon the basis of this unity that human
action is meaningful.

Nowadays there is much talk of unification of the churches.93
But we must not forget that unification from below is not the same
as unity from above, and that the wish for unification should be
realised, first of all, in the smaller and even the smallest congre-
gation. The way to unification, however, follows a course fraught
with the most difficult obstacles; for the stronger the wish the
more pronounced will be the individual opposition. There will
indeed be a basic aim to serve as a relative unity upon which we
shall be able to build. And this may also be assumed of a church
in which it cannot be formulated, but where the will is at work
to give it conceptual expression. In spite of the recognition that
we shall never be able to attain an absolute oneness correspond-
ing to the unity of the Spirit, the will for the greatest possible
realisation of this oneness will be alive in the church, and will
take comfort from Jesus' s prayer: 'that they may all be one, even
as thou, Father, art in me and I in thee' (John 17.21). And it will
be to the glory of the church, by its oneness, to glorify Jesus
before all the world (v. 23).

There is a sharp distinction between all this and the Idealist
concept of unity. 1 . The immanent unity of spirit is only the
incipient actualisation of the transcendental unity really accom-
plished in Christ. 2. It is impossible to equate the spirit of a
religious community with the Holy Spirit of the church. 3. The
man moved by the Spirit becomes and remains a full person pre-
cisely upon the complete actualisation of the immanent unity.
Even where all are one in Christ it would be wrong to imagine
that the personality willed by God is effaced; we must rather
imagine it as reaching its finest perfection at this very point. The
unity is a complete one, but it is fraught with tension, a fact
which points to an eschatological solution that is hidden from us
(see below, 'The Church and Eschatology').

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The absolutely fundamental indissolubility of personal being
brings us to a problem which makes the peculiarity of the social
structure of the church even clearer, the problem, namely, of
equality. The concept of equality94 presupposes a plurality of
persons, similarly placed in reference to a certain value, be it of a
material or spiritual kind. 'Equality before the law' does not tell
us anything about the content of the relationship between men,
but refers purely to the value 'law'. Similarly the Christian
idea of equality says nothing about interpersonal relationships,
but places all men within the sight of God, in that it states first
the absolute distance separating the creature from the Creator,
and even more so that separating the sinner from the Holy One :
the equality of men consists in their universal sinfulness (Rom.
3.23), that means also in their universal need of redemption, and
their equal share in God's grace. This is disclosed in Christ's death
upon the cross. It is not the person who counts in God's eyes, but
the heart (Acts 10.34, I5-^, Gal. 2.6, and elsewhere). In God's
eyes there is no longer either Jew nor Gentile, nor does either
have a prior claim. No one has any claim at all and each must
live by grace; that is their equality.95 Can we then say that the
church of God is built upon ultimately equal beings ? So far as
the relation of each one of them to God is concerned, we certainly
can. This formal equality extends to all of them. In the concrete
situation which arises in life, however, when man is addressed by
God and placed by him in this situation, each man as a person is
completely unlike every other. But does not the equality of all
persons nevertheless seem to be the more fundamental thing,
whereas time and space, as the principia individuationis, show merely
negligible differentiations? This is not so, since equality before
God cannot be proved or demonstrated, nor is it manifest as
'similarity'. It rests ultimately upon the fact that God is always
the same. Equality has nothing to do with affinity between souls,
where the one man has only to look within himself to know the
other; but it is only visible to God, and completely invisible to
us, because we are dissimilar. But this equality is most plainly
preached by the cross of Christ, in which the same judgment and
the same grace is pronounced for the whole world. It has its

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basis in the spiritual unity of the church, which is beyond our
sight, and we have here only the dialectical relation of multi-
plicity and unity repeating itself. The concept of equality, thus
understood, does not allow of any schematising, but rather in-
cludes all men's concrete dissimilarity; in the Christian sense it
is quite possible, even required, that there should be the strong
and the weak, the honourable and dishonourable, those who
morally and religiously have a higher value, and those who have
a lower one, quite apart from obvious social inequalities. But it
is this very idea of invisible equality before God that sets a limit
to our recognition of these inequalities. This equality is to be
realised within the frame of what is possible, in that strength and
weakness, honour and disgrace, morality and immorality, piety
and impiety are there for one another, but never for themselves
alone. Thus the idea of equality leads us again into the idea of
community. This duality of the idea of equality is also expressed
in Luther's doctrine of the priesthood of all believers. The
equality upon the basis of which every Christian is a priest is
invisible, and becomes 'visible' only for faith — but can never be
deduced without it ! — through the unity of the gift in Word and
sacrament. As the whole church rests upon the unity in Christ,
upon the fact of 'Christ existing as the church', so all Christian
community rests upon the equality of all which is based on God.
This can be said only when the view is from above. But the
priesthood of all believers signifies the affirmation of the concrete
dissimilarities of the individual believers, in that the individuals
are drawn into mutual service whereby the one proves himself
a priest for the other. Thus all we have already said about the
community of spirit applies here to. If this is borne in mind the
possible connection between the priesthood of all believers and
patriarchalism immediately becomes evident. The Christian con-
ception of equality does not make everybody equal, but simply
and solely recognises the actual facts in which Pauline patriarch-
alism, for instance, finds its justification. This is the difference in
principle between the Christian idea of equality and all socialist
or Idealist ideas of equality. And that in turn directs us back to

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the Christian concept of spiritual unity, as represented in a theo-
logical concept of the church.96

My purpose so far has been to represent the church as con-
sisting of unity, community and singularity, and to represent
these three factors, which are based on the Spirit, in their
relation to one another, thus contributing to the doctrine of the
social structure of the church as the sanctorum communio.

3. The empirical form of the church

a. The objective spirit of the church and the Holy Spirit

The church of Jesus Christ actualised by the Holy Spirit is at
the present moment really the church. The communion of
saints represented by it is 'in the midst of us'. This proposition
gives rise to a twofold question about the empirical church.
There is the question of 'history and the communion of saints',
and the question of the communio peccatorum within the sanctorum
communio.

The empirical church is the organised 'institution' of salvation,
having as its focus the cultus with preaching and sacrament, or, in
sociological terms, the 'assembly' of the members. It is legally
constituted, and links the bestowal of its benefits with the
orders of divine service it lays down. It accepts all who submit
to these orders, and hence has no guarantee for the inner dis-
position of its members, but, from the moment it is sanctioned by
public opinion and perhaps has even become a political power
in the state, it must necessarily reckon with the fact that it will
have 'dead members' within it. It is the 'historical result of the
work of Jesus Christ' (Seeberg), and as such represents the
objective spirit of the church in its development and being, in
transmitted forms and embodiments and in present vitality and
effectiveness. The objective spirit, as we saw, is the new spiritual
principle springing from socialisation. The autonomous effective-
ness of its will regulates and guides the wills of those partaking of
and forming it. It is embodied in certain forms and thereby

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visibly authenticates its own life. Again, it acts in two directions,
that is, it has an intention both in time and in space ; it seeks to
be effective both in the historical and in the social sphere. It is
the bearer of historical tradition, and its action and effects are
to include more and more individuals in its scope. It seems as if
this sociological structure in the empirical church should now be
studied and analysed as presenting the religious type of com-
munity among many types of community. And yet if we did this
we should entirely distort the matter. The empirical church is
not identical with a religious community. Rather, as a concrete
historical community, in spite of the relativity of its forms, its
imperfect and unpretentious appearance, the empirical church
is the Body of Christ, the presence of Christ on earth, for it has
his Word. It is possible to understand the empirical church only
by looking down from above, or by looking out from the inside,
and not otherwise. Once this fact has been grasped it is of course
in principle possible once more to define the church as a religious
community, always bearing in mind that it is really based on
God. Thus if we now apply to the church what we said about
the objective spirit, we have the claim of the objective spirit of
the church to be the bearer of the historical work of Jesus Christ
and of the social action of the Holy Spirit.97

The historical church claims that it possesses the Holy Spirit
and is the effective custodian of the Word of God and of the
sacrament. This brings us to the first question, the great body of
thought on the problem of the relation of the Spirit of Christ and
the Holy Spirit of the sanctorum communio to the objective spirit
of the empirical church.

The sanctorum communio moved by the Holy Spirit has continu-
ally to be actualised in a struggle against two sources of resistance :
human imperfection and sin. To equate the two, giving imper-
fection the weight of sin, or evaluating sin merely as imperfection,
is to avoid the seriousness of the Christian concept of sin, and
leads either to regarding the church's sociologically empirical
form as sin, or, in the manner of Kant,98 to viewing the empirical
church only as a manifestation of the non-real, ideal church of
the future or as unattainable in this world. Neither attitude does

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justice to the empirical church's historical importance. The first
is wrong because Christ entered into history" so that the church
is his presence in history. The history of the church is the hidden
centre of world history, and not the history of one educational
institution among many. For the church is Christ existing as the
church. No matter how dubious its empirical form may be, it
remains the church so long as Christ is present in his Word.
Thereby we acknowledge that God has willed the church's
historical life, in the sense that it is intended to perfect itself. The
Body of Christ is just as much a real presence in history as it is the
standard for its own history. This brings us once again to what
was said at the beginning of our inquiry, about the normative
character of basic ontic relationships. In the sphere of Christian
ethics it is not what ought to be that effects what is, but what is
effects what ought to be.

This shows us the easily perceptible flaw in Kant's concept of
the church. The church is not only ideally present, but really
present in history. And yet the church is not only imperfect, but
also sinful. Kant, who with his concept of 'radical evil' had
expressed a perception (of Lutheran provenance) leading beyond
the whole of Idealistic philosophy, did not utilise it in his concept
of the church. The members of the kingdom of virtue are indeed
imperfect, but good. Luther's idea of the iustus peccator was some-
thing Kant did not understand.

i . The decisive thing for the Lutheran concept of the church
is that the sanctorum communio remains as it always has been, a
community of sinners. This is the chief reason why Hegel's
theory of spirit is unacceptable. The absolute Spirit does not
simply enter into the subjective spirits and gather them in the
objective spirit;100 but the Christian church is the church of the
Word, that is, of faith. Present sanctification is only a preliminary
sign of the last things ; here we still walk by faith ; that is to say,
here we see only our sins, and believe in our sanctity.101 The
'Word' is the rock upon which the Idealists' spirit-monism
founders, for the Word signifies that there is still sin, that the
absolute Spirit must fight for its authority, that the church re-
mains a church of sinners. These ideas have been brought

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SANCTORUM COMMUNIO

home to us by modern Luther studies, and also by the most recent
trend in theology. We shall now include them in the picture we
have sketched of the sanctorum communio.

The difficulty in determining the relation between the objective
spirit and the Holy Spirit springs from the concept of the com-
munity of love. The idea that the individual and the com-
munity are purely instruments of the Holy Spirit is shown to be
an illusion. Communion with God, and likewise human com-
munion, are continually being broken and renewed. Man does
not constantly live a genuine organic life of fellowship. The
peccatorum communio lives on in the sanctorum communio. The
mankind of Adam is still in actuality there, even if in reality it
has been overcome. Justified man does not get beyond the earliest
beginnings of the new life. So he still experiences the other man
as 'Thou', in the sense of alien, making claims. Only in faith in
the communion of saints is this overcome. Thus the communion
of saints represents only the beginnings of the new life; it is
eschatological and proleptic, in which the Thou reveals itself to
the I as an I, as heart, as love, as Christ.

Thus although the sanctorum communio is continually falling,
coming into existence anew, passing and coming into existence
once more, a state which we saw was part of the nature of every
moral person, this movement of repentance and faith is fulfilled
at one fixed point: it is by the Word that the church is broken,
to become the church of the cross, and by the Word it is 'built
up' to become the church of Easter. The communion of saints
as the communion of penitent sinners is held together by the
unity of the Body of Christ. As in every other community, so in
the church, penance is done by each man for his own sins and
for those of the collective person of the community. Is this col-
lective person 'Christ existing as the church', the Body of Christ?
It can be only in so far as God himself is at work in the penance.
It is not the communion of sinners, but the sanctity even of this
community that is 'Christ existing as the church'. The fact that
as the communion of sinners it is nevertheless the communion of
saints, or rather, in this world, is never saintly without being
sinful, is Christ's presence in it; it is precisely as such, as a com-

THE COMMUNION OF SAINTS

munion saintly in its sinfulness, that it is 'Christ existing as
the church'. If it were argued that it is the individual and not the
church's objective spirit that is sinful, this would be right to the
extent that in the church the general direction of the wills in
principle becomes a new one. This is not to say that when the
empirical church is active as a 'whole' what it does is an act of
the Holy Spirit. This would conform with Hegel's theory, and
to assume it would be to do away with the monadic image of
society as we presented it. A church council is no holier than one
man alone. Thus into the objective spirit of each particular
time, apart from human imperfection, much evil will has
flowed too, and frequently Augustine's words have seemed to be
confirmed that 'the church has often been only in one individual,
or in one family.'102 Sin has to be taken up into the concept of
the objective spirit. Thus the fact of guilt makes it clear that the
objective spirit of the collective person of the church cannot be
identified with the Holy Spirit. There is, however, a further
equally clear reason for this.

2. The empirical church lives in history. As the spirit of one
man as a member of the church might have a particular task at a
particular time, so the objective spirit of the church, fashioned
according to the given situation, is different in every age. It
receives its stamp from historical circumstances. The fact that the
objective spirit is within history necessarily implies the fallibility
and imperfection of its knowledge and will. In the objective
spirit embodied in the church of each particular age in the past,
the individual, accidental and imperfect nature of this spirit is
made manifest. These qualities make it impossible to identify
the objective spirit with the spirit of Christ or the Holy Spirit.

3. Perhaps many who are not predestined also affect the
objective spirit of the church, both helping and hindering it. This
is probably the most compelling proof that the objective spirit
and the Holy Spirit cannot be identified with one another. For
those who are not predestined do not belong to the church, and
yet the Holy Spirit, through the objective spirit, can use them
too as instruments of his creative activity. They remain of course
purely instruments, and are never the object of the Spirit's

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work. The distinction between the objective spirit and the Holy
Spirit has thus become quite plain. And yet we must assume that
there is a connection between them.

Through all the church's sinfulness, its historical contingency
and fallibility, the historical tendency of the Spirit of Christ is at
work in the form of the objective spirit, and the Holy Spirit uses
this too as the bearer of his concentrating and sustaining social
actions, notwithstanding all the sinfulness and imperfection of the
individuals and of the whole. This happens in accordance with
what was said earlier about the time-factor and the space-factor
in the rule of Christ and the Holy Spirit. It is solely by the Word,
however, that each assures the church of his presence. Here it is
clear that in the building of the empirical church Christ and the
Holy Spirit make use of historical forms of objective spiritual life.
Hence the objective spirit of the church will have its special func-
tions in this service, as we shall see later.

Opposing one another, then, we have on the one hand the
endlessly changing, imperfect, sinful objective human spirit, and
on the other hand the Holy Spirit and 'Christ existing as the
church', the Holy Spirit everlastingly one, and perfect, bearing
the objective human spirit. The objective human spirit is a prey
to the historical ambiguity of all profane communities, of all so-
called ideal social groups, vain, extravagant and mendacious.
Nevertheless it claims with certainty that it is the church of
Christ, that it has its place in spite of everything within a church
built and sustained by the Holy Spirit. It is a certainty which,
precisely by reason of the church's similarity to other 'religious
communities', often threatens to come to naught. Confronting
one another there are the purely historical collective persons of
the church and the person of Christ as God's presence in the
church ; the 'religious community' of men and the community
of the Spirit ; and in so far as the former, in spite of all appear-
ances to the contrary, and with a full awareness of its position,
believes that it is identical with the latter, it believes in the church,
in the communion of saints (see below on 'Believing in the
Church'). Thus there cannot be any question of establishing by
historical means that the two are identical. The identity is

THE COMMUNION OF SAINTS

'invisible' and can be seen only in the Last Things, and yet it
already has its actual beginning now. The objective spirit is the
bearer and instrument of the Spirit of the church of Christ, it has
certain visible forms, which the Holy Spirit has created out of
himself and infused into the objective spirit. Thus the Holy
Spirit working through it is the guarantor for the efficacy of
these forms, which are in fact the preaching of the Word and the
administration of the sacraments. But the objective spirit does
not bear these as a man bears a sack on his back; rather it is
itself sanctified by the burden; it bears it in its heart, that is of
course only in so far as the Holy Spirit is himself doing the bear-
ing in it, for the objective spirit is not the Holy Spirit. But the
objective spirit is at once an instrument and an end in itself, in
accordance with our earlier definition of the community of love.
It is the object and the means of operation of the Holy Spirit,
and it is both these things in the manner of the blending of
Holy Spirit and objective human spirit described earlier — which
clearly shows the impossibility of the two being identical.

b. The logical relation between the empirical and the essential
church

Our discussion of the relation of objective spirit to the Holy
Spirit and the Spirit of Christ has determined the material
relation between the empirical form of the church and its form
in the spirit. Does this still allow us to speak of a church ? Can
the empirical and the essential church be reduced logically and
sociologically to a single concept?

This question first of all puts the concept of the essential
church into correct relation with the concept of the kingdom of
God.103

i. Both by their nature comprise only those who are pre-
destined (the problem of the donum perseverantiae requires a
separate dogmatic inquiry on its own account, and has no great
significance here).

2. The material content of each is identical, namely the sub-

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jection of mankind to God's will for his rule over men and for
their redemption.104 The purpose of God's rule over man is the
kingdom. But whereas all the predestined are included in the
kingdom, the church includes only those elected in Christ (Eph.
1.4; I Peter 1 .20). Thus the former exists from eternity to eternity;
the latter has its beginning in history. To talk of a church of the
Old Testament would be meaningful only if this were understood
as meaning the community of those awaiting Christ.105 But such
a description would be misleading, and would unnecessarily
burden the concept of the church. 'The church is the kingdom
of God, but in the form ordained for the time between Jesus's
ascension and second coming.'106 'The church is the kingdom of
God realising itself on earth under the constitution of the New
Covenant.'107 In its visible historical form it comprises many
more members than the kingdom of God, but in its essence not a
single member more. (Rather, many members fewer. This in
opposition to Hofmann,108 for instance, is our assumption for the
time since Christ as well). We prefer to call the church the
kingdom of Christ (see above).109

This kingdom of Christ or the church, is, however, present to
us in concrete historical form, and present in such a way that it
must reckon with having many nominal members. It is present,
in other words, as a national church (Volkskirche) and not as a
'gathered' church (Freiwilligkeitskirche) . How can a church that,
as a human community, is by its very nature a community of
wills, at the same time be a national church ? Such is the socio-
logical formulation of the problem of the empirical church. The
solution is to be found by reflecting upon the nature of the
'Word'. The sanctorum communio, with the preaching of the Word
which it bears and by which it is borne, extends beyond itself and
addresses all those who might belong to it, and this is part of its
nature. From this it does not of course follow that the 'dead'
members also belong to the Body of Christ.110 The second reason
is that here on earth there is no way of telling the wheat from the
chaff; this is something that will be revealed only on the Day of
Judgment, and is now being secretly prepared. At the same time
the sanctorum communio, as it extends beyond itself, presses back

'5*

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upon the 'real' church, to realise what is possible. The sanctorum
communio, which by its nature presents itself as a national church,
equally demands the gathered church, and continually estab-
lishes itself as such ; that is, the sanctorum communio sustains the
others, as it were, in whom the possibility of becoming 'effective'
members of the church is dormant, by virtue of the Word which
constitutes it and which it preaches. A man can be assumed to be
a possible member, however, as long as he has made no con-
scious retraction, and even this the church will not necessarily
consider as final, so that it can never be demonstrably impossible
for him to become a member. The logical and sociological
unity of the gathered and national, essential and empirical,
'invisible' and 'visible' church111 is thus established through the
Word, and this is a genuinely Lutheran perception. Now for the
church there is a point in time when it may not be a national
church any longer, and this point is reached when it can no longer
see in its national form any way of fighting its way through to
becoming a gathered church. But such a step would in the event
spring from church politics and not from dogmatics. It does,
however, show that the church's essential character is that of a
gathered church. It is nevertheless in its historical national form
that the church's chief strength resides. This is overlooked by
those who scorn the church's historicity. True love for the church
will help to bear and love its impurity and imperfection too ; for
it is in fact this empirical church which nurtures God's holy
treasure, his community. There have been many presumptuous
attempts at purifying the church112 from the formation of the
perfectionist sects of the early church to those of the Anabaptists
and Pietists; there has been the Enlightenment and Kant's
secularised notion of the kingdom of God, then the beginnings of
the socialist expectation of the kingdom of God as represented by
Saint Simon, which led via Tolstoy to the religious and social
Youth Movement of our day — everywhere the attempt to have
the kingdom of God present not only to faith but to sight, not
shrouded in the particularities of a Christian church, but clearly
manifested in the morality and sanctity of persons, in the ideal
regulating of all historical and social problems. But of the fact

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that God's revelation is really proceeding in history, that is, in
a hidden way ; that this world is still a world of sin and death,
that is, historical, and that its history is sanctified by the fact that
God made it and entered into it, and used it as a means to his
end — of all this the apprehension is lacking, and so too is the
love which is alone capable of seeing it. No matter how much in
earnest those who despise the historicity of our church may be,
their efforts are the merest trifling if they fail to hold fast to the
realities God intends should be taken seriously. The church is
meant to let the tares grow in its garden, for where else can it
find the criterion of knowing and judging which of its members
are tares? Thus it will perhaps lovingly tend many a budding
life that will later become pernicious to it, but it will never
condemn and judge, but remain aware of the limits of its histor-
icity.

Luther's love for the church and deep dogmatic insight into the
significance of its historical nature made it very hard for him to
tear himself away from the church of Rome. We should not
allow resentment and dogmatic frivolity to deprive us out of hand
of our historical Protestant church.

We spoke of 'the' empirical church. Does this phenomenon
exist at all? For those who view it historically the church con-
sists of many individual local churches and a single organisation
comprising them. Can the individual local churches be brought
together into a unity? The 'empirical church' appears to be an
abstraction, or alternatively a statistical collective unit made up
of the individual local churches, if one does not wish to see these
as merged and lost in the organisation. The question is whether
the meaning of the idea of the empirical church is completely
contained in the idea of such a collective unit. In answering
this question we shall discover more information about the
structure of the sanctorum communio.

The New Testament calls individual local churches the 'Body
of Christ', just as, on the other hand, it sees in them 'the realisa-
tion in a specific place of the one church of God',113 and just as all
those who cleave to Christ- are one body with him. Thus the New
Testament supplies only the problem, and not the answer. Luther

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THE COMMUNION OF SAINTS

laid full emphasis upon the individual congregation and yet said :
'No one says: I believe in the Holy Ghost, one Holy Church of
Rome and the communion of Roman Catholics; which makes
it clear that the Holy Church is not tied to Rome, but extends
throughout the world. . . .'114 Zwingli, after adopting Wycliffe's
notion of the church, and linking with it the Swiss idea of the
Kilchhbre (the local church) coined the idea of the 'universal
church' as the church embracing all individual churches.115
This corresponds to our idea of the empirical church and had its
origin in the recognition that the many individual congregations
do not exist side by side as separate units, but are there to be
gathered together into a real unity. This is a reality correspond-
ing to what is simply the empirical church, namely the totality
of all the congregations (Gesamtgemeinde) . This conclusion is a
necessary one, for only thus does God's whole historical will for
redemption become plain. In this totality as the 'sum' of all the
places at which the gospel is proclaimed, there is the 'same
spirit', the one Word. It is one Body, real community, sanctorum
communio. The reality of the fact that all the individual congre-
gations belong together has always been more strongly empha-
sised by Roman Catholicism than by us. The Roman Catholic
Church has of course historicised it. We do not say that the
empirical universal church (Council or General Synod) is more
than the local church ; that would be completely un-Protestant.116
But the Body of Christ is Rome and Corinth, Wittenberg, Geneva
and Stockholm, and the members of all the individual churches
all belong to the totality as the sanctorum communio.117

Is the Body of Christ as a whole then primarily present in the
universal church, so that all individual local churches are only
members of the Body ? The New Testament says nothing of the
kind, and the question has no value for dogmatics because it
understands the concept 'Body of Christ' simply in the organic
physical sense, whereas in fact this concept describes the presence
of Christ and the work of the Spirit in his church, the concept of
body here being not one of form but of function with regard to
the work of Christ (see above on the 'body' of the collective
person). Christ is fully present in each individual, and is yet

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One, and is again not fully present in any one person, being fully
possessed only by all men together.118 Thus each individual local
church is the Body of Christ, and yet there is only One Body, and
again only the universal church can actualise all the relationships
in the Body of Christ. If the idea of the Body of Christ were
applicable only to the individual local church, then difficulties
would immediately arise concerning the question of this as the
smallest sociological unit in the idea of the church, and doubtless
the community of two people, placed under his Word and sus-
tained by him, as, for instance, in marriage, would have to be
considered as such a unit, so that, to be exact, the idea of the
individual local church would have to be applied to it as well,
and so the Body of Christ would also be present 'where two or
three are gathered together'. But since where the Body of Christ
is the sanctorum communio is, this makes marriage the smallest
sociological unit of the sanctorum communio. In fact it can be
present in marriage to the highest degree. Just as every collective
person stands without knowing or willing it in another more
comprehensive one, so the smallest sociological unit of the
sanctorum communio necessarily extends beyond itself and stands
in the midst of the 'whole' Body of Christ, of which it is simply the
individual realisation. It is wrong, on the other hand, according
to the fundamental principles of social philosophy already
established, either to imagine that individual local churches have
priority and that the whole body is atomistic in its structure, or to
assume the opposite.

c. Sociological forms and functions of the empirical church

i. The worshipping congregation. A Christian church, as an
individual local church or a house-church, is held together by
the fact that its members are gathered round the Word. The
Word represents the unity of the essential and the empirical
church, of the Holy Spirit and objective spirit, which is to say
that the concrete function of the empirical church is the divine
service of preaching the Word and of administering the sacra-

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ments. Preaching is the 'ministry' of the church, so there must
also be a congregation. The one implies the other. This has been
axiomatic from the earliest Christian times right up to the age of
pietism and orthodoxy. It was only when life began to be
conceived of in individualistic terms that the necessity for a
congregation ceased to be regarded as reflecting the natural
course of things and came to be thought of as psychological, the
question of the significance of the congregation then being raised
in terms of its use and necessity for the individual. The question
itself reveals a basic lack of understanding of the idea of the
church. Thus a long recital of the reasons why it is inwardly and
outwardly advantageous or morally necessary for the individual
to go to church would not be any answer to it at all. In replying
thus we should from the outset be foregoing our rights to our own
basic position. The question is unable to deal with the facts of
the matter. The only idea that can be put forward as a basis is
that of the church itself; this does not mean that there is no basis
for the significance of the congregation — it is not simply some-
thing that has established itself as a tradition in the course of
time, as one might suppose — but simply that the basis must be
sought upon a completely different plane. Preaching is an act-
ivity of the church divinely ordained for the church. I belong to
the church, so I go to the gatherings of the congregation ; such
is the prosaic reasoning of the members of the congregation.
Their presence is not the result of any calculation of expediency,
nor an act of dutifulness, but something 'organically' self-evident.
Max Weber rightly emphasises how important the gatherings of
the congregation were in primitive Christianity (in contrast to
its significance in the time of the prophets of Israel) .119 Only in
the congregation is the Spirit at work; there he dispenses his
charismata. The idea of a Christian who does not attach himself
to the congregation is unthinkable. The church united by the
one Word congregates again and again to hear it, or conversely
the Word creating the church continually calls it together anew
in a concrete congregation; for it is a Word that is preached, in
accordance with God's will and that of the church, through
which he realises this will.

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This answer, it is true, does not satisfy the questioning indi-
vidualist. Cannot each church member read the Bible on his
own and profess his belief in the church, the invisible communion
of 'consciences', or 'souls', in private? What purpose is served
by the dreary flatness of public congregation, where you risk
having to face a narrow-minded preacher alongside spiritless
faces ?

There is no doubt that those living far from the congregation
can also belong to the sanctorum communio — I am thinking of in-
valids, castaways, etc. — which means we cannot say that for the
individual the congregation is 'necessary to salvation'. Neverthe-
less, the significance for the church of gathering together is fully
maintained. These people too have received their faith through
concrete contacts with others, through the preaching of the
word (Rom. 10.17). Every other case it is possible to think of in
this connection proves that it is possible in principle for God to
subdue men to his lordship without the mediation of the actual
congregation. But this is something that falls beyond the scope
of our aims. For us the preaching of the empirical church is the
'Word of God' we can hear. And this must be applied in the
narrower sense to the historical, congregational form of the
empirical church. The congregation of the faithful remains our
Mother. Thus the question why, from the psychological point of
view, we hold fast to the congregation is synonymous with the
question why we love our mother, and the answer — if answer is
needed — is gratitude. The decisive factor, however, is that the
Christian feels he has never outgrown this place of his spiritual
birth, so that he is prompted to seek the congregation not only
out of gratitude for the gift he has received, but also because he
prays that he might ever receive it, and forever be born anew
(John 3.3; II Cor. 4.16). He knows that there God's Word is
preached according to his will, and that there too the church of
God is to be found (Matt. 18.20). But no matter how isolated he
may be he knows that he is one of the Good Shepherd's flock,
attached to the historical fellowship of the church, the congre-
gation, from which he received his past and present life, and in
which alone he can truly live. In the congregation the church

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stands surety for God — in accordance with God's will — and it is
here that God stands surety for his presence in the church. Thus
the actual congregation has a significance all its own. First, it
makes it apparent that the church is 'visible', a community of
men, body and soul; not kinship of soul, or a community based
on like feeling, but a community of love between whole men.
That is the historical importance of the congregation. Its
historicity, is, however, the cause of both its defects and its
strength, which fructify the personal life. The defects are, in the
first place, all the unedifying factors of which we should find it
just as easy to speak as do the individualists. Secondly, we know
that we remain individuals, Greeks, Jews, Pietists, Liberals, etc.,
and that each man is completely enmeshed in the concrete
circumstances of his life. It is precisely from this, however, that
the strength of the congregation derives. My neighbour, the man
living beside me completely immersed in his own affliction, quite
different from me, a stranger — he too is clearly willed by God.
The unity of the divine Word rises sovereign above the utter
dissimilarity of the individual members of the congregation,
and the perception that the one man cannot have anything in
common with the other, the completely alien, unknown 'Thou',
that there is a gulf between them extending to the very ground of
their being, makes it evident that here only the hand of God can
intervene, that only the love given to our heart by God can sus-
tain communion. Thus one man reminds the other of the God
who wishes them both to be in the same church. In the other man
in his actuality there is revealed to me the power and the glory of
the kingdom of God, and the congregation becomes the fountain-
head for the prayerful profession of belief in God and his church.
In the congregation, moreover, I do not, as if I were com-
muning alone with the Word, speak and hear at the same time.
But there is someone else speaking, and this gives me an incom-
parable certainty. Someone completely strange to me is proclaim-
ing God's grace and forgiveness to me, not as an experience, but
as God's will. He helps me to grasp in concrete form that the
church and its Lord are guarantors for my certainty that I shall
receive grace. The fact that there is someone else promising me

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grace makes me certain of the church, and rules out any danger
or possibility that I might be lost in illusions. The certainty of
faith arises not only from solitariness, but also from the congre-
gation.

To summarise : The congregation is willed by God, and is the
means whereby he makes use of the social connection between
men to spread his rule over men. This will of God is realised,
through the objective spirit of the church, in the setting-up of
ordered worship. The worshipping congregation is an essential
part of the church. Such is the objective picture. Subjectively
the individual's constant link with the congregation arises from
his recognition of God's will to speak in the empirical church,
from his awareness of belonging to the community whose office
is to preach the Word, and which is itself the object of the preach-
ing. There is an organic link between the congregation and the
individual, brought about by the gratitude of the latter to the
mother who gave him his life, and by his love for her, along with
the confidence that she will constantly bestow her gifts upon him.
Lastly, there is his firm hope that in the congregation he will again
and again, in concrete form, receive the assurance that he is in
the church of God and lives in his grace.

Hitherto the meaning we have given to the word 'congre-
gation' has been the general one of a worshipping congregation,
whether worshipping publicly or privately. Both represent the
sanctorum communio, and have the same value. And yet it must be
stressed that the first is more necessary than the second. The
local church is a piece of the world organised purely out of the
sanctorum communio; it is not, as the house-church, for instance,
merely a renewal in the Spirit of a form already given. Thus the
difference is that in the first the objective spirit of the church must
always be active in a productive and constructive way, finding
new forms and preserving old ones, whereas in the second there is
no objective spirit of the church as such, but one coinciding with
the spirit of the household. Thus the local church will always
serve as a pattern for the house-church. The former is more-
over indispensable for the further reason that for all its in-
sufficiency it ensures a relatively uniform doctrine. The decisive

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reason, however, is that the local church is independent of all
family and political connections. It is as such that it is the
'historical result of the work of Jesus'; whereas house-churches
must be regarded as but the consequences of the work of the local
churches. As such the local church is intended to become uni-
versal, and has a commission which transcends all nationality.
As such it makes effective the concrete community which is of its
essence, since both Jew and Greek and bond and free belong to it;
and as such it is not only in the world, but against the world as
an objectively spiritual power with a moral will and the courage
to fight. Thus the congregation represents the will of God and
performs the task of the church not only as between the church
and God but as between it and the world. It is demonstrative
action 'pointing' to the power of the objective spirit of the
church, which is sustained by the will of God; 'that they may
become perfectly one, so that the world may know that thou hast
sent me, and hast loved them even as thou hast loved me' (John

!7-23)-

For house-churches to increase at the expense of the local
church community is a retrograde step, a proof of a lack of
spiritual productiveness in the local church, and a flight from
the seriousness of the historical situation. Both kinds of congre-
gation should grow hand in hand. The impulse to community
should not sap the life-blood of the public church, but contribute
to it.

At the start we established that the congregation and the
ministry go together. We must now examine the meaning of the
Protestant ministry, and investigate the sociological forms of the
various congregations, as these forms are given by the ministry.

ii . The Sanctorum Communio as bearer of the ministry. The church is
'Christ existing as the community'; Christ's presence consists in
the Word of justification. But since where Christ is his church is,
the Word of justification gives reality to the church, which
means that it demands a coming together of the faithful. These
are thoughts which have already been worked out.

The Word is the Word the church preaches. Not the Bible,

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then? Yes, the Bible too, but only in the church. So it is the
church that first makes the Bible into the 'Word' ? Certainly,120
in so far, that is, as the church was first created and is maintained
by the Word. The question as to what came first, the Word or the
church, is meaningless, because the Word as inspired by the Spirit
exists only when men hear it, so that the church makes the Word
just as the Word makes the church into the church. The Bible
is the Word only in the church, that is, in the sanctorum communio.
The Word is concretely present in the church as the Word of
Scripture and of preaching — essentially as the latter. There is
no distinction between these in themselves, since so long as they
are not inspired by the Spirit they remain the word of man. The
Spirit has not united himself in substance with the word of the
Bible. Thus effective preaching is possible only in the sanctorum
communio. The promise that the Word shall be fruitful applies
(Isa. 55.11) to the preaching carried out within the sanctorum
communio. Praedicatio verbi divini est verbum divinum.121 This is not
self-evident, for preaching is obviously a product of the objective
spirit of the church. And it is meant to be so, because it does not
just repeat, but says new things, does not recount from the past,
but addresses the present;122 no member of the church can evade
the objective spirit. To attempt to flee is useless; flight only
makes the situation more confused. 'Serve the time' (Rom.
12. 11) is preaching's great motto.123 The objective spirit,
burdened as it is with so much contingency, imperfection and
sinfulness, nevertheless has the promise that it can preach the
Word of God ; it becomes the bearer of the social action of the
Holy Spirit. Anyone who really hears the Word in preaching
sees the clash between the objective spirit (especially perhaps
that of 'theology') and the Holy Spirit in its most striking aspect,
but he sees too that it is the Holy Spirit's wish to take his course
through the objective spirit of the church. The basis of all this is
the reality of the sanctorum communio, for it is to the sanctorum
communio that the Word is given, as both creating it and as the
instrument of its activity. Where it is present the Word is not
ineffective.

But who, then, is permitted to preach? Surely it can only be

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someone belonging to the sanctorum communio'? And yet how is
man to know what God alone knows? 'The Lord knows those
who are his.' This seems to be the rock upon which the church,
and its task and its hope with it, must founder. There seems to
be only one way left open. If the person is perhaps not holy, it
must be the office that is holy; the consequence is — the Roman
Catholic idea of the priest and his ministry. But this will not do
either, for nothing is holy but God's holy will and our will, if it
is touched by the divine one. Now it may be supposed that there
are preachers active at all times who, at the time of their preach-
ing at least, do not belong to the sanctorum communio. Is the
preaching of these men really condemned to bear no fruit?
Luther took comfort from the idea that the spirit bloweth where
it listeth, and that being able to preach effectively, that is, pos-
sessing this charisma from the Holy Spirit, was something quite
different from actually having the Holy Spirit within one as a
justifying and sanctifying force. Even Judas may have been a
most powerful preacher.124 Since therefore the Protestant
Church believes the words of Isa. 55.11, and even more because
it has a knowledge of the freedom of the Holy Spirit and of the
charismatic significance of preaching, it is able to accord preach-
ing a central place in its divine service without recourse to the
Roman Catholic idea of the ministry or any sectarian ideas of
the holiness of the person. If our starting-point is that preaching
has the purpose of working on subjective spirits, subduing them
to God's lordship and making them members of the sanctorum
communio, that it is testimony to Christ, and not to one's own faith,
then its effectiveness is mediated by the objective spirit, for it is
plain that a purpose can be achieved without the man who is
pleading its cause being inwardly connected with it. He is
rather the point through which two powers pass: that of the
objective spirit of the church and that of the Holy Spirit.
Likewise a preacher can bear witness to the objective spirit that
is alive in the church without himself partaking of the Spirit of
Christ that gives rise to it. To summarise: even if the man who
preaches does not belong to the sanctorum communio, and will never
belong to it, the fact that he uses and must use the forms developed

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by the objective spirit means that the Holy Spirit can employ
even him as an instrument of his activity. Objective spirit
subsists not only in forms that have become fixed, but in like
degree in the living force of public opinion, in theology, for
instance, in interest in certain problems, in strong volitional
impulses for some particular practical undertaking, etc., so that
there is no qualitative distinction in this respect between preach-
ing and the administration of the sacraments. These are the
reasons why the sanctorum communio is in fact able to found an
'office' of preaching and of administration of the sacraments that
is as such entirely sustained by it and is yet completely inde-
pendent of it from the point of view of the persons performing
these functions. (This has nothing in common with the idea of
the ministry as presented by Stahl, Kliefoth, etc.) On the other
hand no exception can be taken to the formula of the Confession
of Augsburg VII, ' congregatio sanctorum, in qua.' Its meaning is that
preaching is possible only in the sanctorum communio; that is, that
it is based upon it.125 The office depends upon the church; this
makes the according of any special position to the bearer of the
office impossible. In the Protestant Church there is no theurgy,
and no magical authority interested in the office, or in individuals
bearing this office. The idea of the priesthood of all believers is
only another way of expressing this principle. The fact of the
church that has only one Head, Christ, preserves us from the
idea of an ecclesiastical this-worldly head, which, as Luther
justly explains, cannot exist, since he would not know those whom
he was governing.126

When the Protestant idea of the ministry is thus grasped and
justified, in connection with the objective spirit, there is a deeper
understanding of the organised local church, which is held to-
gether by the orderly gathering for the administration of the
Word and sacraments. It is therefore clear that the empirical
church, the ministry and the congregation, go together, and that
God's way with his holy people is through the midst of history.

iii. The sociological context of the acts of the ministerial office and the
congregation, the three concentric circles. We have now to establish

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the significance of preaching and the sacraments in the Protestant
sense for the congregation in which they take place. It is import-
ant to begin with a brief analysis of the sense-experiences in
relation to their sociological character. We indicate only
the basic matters which are important for our purpose. These are
the matters of hearing and touching, which are presupposed in
preaching and the sacraments. Hearing is the mediator of the
most profound and differentiated spiritual perceptions and feel-
ings, indicated by 'word' and 'music' (Schopenhauer described
music as a pure idea). Every acoustic 'sign' demands man's
spiritual attention. There arises a system of relationships of
understanding to what gives the sign. Spiritual self-activity is
aroused among the individuals. They find themselves involved
in a spiritual traffic, whether of agreement or disagreement, with
the speaker. The entire spiritual person of the man is involved.
In contrast to this the experience of the tactile — in which we
include 'tasting' — is exhausted in the sense-experience itself.
There is no essential connection between the sense-experience
and the spiritual significance, but only a symbolic and unreal
connection. The word is not a symbol, but a 'sign'. The word
means something in itself, whereas the contact of touch means
nothing 'in itself, but can become the bearer of the 'symbol' of
meaning. The word is an adequate expression of a meaning,
whereas touch has to be somehow explained if it is to be under-
stood. In his sense of touch man knows with his body, which
experiences the contact, that he is quite alone, and what happens
is related to him alone. With the spoken word, on the other iand,
it is clear to him in an objective way that a number of m?n can
be gathered round it. So when preaching is put at the centre of
the Protestant service, this emphasises that the preaching creates
a community composed of individual hearers who are to son e
extent intellectually active members. It is not that a mass is
caught up in a cultic spectacle by some magic contact, but each
individual is addressed, both in a general intellectual sense in the
challenge to think about what is said and to enter into the
intellectual context which is presented, and in an ethical sense in
being placed before the decision 'for or against'. The Protestant

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congregation is a congregation in which ethical personalism is at
work. It can never become a 'mass'.

What is the sociological relation of the congregation to the
preacher? Is he drawn into their fellowship as one questioner
among others ? Or is he the bearer of unconditioned truth, and
is he their teacher, answering their questions ? Should the sermon
be a dialogue or a monologue? Is the question-and-answer
method of the catechism theologically as well as pedagogically
significant? In answering this question, which is so important
sociologically, and has been frequently discussed, there has been
a great deal of one-sided argument. It is characteristic of the
preacher that he simultaneously questions and proclaims. He
must ask along with the congregation, and form a 'Socratic'
community — otherwise he could not give any reply. But he can
reply, and he must, because he knows God's utterance in Christ.
He is there in the pulpit to proclaim the truth, to be a teacher,
and to let the hearers know. In sociological terms, in the sermon
God's claim of authority is made plain to his congregation. The
congregation is the society of authority. But the preacher him-
self does not have this authority — this belongs to the Word which
he speaks. Jesus in his preaching combined personal and objec-
tive authority, but not so the preacher. The preacher himself is
a member of the fallible and sinful congregation, and thus we
have sociologically a twofold character in the congregation
where preaching takes place. It is a pre-supposition of a Christian
congregation that it comes together as a questioner, and at the
same time it is the strength of the congregation that each indi-
vidual learns of the knowledge and the truth that belong to
the congregation, and in so learning possesses the truth, that is, in
faith. Here too it is true of this knowledge of faith that it is
possessed only in a constant question about the truth and a
constant winning anew of this knowledge. Question and
answer go together, not because there is in fact no answer (as
Barth says127) but because the actual answer can only be grasped
in faith.

In brief, the congregation in which preaching takes place is
ethical and personalist, it is a community of men who ask

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questions and who know, it is a community which bows before
God's claim of authority.

What then is the situation with the congregation gathered for
the administration of the sacraments? The Roman Catholic con-
cept of grace produces a magical concept of the sacraments;
infant baptism must be understood as having the same signific-
ance as adult baptism. This means, however, that the Roman
Catholic congregation gathered for the sacraments is the 'mass',
which formally corresponds to the idea of the massa perditionis,
but is now united in a positive direction. Original sin, regarded
as a natural fate, is set aside by the natural physical infusion of
grace. But sociologically the 'mass' is the concept correlative to a
physical dynamis. Is there also a Protestant congregation com-
posed of the 'mass' ? Tillich, prompted by the proper feeling
that the 'Spirit' turns away from the masses, made an attempt to
discover an immediate relationship between the two128 by seeing
the sanctity of the mass in the fact that, as something unformed,
it might be an object for the revelation of the formative Absolute.
But this has nothing to do with Christian theology. We know
only the sanctity of the church of God, which is bound up with
the Word in Christ and formed by it. The Word is taken up
only by personal appropriation, so that the church presses out of
the mass. But what Tillich was trying to point out is nevertheless
important. The church must enter into a discussion with the
mass; it must hear when the masses are calling for community,
as in the Youth Movement and in sport, for instance; and it
must then not neglect to make its Word of the sanctorum communio
heard in their midst. The basic rule, however, is that the mass
must be adjusted to the Christian idea, and not the other way
round.

The Protestant idea of the sacraments is necessarily connected
with the Word, and this rules out the idea of the mass. Sacra-
ments are acts of the church, and like preaching they unite within
them the objective spirit of the church and the Holy Spirit
operating through it.

Protestant and Roman Catholic baptism are both infant bap-
tism. But since the children do not themselves have faith, not

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even as fides directa, and yet the sacrament nevertheless requires
faith, what plays the part, for the child, of the one who receives
the sacrament in faith can only be the objective spirit of the
congregation. This takes the child up within it in faith through
baptism, but since, where one member of the church is there the
whole church is, in this child it is the whole church that is be-
lieving. Thus on the one hand baptism is effective divine action
by the gift of grace, through which the child is placed in the
church of Christ. But at the same time it involves the stipulation
that the child should remain in the Christian church. Hence the
church as the communion of saints carries its children, like a
mother, as its most treasured possession; it is only by virtue of
its 'community life' that it can do this; if it were a mere 'associ-
ation' the act of baptism would be meaningless. So the meaning
of infant baptism is limited at the point where the church
cannot seriously consider 'carrying' the child any longer, where
the church is inwardly broken and it is certain that the child
being baptised is coming into contact with the church for the
first and last time. The church should be open to all, but in
being open to all it should be conscious of its responsibility. The
only reason for its doors being closed can be its responsibility to
God; in this, however, there must be a prompt recognition of
the fact whenever a church has ceased to be a national church
and has become a mission church.129 The interpretation of
baptism as an act of the church is opposed to the idea of a
Protestant 'mass'. Baptism embraces the whole circle of the
empirical church, in that the church is defined by it. (The
question whether all who have been baptised belong to the
body of Christ we discussed earlier.)130

If infant baptism embraces all those who are possible members
of the church, the sacrament of Holy Communion131 gathers
together all who earnestly wish to subject their will to God's
lordship in the kingdom of Christ. The sacrament of Holy
Communion is given to the sanctorum communio as an act symbolic
of the active divine will for communion, and, like the Word, is
real only 'in' the sanctorum communio (in qua) ; that is, it is part of
the organising activity of the church and is of the greatest

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significance for its sociological structure, and it is only in it that
its effectiveness, like that of the Word, is assured.

Holy Communion is, first, God's gift to every individual. Its
sensory nature cannot be ignored. It means that the sacrament
demands a personal decision with the same distinctness with
which it urges itself upon a man, and is equally distinct in its
promise of a gift. The fact that it involves actual physical touch
convinces the individual that its gift and the task whose fulfilment
it expects from him are assigned to him personally (not only to
his spiritual, but to his bodily person) .

Holy Communion is, secondly, and to a much greater extent, a
gift to the church. Christ's spiritual presence is not only symbol-
ised, but really given. Christ comes alive in the faithful as the
church ; the gift, that is to say, is twofold : Christ makes a gift of
himself, of communion with him, that is, he gives me the benefit
of his vicarious Passion and he makes a gift of the church, that is,
he causes it to become new and thus gives the church to the
church itself. He presents each of us with the rights and duties of
priestly action towards our neighbour, and likewise gives each
of us our life in the church. It is his gift that enables one man to
sustain the other, and be sustained in return. In giving himself
he gives us the duty and the strength to act in brotherly love.
In that he is present, in that the church is Christ's body, brotherly
love is there too ; it does not merely follow, even though in point
of time this might appear to be the case ; the presence of Christ
means communion with God through Christ, and the effective
reality of the church as bearer of the individual members.
Christ's priestly action is the basis for ours. I John 3.16 clearly
states this, as does I Cor. 11.26: 'For as often as you eat this
bread and drink the cup, you proclaim132 the Lord's death. . . .'
Just as the performance of the act combines both, so the con-
nection is also materially present. Holy Communion is the
ultimate source of all we said above about the community of
spirits.133 Luther, in the works we quoted at that point, has given
clear expression to the gift and miracle of the church which takes
place in the sacrament.

But the sociological significance of the action in the sacrament

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is not complete unless it is recognised in its third aspect as a
human action before God. A congregation of people professing
its faith places itself before God, and symbolising what has been
done for it, meets in the most intimate fellowship to eat of the
same bread and drink of the same cup. This free gathering to
eat from the table of the altar is not free but obedient symbolism,
which means that divine action is assured. This obedient symbol-
ising on the part of a congregation gathered of its own free will is
what distinguishes it from the congregation where preaching
takes place. The decision brought about by preaching now be-
comes a visible action, a profession of faith not only in God's
grace, but in his holy church. Thus the congregation where
preaching takes place is a necessary presupposition of the congre-
gation in which the sacrament is celebrated, and the latter, as a
fellowship of those professing their faith, is by its very nature
smaller than the former. It is therefore not the case, as is often
supposed, that the congregation for the sacrament brings the
church into existence. It is the preaching of the Word which does
this ; the decisive factor is that the church now bears witness in a
way visible to all, acting obediently and symbolically, and that
God acknowledges it as such in visible fashion.

Two present-day problems demand attention. First, there is
talk of 'the church within the church',134 the members of which
meet regularly within the framework of the local church upon
certain occasions, either within or outside the church, especially
for the sacrament, taking as their warrant Luther's famous
Preface to the German Mass, of 1526. Luther speaks in this of
the setting-up of small gatherings of a private kind for the
purpose of worship, for prayer, Bible-reading and the celebration
of Communion, the members being subject to church discipline
and interdict, for those who 'want to be Christians in earnest'.135
Luther expressed similar ideas as early as 1522.136 On both
occasions it is plain that he is not speaking of a sanctorum communio
visibly represented in such acts, but of serious-minded Christians,
so that the idea of a 'church within the church' is not identical
with the 'true church'. This, however, is the great danger that
must almost inevitably be latent in such an idea. The church

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within the church is not separable from the empirical church
community, and is itself such a community. If the separatist
attitude is nevertheless adopted, the result is the establishment
of factions. It is thus advisable to proceed cautiously with the
idea of the 'church within the church', as also with the thing
itself, which religiously is just as momentous as it is perilous.
The congregation for the sacrament is the empirical church, and
nothing else, not the sanctorum communio in pure form.

Secondly, it has been deplored that communion services in the
big towns suffer from the participants not knowing one another;
the idea of brotherly fellowship is said to lose some of its force
and the services some of their personal warmth. On the other
hand we must ask: is not just such a congregation as this an
overpowering sermon on the significance and reality, transcend-
ing all human community, of the communion of saints ? Is not
the profession of the church and of brotherly love at its most
unequivocal precisely when there are such complete safeguards
against its being confused in any way with any kind of human
fellow-feeling? Does not this kind of communion, in which Jew
remains Jew, Greek Greek, worker worker and capitalist capit-
alist, and yet all are the Body of Christ, much better preserve the
reality of the sanctorum communio than one in which the hard fact of
human differences is veiled in deceptive mildness ? Where there
is a real profession of the communion of saints the strangeness
and seeming coldness can but fan the flame of the true fire of
Christ, but where the idea of the sanctorum communio has not been
grasped and professed, personal warmth can serve only to disguise
the absence of the essential thing, but cannot replace it. Such
then is the special fruitfulness of Communion services in big
towns, and the minister at such services should speak of it in his
sermon too. It is only because the type of sermon still used for
such occasions did not originate in the age of the big cities,
because the sociological phenomenon of the big city is not under-
stood, and because the minister who serves the city-dwellers
does not make himself one of them, that these sermons are
usually so devastatingly irrelevant.

To summarise: the sociological principle by which the whole

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church is built up is the Word. Upon the Word the church
'builds itself up', intensively and extensively. Christ is the
foundation upon which and in accordance with which the
building up (oikoSo/xjj) of the church is carried out (I Cor.
3; Eph. 2.20). And thus it grows into a 'holy temple in the
Lord' (Eph. 2.21) 'with a growth that is from God' (Col. 2.19)
'until we all attain ... to a mature manhood, to the measure of
the stature of the fulness of Christ' (Eph. 4.13), and all this so
that we grow up into him 'who is the head, into Christ'. The
whole process of building goes from Christ to Christ, its point of
unity being the Word. Whereas baptism characterises the
congregation's wish to spread God's lordship as widely as possible
(that is, it characterises for us the fact of the national church),
the congregation gathered for preaching is composed of those
personally placed before the decision of accepting or rejecting
the divine gift ; it is both a national and gathered church. At the
Lord's Supper the church presents itself purely as a gathered
church, as a confessing congregation, and is required and
acknowledged as such by God. But it does not represent the
pure sanctorum communio; it is the smallest of the three con-
centric, sociologically distinct circles, and is both the source of
the church's effectiveness and the focal point of all its life. This
two-sidedness makes for its vitality, which is the vitality of the
church in being at once the point at which God is aiming, and
his instrument.

iv. The sociological problem of the care of souls. On the basis of the
empirical and historical church the relation of one member to
another now takes a new turn. We have to look at the problem
of the care of souls, which is sociologically unique.

The position of anyone engaged in the care of souls (which of
course means every Christian brother) with regard to the church-
member is twofold. On the one hand he is a member of the
church of Christ, and is thus endowed with every priestly right
and duty. On the other hand he is just 'another believer', who
cannot basically say anything of decisive import about me. Thus
in Protestantism the care of souls has two aspects, the 'priestly'

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and the 'counselling'. The meaning and content of the first is
clear from the idea of the church already described.137

The idea of the counsellor, however, presents us with a new
problem. What can be the significance for the Christian of the
fact — thus runs the question as generally put — that he sees before
him another man who is also a believer ? Of what help to the
individual, who has to rely upon himself, is the 'cloud of wit-
nesses' (Heb. 1 2.1), of what help is the example and model, the
history of the church, and tradition ? For the Protestant all these
questions are basically identical. Not only is Christ exemplum as
well as donum for men, but equally one man is these things for the
other. When a man stands before God every model, every
example, every tradition to which he might make appeal vanishes ;
each man must decide alone what he has to do. How is it that
Luther continually emphasises the necessity for one man to seek
'counsel'138 from the other when faced by important decisions,
as also did Kierkegaard, who has spoken as no other has done of
man's solitary state?139 Both men kept their eyes open to the
concrete historical and social relationships within which man
is placed. Man, in fact, is surrounded by models, and should
therefore use them, not transferring to them the responsibility
for his own deeds, but receiving reports from them upon the
basis of which he then freely decides. God has made it possible for
man to seek counsel from others ; it would be presumptuous folly
on his part not to make use of God's offer. Having a history
behind him that testifies against him must give pause to the indi-
vidual who is not without conscience. That was what made the
struggle against Rome so difficult for Luther. Man is meant to
use every possibility that might help him to arrive at a correct
decision. Such is God's will. And the history of the church, the
'counsel of our neighbour', in short the fact that man lives in
society, is of the utmost significance. The two kinds of pastoral
care must therefore be strictly distinguished. The first represents
one man's absolute significance for the other, deriving from the
idea of the church. The second concerns one man's relative
significance for the other, deriving from man's historicity. To
overlook this distinction is to misunderstand the whole Protestant

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idea of the church. It shows once more the difference between
the church and a religious community.

It is not easy to see how we may get this pastoral care in the
church today. At any rate it will only be possible on a proper
understanding of the Protestant view of the church. The first kind
is particularly impossible if there is no understanding of the
presence of Christ in the church. On the other hand, the contact
between members in mutual pastoral care can give concrete
actuality to the idea of the church. If there were the possibility
of regular private confession, this would perhaps help; but of
course only if the church were ready to give the congregation
clear teaching about the real nature of the church.

d. Authority and freedom in the empirical church

The church rests upon the Word.140 The Word is the absolute
authority present in the church. It is indeed present only in the
word of the church, that is, in represented, relative authority,
but it is still the norm directing the church, in accordance with
which the church also 'directs itself. The absolute authority of
the Word demands absolute obedience, that is, absolute freedom,
whereas corresponding to the relative authority of the church we
have relative obedience, that is, relative freedom. The only
irksome element in this formulation is the concept of the relative
authority of the church and the relative subjection and freedom
of the individual facing it. This seems un-Protestant, a threat to
freedom of conscience. And yet it is precisely the acknowledg-
ment of the theological necessity for the idea of the church's
relative authority that makes the boundary between the gospel
of the Reformation and fanaticism in all its forms. We hear the
Word of God in the word of the church, and this qualifies the
church's authority. The fact that the church has the burden of
the Word laid upon it forces it into the responsible situation not
only of having to preach but also of having to speak authorita-
tively, especially upon all points connected with preserving the
purity of the Word, its preaching: upon the creed, dogmatics,

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exegesis, the order of public worship, and so on : — there actually
were Presbyteries once, at which these things were discussed, at
which theology was practised! The church is further called to
speak authoritatively upon its attitude to contemporary events
and to the world at large, but this, of course, only after it has
spoken clearly and unequivocally about the primary things:
otherwise everything else will be lost in thin air. But even in
cases where the church is not able to speak authoritatively it may
still have recourse to qualified silence essentially different from
ignoring things and passing them over without qualification.
But once the church has spoken authoritatively, upon, let us say,
what it considers to be valid Protestant dogmatics, then I as a
dogmatist — and every Protestant Christian is a dogmatist — have
only a relative freedom in respect to this matter, within the frame-
work of what the church has said, or conversely, I am relatively
bound in my ideas on dogmatics, my confession of faith, and
so on. I owe relative obedience to the church; it has the right
to demand from me a sacrificium intellectus and perhaps upon
occasion even a sacrificium conscientiae. Only when I am faced not
by my detached understanding, my unruly feeling and experi-
ence, but really by the absolute authority of the Word of God
demanding my absolute obedience and absolute subjection does
my relative freedom become absolute ; at this point my relative
subjection to the church can be destroyed if it stands in the way
of my absolute subjection to the Word. If this were not so the
principle of social equilibrium, which is also justified theologi-
cally, would be invalidated; but this would be to demolish the
Christian idea of the church, and we should be back with the
Roman Catholic conception of the church and of authority. The
councils and synods have relative authority and should most
vigorously and emphatically assert it, and plainly and clearly say
what their standpoint is towards the Bible, dogma, the creed and
doctrine, and then there will no longer be cause for them to lament
the world's indifference. But the church must know that its
authority is still a derived and reflected authority. The actual
moment when the individual church member feels constrained
to rebel against this authority, is a matter for God alone ; in any

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case the only valid motive for turning against the authority of
the church would be a perfect obedience rooted in the closest
attachment to the church and to the Word in it; it can never be
an act of irresponsible wilfulness.

e. The church as an independent sociological type, and its place
in the order of sociological types

We now have to fit the picture we have drawn of the church into
our earlier definitions of the nature of sociological relationships.
It is not a genetic question, but the problem of the church's
essential nature.

We said that in the concept of the church there is a collision
between two lines of thought ; between the idea that the church
is founded by God, and that nevertheless, like every other kind
of community, it is an empirical community. This adds to the
difficulty of determining the church's sociological type. It seems,
however, that it can be seen as such a type.

i. The picture of the church as an organised type of social
grouping makes it seem possible to class it sociologically as a
'society'. A society, according to our definition, is based upon a
multiplicity of atomistic wills. It is constructed as a means
directed towards an end. The entry into a society must be a
formal one. What constitutes the society is the contract. It is
possible to construe the sociological type 'church' according to
two types of social groups ; that of an institution and that of an
association.141 The sociological difference between the two is
that the institution is essentially independent of people coming to
it, whereas the association, if its members disperse, is by its very
nature disbanded. If the church were constructed according to
the latter type, it would appear to be an association of those
interested in religion, pursuing their interest in regular meetings,
in exactly the same way as a music club, for instance, comes
together regularly for concerts.142 The church then caters for
the free enjoyment of each individual. The act of confirmation
publicly testifies that the person being confirmed is really

THE COMMUNION OF SAINTS

interested, or is at least willing to submit to the rules of the
association. If of course he loses interest in the object of the
association, he can always declare that he is withdrawing and is
then exempted from paying the 'club subscription' (in the form
of church taxes) . The association is disbanded upon agreement
by all its members. If we feel tempted to ask how the theory that
the church is an association can be reconciled with the church
community's idea that it is an organ of God's authoritative
purpose, we are given an answer in which this claim is reduced to
a merely relative one by a comparison with that of other religious
communities, so this will get us nowhere. The idea of the church
as a construction of this kind seems to be illuminating. But
sociologically it leaves a great many loose ends, (a.) What mean-
ing can be ascribed to the acceptance of infants into an associa-
tion? However fanatical he might be, no chess-player would
dream of making his child a member of a chess-club, (b.) Every
organised association is private, and can refuse admission. The
meetings of the church, on the other hand, are in principle open,
and accessible to all. There is no exclusion from the church.143
(c.) The forms of the objective spirit of an association are con-
ventional, practical, and propagandist; those of the church are
symbolic and full of meaning. Those of the association are dis-
pensed with as soon as their practical usefulness is over; in the
church there are dying forms that are deliberately maintained.144
The association is as such traditionless ; the church is not.

But the theory that the church is an association, if it is already
discredited by the church's external organisation, is completely
demolished when we come to consider the doctrine of the church.
This surely need not be outlined again. A glance at the Christian
view of sin, grace, Christ, the Holy Spirit and the church shows
the complete inapplicability of the idea of an association to the
concept of the church.

The difficulties alluded to above can — so it seems at least —
be overcome by the idea put forward by Max Weber145 and
Troeltsch146 that the church is an institution,147 a 'trusteeship'.
The church, they say, is essentially not a community of persons,
but an institution. In it a certain efficacious gift is promised to

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those fulfilling the requirements for its attainment. A parallel
would be the university, for instance, where the condition for
receiving the gift is the payment of money, but for its effective
reception specific co-operation. Similarly, each member is
enrolled and made subject to a tax, in the institution of the church,
but is guaranteed eternal salvation if he makes regular use of the
means of grace and submits to the institution's rules, its commands
and punishments. It is possible, useful, and indeed required, to
subject children too to the rules of the institution, in order that
they may become partakers of salvation as soon as possible. The
demands made upon the greater number of those who come to
the institution are small. Baptism, confirmation, withdrawal, the
church dues, the meaning of the gatherings of the congregation
and in specific circumstances also the objective-spiritual forms
can in fact be interpreted as institutional, so it seems as if Weber
and Troeltsch are right. The critical point with regard to their
theory is reached only when one inquires into the authority upon
which the institution is based. If it is asserted, as in Roman
Catholicism, that it is simply divinely based, then the purely
institutional character of the church is preserved and demon-
strated, and Weber's and Troeltsch's definition, applied to the
organised phenomenon of the Roman Catholic church, is
sociologically correct. In it the spirit, the institution and the
ministry belong together without necessary reference to the
congregation. From the point of view of dogmatic teaching,
however, there are many obvious contradictions. It is impossible
to interpret the basic social relationships atomistically, if they
claim a Christian foundation. This fact has never been lost sight
of by the Roman Catholic Church itself. In spite of the dis-
similarity of their structure Catholicism affirms both the institu-
tion and the community148 side by side, as is already made clear
in the writings of Augustine. The Protestant 'institution' is not
set up by God over the congregation but is an act of the congre-
gation itself, since the ministry too belongs to it and may be
conceived of only in connection with it. This, however, disposes
of the idea that the Protestant Church is an institution in the
true sociological sense, since, first, there is no Protestant institu-

THE COMMUNION OF SAINTS

tion without a congregation, as there is in Catholicism, and
secondly the gifts it promises are those God gave to a community
of persons, to his church, in confiding to it the Word of preaching,
through which he also sustains the church. The idea of an
association is more correct here, since it at least sees the church
as composed of persons, and it is no accident that it sprang up
— doubtless in connection with the study of Protestant sects —
upon Protestant soil. The whole interpretation of the organisa-
tional forms of the Protestant Church as being those of an
institution must therefore be dismissed as erroneous.

2. It is only by beginning with the church as a community of
persons149 that the Protestant forms of baptism, confirmation,
withdrawal, gatherings of the congregation and church rules
(taxation procedures) can be understood; only from this stand-
point can one understand the structure of the objective spirit of
the church, as it is embodied in fixed forms. This is what we
have now to show. At the same time, the defect in the theory of
the church as an association, and the insufficiency of the socio-
logical concept of community will become clear.

Only a community, not a society, is capable of carrying
children (see p. 57 above). Infant baptism in an association is
nonsensical.

The association theory sees confirmation, or reception as a
communicant, as the moment of entry into the association. Since
we too see in Communion the first open act of profession, it
would seem that we are in agreement with that theory, but only
to someone confusing the problems of genesis with those of essence;
a mistake which is at the root of Troeltsch's entire distinction
between church and sect. All genuine community, as com-
munity of will, presupposes the free act of affirmation of the
community — there are no 'organic' communities, in the sense of
purely vegetable growth, which could be described as human —
and this is true above all of the community of the church. Thus
it is the object of the social act of will that is the decisive factor. If
this is really only the enjoyment of being uplifted by preaching,
etc., then the association theory is quite right. But this is not the
root of the matter. The object of the affirmation is the church,

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in which I come under God's lordship, to which I am grateful
for having baptised and instructed me, and the value of whose
fellowship I recognise — and this view of the matter puts the
association theory out of joint. This is not, however, the whole
significance of the object which is affirmed, as will soon become
clear.

Just as the Christian church, when it accepts members, does
not impose any other condition but the affirming act of will, so
its only condition for the exclusion of one of its members is the
denying act of will. The Christian community has no right to
dispose of the individual member. With an association it is
different: just as upon entry the prospective member must
fulfil certain conditions (respectability as a citizen, payment of
money, etc.), so the loss of these attributes entails exclusion, no
matter how much the person concerned may wish to continue in
his membership. The community of the church by its very nature
and on principle does not practise any exclusion. Protestant ex-
communication150, if it existed, would not be exclusion from the
community, but the temporary removal of the person concerned
from special proceedings of the community. The deepest reason
for this is God's wish that the church should be a historical
church. This is the third argument against the theory that the
church is an association.

Nor can the legal forms of the church be interpreted as being
those of a society ; rather the church must maintain itself, and
it is for that reason that its members pay their dues, just as in a
family everyone contributes to its maintenance. All the matters
thus regulated by law originated in the will of the community
itself. They serve only to make its own life possible.

Finally, the reflection that the church, like every other genuine
community, is an ethical collective person must be a conclusive
proof for the sociologist that the church is a community. The
church has its own guilt, just as a marriage has. It is called and
judged as a whole by God, and is one of many collective persons,
even if it is bigger and more powerful than most. Its uniqueness
does, it is true, first appear when it is conceived of as the com-
munity and church of God, based upon and brought into being

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by the Spirit, as which it is 'Christ existing as the church',
Christ's presence. The association theory as well as the institu-
tion idea fail to cope with the Protestant understanding of the
Spirit and the church, the former in that it does not take the
problem of the reality of the Spirit into consideration at all, and
the latter in that it severs the essential connection between the
Spirit and the church, thus entirely losing its sociological interest.

We shall now show, by reference to the concept of objective
spirit, the inadequacy of the pure concept of community as a
sociological category for interpreting the church.

The structure of the objective spirit, in the forms in which it
is embodied, is clearly that of a community, a way of acting, that
is to say, which is filled with symbolic meaning. Its essential
expression is in the cultus. It is true that when we consider the
proper activities of the church, preaching and the administering
of the sacraments, we hesitate to describe them as purely
representative, although such a description, from the point of
view of their forms, would be possible and quite logical. The
congregation gathered round the Word and the sacraments is
certainly the representation of the church, both before itself and
before God. The means of grace then appear as the adequate
forms of expression of the church. We have already seen that this
is only a part of the matter, and that the administration of the
Word and of the sacraments must also be something effective and
purposive. In line with this idea, we see in the structure of the
church a certain antinomy, which we also saw in the concept of a
community of love. It is not enough to interpret the church as a
community; it is indeed a community, but a community
concretely defined as a community of spirit. And this not only
modifies and specifies the general concept of 'community', but
also postulates a new antinomy in the basic relationship into which
we must inquire.

We must now correct and limit the whole sociological con-
struction placed upon the church by considering the theological
character of the concept of the church. We are speaking not of
religious community, but of the empirical church as the sanctorum
communio present in its actual embodiment as community of

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spirit, extending beyond all community possible to man. A
community of spirit is not the same thing as a communion
between souls; rather, it affirms the community's transcendental
foundation and thus attests that its nature is that of an objective
authority-group, and not of a power-group — a view towards
which dialectical theology seems to incline — which would
exclude all community. This clearly means that the church is
organised towards a certain aim, namely the achieving of the
will of God. But the will of God is aimed at the church itself, as
a community of spirit, so that it is both a purposive society and
an end in itself, in accordance with our perception that the church
is both an instrument and an end in itself. God, as he seeks to
make his will prevail, gives himself to the hearts of men and
creates community, that is, he provides himself as the means to
his own end.

This mutual co -inherence must neither be distorted into a
picture in which there is a community which has in addition an
aim, nor into the idea that there is a society with an aim which
becomes a community — both of which cases would be possible
sociologically. But in the idea of the church the one element
does in fact mingle with the other in such a way that every
attempt to separate them genetically completely destroys the
sense.

The objection that acts of the will cannot simultaneously be of
the nature of a community and of the nature of a society, other-
wise the distinction between the two would have no object, can
be countered only if both acts are comprised and surmounted in
a new and different act; and this in fact comes about in the act
of love wrought by the Spirit in which the community of spirit
consists. I organise my relationship to the other man so that it
has one sole aim : the will of God is fulfilled in my love of my
neighbour ; now the fact that the Holy Spirit loves in me makes
me certain that when I organise my relationship to the other man
so that it has an aim, this aim is the relationship itself. Only the
Holy Spirit in me is capable of linking the two together; his
effect is that, in wishing to be obedient to God alone, that is, in
having a pure aim, which as such lies outside the community, I

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completely surrender my will, so that at the same time I really
love my neighbour. The Holy Spirit unites in himself the claim
for lordship, the will for an aim and the will for a meaning in
drawing the person into his own course, and is thus himself at
once master and servant. The act specially characterising the
conduct of the church is that of love wrought by the Spirit as
manifested in all the different kinds of activities described
earlier. Christian love is primarily not identical with the 'will
for a meaning', it is not directed towards the acknowledgment
of the value of the community, but towards the acknowledg-
ment of the divine will for the other, and thus towards the divinely-
willed value of the other. We have already shown that it is in
complete surrender that one finds the fellowship of the Holy
Spirit ('He who loses his life . . .'). It would therefore be wrong
to say that the specifically sociological action of the Christian
church is that of a community in the ideal and typical sense. Its
action is beyond that of a community and that of a society and it
combines both. And yet it is really a community, the community
of spirit and of love. Here we go beyond the sociological type of
'community', we see it as one-sided. All empirical action by the
church should be judged from the standpoint of the twofoldness
and unity of the will for community and the will for achieving
God's purpose; it is from this standpoint too, that is, that we
must develop the theory of the objective spirit of the church.

The only sociological category that could possibly be com-
pared to the church, and even then only approximately, is, so
far as I can see, the original patriarchal structure of the family,
which, indeed, is imitated by smaller groups of Christians. The
father's will is that his children and servants should five in
community, and obedience to the father consists in preserving
this community. That is why the image of the family occurs so
frequently in the Christian vocabulary, and has given us the most
usual New Testament name which Christians call each other,
namely 'brother'. Paul's saying (Eph. 3.15) that all fatherhood
on earth has its name from the divine fatherhood is very signifi-
cant. That is why, since the earliest Christian times, the idea of
patriarchalism has featured so prominently. The treatment it

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received in the Middle Ages was admittedly also connected with
the class structure and cultural developments of that time, but in
any event it did exploit and revive one of Christianity's earliest
sociological perceptions. Troeltsch has given a powerful
exposition of this idea.151 It does in fact seem that the structure
of the patriarchal system is similar to that of the church, and yet it
provides no possibility for the pure combination in one organisa-
tion of the aim of obedience and of the real community-relation-
ship. Either it is the one or the other ; but effective co-inherence
is achieved only through the action of the Spirit himself, so that
the church can also be characterised as a family moved by the
spirit. The reason for the church's unique sociological structure
is found in the idea of the Spirit, that is, in the reality of its being
based upon the Spirit, which means that the understanding of
this uniqueness can only be theological and not morphological
and sociological. Viewed as a religious community the church,
like most organised social groups, is but an impure case deriving
from an ideal type. We saw that the church can be regarded
sociologically as a community, and our view remains that this
solution is more correct than any other. The religious community
has, it is true, no sociological structure sui generis ; only the em-
pirical church based upon the Spirit has this. In it community,
society and authority-groups are intermingled in real and most
intimate fashion. As this structure becomes effective only
through the Spirit, we speak of it as a community of the spirit.
But we must reiterate that all community exists in faith in the
Word so long as we do not live by sight, but only in a world of
eschatological signs. Love as the community's life-principle
overcomes the social attitude of people to one another. In point
of content the structure is based upon the Christian idea of
revelation. The divine will to rule over men by love seeks to
build a kingdom of persons for itself. Love is the kingdom's aim,
love seeks to rule and conquer; but the kingdom itself is intended
to be the victory of God's love, and thus it is an end in itself as
the kingdom of the loving community; that is, God's love
serves to realise the kingdom and reigns in it. Basically this re-
veals once more the unique involvement of God's rule152 and

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God's kingdom. We met with the same ideas in the antithesis of
the church as an instrument and as an end in itself, which was
also repeated in the action of the church. In preaching, the
church makes itself the instrument of its own constant edification.
It confronts itself in preaching as a social grouping simply and
solely organised towards the will of God. Thus the goal of
God's will is simply the communion of saints. In the means of
grace, just as in the organised forms of church discipline and
doctrine, God's will for lordship is reflected — after the prescript
of Matt. 1 6. 1 8 — not in the persons exercising them, but in the
functions as sustained by the sanctorum communio. Mosheim knew
that in a kingdom one must distinguish between the cives and the
constitution3 This is a fruitful sociological insight. Although
Christ has reserved the iura maiestatis regni sui sibi soli the ordinatio
and gubernatio are nevertheless present in the church too. The
idea of extending the constitutio to the means of grace, as we have
done, in order to see in them an expression of God's rule over
the church, was not familiar to Mosheim. For us the church's
entire claim to authority derives solely from the authority of the
Word. Thus the idea of the priesthood of all believers remains
the principle upon which the church is built. No empirical body
'in itself has a claim to authority over the church. Every claim
derives its authority from the Word. It seems to me that the
necessary conclusion is that the church should become inde-
pendent, that is, be disestablished; but we must leave this
question here.

Thus the objective spirit too, as the will directed towards an
end, strives upon the one hand continually and in an ever-wider
compass to subject individual spirits to itself and hence to the rule
of God, and it is impelled to do this by the unqualified will to rule
of God, who uses it as the means to his end. It is in this boundless
will for subjection that the missionary idea has its foundation.
God is one, and his kingdom shall be the whole world; thus
universality is set in the very heart of the Christian message.
Missionary activity is God acting through the church. On the
other hand the objective spirit is the representation of the com-
munity moved by the Holy Spirit and is itself will for community,

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precisely because it subjects itself to God's will for lordship. In
its structure it is a novum, for it springs from its sources in order to
achieve its purpose and yet at the same time represents itself as the
community. Only from within can one understand this structure
not as an impure sociological type, but as the novum of com-
munity of spirit.

To summarise : the church is a community sui generis, a com-
munity of spirit and of love. In it the basic sociological types,
society, community and authority-group, are combined and
surmounted. In all its effects the objective spirit of the com-
munity must be conceived of both as representative and as
purposive. The relations of the members of the community are
those of a community of spirit and not those of a society. The
only element of a society is that objectively the church is con-
stituted by a final aim. There is no need to repeat here all that
has been said before about the church's multiplicity of spirits
and spiritual unity.

i. Church and Sect. From this point the problem of church and sect
can easily be resolved. We maintain that the sociological defini-
tion of the church is equally applicable to the sect, i.e., that socio-
logically there is ultimately no essential difference between the
two. Thus we oppose Weber's and Troeltsch's now famous
definition that 'the sect is a voluntary association of people
exclusively qualified (ideally at least) religiously and ethically,
into which one enters voluntarily provided one finds voluntary
acceptance by proving one's religious quality.'154 Again, 'The
sect is a voluntary society, composed of strict and definite
Christian believers bound to each other by the fact that all have
experienced "the new birth". These "believers" live apart
from the world, are limited to small groups, emphasise the law
instead of grace and in varying degrees within their own circle
set up the Christian order based on love; all this is done in pre-
paration for and expectation of the coming Kingdom of
God.'155 Holl156 has shown that this idea of the sect derives
solely from Protestant sectarianism and is thus erroneous for this
reason alone. To contrast it with the idea of the church seen as

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something instituted for salvation, into which one is born, which
is open to all the world in adjusting its claims to the masses, makes
it evident that Weber's and Troeltsch's view is based on a genetic
analysis. The essential difference as they see it, is that the church
progresses historically and organically, whereas the sect arises
and subsists only through voluntary union. This distinction,
however, if it is meant as one of principle, is inadequate both
historically and sociologically, historically because in the second
and third generation the great sects often become completely
open national churches, and sociologically because it is an essen-
tial quality of the church community too that it should be a
community of will. This Weber and Troeltsch do not recognise ;
had they done so they would have seen that the genetic approach
was entirely misplaced. For the church too is only a church in so
far as it comes to be effectively willed by persons, i.e., as a gath-
ered church. The purely social act of will is, however, the
same in both church and sect so long as it is oriented upon the
Word of God, that is, so long as it is love wrought by the Spirit.
The sect too, so long as it has the Word, is the church of Christ,
and its community is the communion of saints. Its fundamental
sociological elements are identical with those of the church.
While the church's sociological organisation, as we have shown,
is essentially adequate to the standard character of these basic
ontic relationships and their consequences (infant baptism, the
openness of the church, confessing congregations) the sect, by
excessive and one-sided emphasis on certain insights (the sanctity
of the person, conversion) very often produces one-sided results
in the organisation of its basic sociological relations. These the
national self-conscious church is bound to reject, they are not to
be regarded as adiaphora. But so long as the sect is seen from the
point of view of social acts of a Christian kind truly performed in
it, we have no right to dispute in principle its essential identity
with the church.157

In the distinction we made above between the Protestant and
the Roman Catholic concepts of the church, which consisted in
the fact that the former thinks of the Spirit as linked with the
congregation, whereas the latter links it with the ministry, a

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SANCTORUM COMMUNIO

fundamental sociological difference is manifestly involved. But
we have to go further still. It is the miracle of the divine promise
that where the Word of God is preached it creates a congregation
for itself, wherever it may be. Thus we have to assume that in
the Roman Catholic Church too, where the Word is also preached
such a congregation is present, which falls into the same category
as those of the Protestant Church and the sects. The rock upon
which the Roman Catholic Church founders is not the Word but
'pure doctrine', and it is only from this standpoint that we are to
understand its sociological structure as an institutional church,
which is actually quite different from that of the Protestant
Church. No sociological structure is sacred in itself, and there is
no structure capable of completely obstructing the Word in its
course. That there should be an impulse to achieve pure doctrine
is just as obvious as the fact that no church can claim to possess it
absolutely. We must describe it as an error in the Confession of
Augsburg VII that it directly links the recte docetur with the
congregatio sanctorum. 'Pure doctrine' is not a condition for the
existence of the congregation of the saints (Isa. 55.1 1 says nothing
of this) . That it always tends towards pure doctrine is certain,
but this tendency can remain ineffective through historical
circumstances. We are bound to recognise and believe in
principle, therefore, that the sanctorum communio is present both
in the Roman Catholic Church and in the sect. But we recognise
the Protestant Church as the 'true' one — which is not the same
thing as describing it as the 'essential' church — and think that in
it God has chosen for himself an especially pure instrument for
his work ; which leads us further to believe that it is in a special
sense the lap of God's holy church.

One problem remains. If the church is essentially a gathered
church, what is its relation to national churches? 1. A national
church corresponds to the dogmatic meaning of the church as
offering the gospel to all; 2. but God's gracious will should be
specially recognised in a national church, in that as an organically
developed historical power it possesses greater firmness and lasting
power than the voluntary association : historically sterile periods
can be withstood by the national church, whereas the gathered

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church is ruined by such a time. It is divine grace that we have a
church which is deeply rooted in the history of the nation, which
makes the divine will for us, given through the power of the
church's historicity, relative independent of the momentary
human situation.

Lastly, a national church is reproached for its conservatism, and
certainly often not without reason. But conservatism is not only
a significant power, but it is also justified on the Protestant view
of history. Protestantism never rejects past history absolutely.
Rather, it gives a relative value to history, to tradition. History
cannot be absolutely holy, as in the Roman Catholic view, but
it is nevertheless in some sense the will of God, even in its actual
forms. That is why it was so hard for Luther to break with
history, and to 'make' history himself. The conservatism of a
Protestant national church is based on this relative evaluation
of past history, and it is sceptical of all innovators. It makes the
church old-fashioned, and it runs the risk of canonising the past.
This very conservatism which preserves the good seed in super-
ficial times becomes a danger to the church.

But this conservatism also provides the link with the sociological
elements in the world, the constitution of the state, and the
acknowledgment of the powers of the state in general. This
acknowledgment is assured in principle by the idea of the
priesthood of all believers. Within the sociological reference this
means that since the time of Paul the church has justified
patriarchialism. The dangers of conservatism are obvious, and
the church has often succumbed to them, so that Troeltsch can
even say, 'The churches are husks which gradually harden the
kernel they were protecting.'168

Similarly the Christian evaluation of history gives rise to the
principle of progress in the church. The church must be a church
of the present day, it must take and prove all the forces that
accrue to it from present-day life. Past history is in principle no
more right than the present. As a modern Christian I have both
the right and the duty to criticise history and give form to the
gospel for the present. And every local congregation has this
duty vis-a-vis the whole church. On the Protestant view this

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SANCTORUM COMMUNIO

makes for a balance between the retarding and the progressive
element. The sociological expression of the progressive element
in the church is the idea of organism. The entire life of the
community comes from co-operation of the members. Any
concrete case of the rejection of something new, or the throwing
off of a dead tradition, must be decided by the conscience of the
church authorities. Their finest task is to make every possible
power of renewal and vitality fruitful for the work of the church.
To this task belongs the handing over of certain offices in the
church to charismatically gifted personalities, whether in the
exposition of Scripture or works of love or powers of organisation.
Further, there should be a constant watchfulness over the interests
of the young generation, and a prudent use of the situation where
similar thoughts are stirring, and attentiveness to what is being
said outside the church. Fundamentally it is in this lively attitude
that the law of life for every community is fulfilled : a fighting
movement all the time (such as the Roman Catholic church does
not have — the institution and the people as a mass). Only when
every door is open to this movement, and when on the other hand
the retarding element is powerful enough to reject the useless
and to deal critically with the fruitful, will there be a quickening
mingling of proper conservatism and proper progress in the
church.

Although both powers are at work in every national church
and every gathered church, since they arise from the Protestant
view of history and from historical life as a whole, although,
further, there are national churches with a great will to progress,
and gathered churches, certainly, which are crassly conservative,
in general one can say that the national type of church tends
more to the historical past and the gathered type of church more
to the new and progressive. In view of all we have said, especially
of the necessity of the national church from a dogmatic stand-
point, we can now affirm that the national church and the gath-
ered church belong together, and that it is all too obvious to-day
that a national church, which is not continually pressing forward
to be a confessing church, is in the greatest inner peril. There is a
moment when the church dare not continue to be a national

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church, and this moment has come when the national church
can no longer see how it can win through to being a gathered
church (see above, on baptism and confirmation), but on the
contrary is moving into complete petrifaction and emptiness in
the use of its forms, with evil effects on the living members as
well. We have to-day reached the point where such questions
must be decided. We are more than ever grateful for the grace
of the national church, but we are also more than ever keeping
our eyes open for the danger of its complete degeneration.

To summarise, the sanctorum communio, the type of the Christian
community of love, is bound to the Word of God, and to that
alone. It is present, according to the promise of Isaiah 55.11,
in every historical form in which the Word is preached. Weber's
and Troeltsch's distinction between church and sect is historically
and sociologically untenable. Even in the special sociological
type of the Roman Catholic Church the sanctorum communio is
believed in by virtue of the action of the Word. The effort to
attain to the true church and to pure doctrine is essential.

f. The individual form of the objective spirit in the church
of to-day

i. Church and Proletariat. 'What is the state of . . . the question
concerning the significance of Christianity for the solution of the
modern social problem ? This is the problem of capitalist econ-
omics and the industrial proletariat created by it; the problem
of gigantic bureaucratic and military states, and of immense
increase in population leading to world politics and colonial
policies; the problem of mechanised activity producing huge
amounts of material, and mobilising and combining everything
in world traffic, but also mechanising men and labour. We only
need to formulate the question in this way to recognise that the
most important answer is that this is a problem which is entirely
new and unprecedented for Christian social work' (Troeltsch).159
We can no longer make the last of Troeltsch's assertions in
his form, and yet we must recognise that for the church of to-day

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SANCTORUM COMMUNIO

everything depends on its once more approaching the masses
which have turned away from it, and moreover in such a way
that the church brings the gospel into real contact with the
present situation of the proletariat, in full attentiveness to how
these masses look upon the gospel.

The objective spirit of the church in its present historical
conditions has not yet shown much awareness of this problem.
Christian social work has had some admirable achievements.
But where is there to be found any objective discussion of the
gospel, the church, and the proletariat? On my view it cannot
be gainsaid that the future and the hope for our 'bourgeois'
church lies in a renewal of its life-blood, which is only possible
if the church succeeds in winning the proletariat. If the church
does not see this, then it will spurn a moment of the most serious
decision. Nor is it hard to see that the churchliness of the modern
bourgeoisie is threadbare, and that its living power in the church
is at an end. On the other hand it seems to me as if, despite
outward opposition in the proletariat, there is no modern power
which is basically more open to the Christian gospel than the
proletariat. The living proletariat knows only one affliction,
isolation, and cries out for one thing, community. These ideas
are of course entangled and confined in class consciousness.
Nevertheless they are seeking something more intensively than
the bourgeoisie ever did. The church dare not let the prole-
tariat proclaim 'human peace' without speaking its own word in
this situation. It must not let the socialist youth movements
speak of community without calling into their midst the word of
the sanctorum communio. It must not shrug off the interest in sport
shown by modern youth (not just the proletarians), but it must
recognise that this too is a cry for community in discipline and
struggle, and that here too the Word of the sanctorum communio
could find attentive response. Certainly it will not be heard,
and cannot be heard, in the way it often speaks to-day. For above
all the gospel must deal with the present — and that means at this
moment the proletarian mass— in a concrete way, 'serving the
Lord' (Romans 12.11). But let there be no apotheosis of the
proletariat! It is neither the bourgeois nor the proletarian which

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THE COMMUNION OF SAINTS

is right, but the gospel alone. Here there is neither Jew nor Greek.
Nevertheless the gospel must be concretely proclaimed in history,
and that is why it brings us today face to face with the problem
of the proletariat. It is not very easy to offer a proof for some-
thing which is more instinctive than conceptual, in this case to
prove that our modern church is 'bourgeois'. The best proof is
that the proletariat has turned away from the church, whereas
the bourgeois (the petty official, the artisan and the merchant)
have remained. So the sermon is aimed at relatively secure
people, living adequately in orderly family circumstances, rela-
tively 'educated' and morally relatively solid. So the sermon
meets the need for having something fine and educated and moral
for the free hours of Sunday. Hence the all-too-familiar type of
sermon which is called an 'address', in which proof is offered of
the preacher's literary culture and the corresponding interest
of the 'public'. The danger of the church's becoming a mere
association is obvious. (In this context we also find the mischiev-
ous habit of individual artistic efforts, such as solos by a pro-
fessional singer, in the framework of the service.) If I consider
the pictures hanging in church halls and meeting-places, or the
architectural styles of churches of recent decades, or the church
music provided by Mendelssohn and others, I cannot help
thinking that in none of these things is there the slightest under-
standing of the church's essential social nature. It would be an
interesting task for a sociology of the church to make a historical
examination of its artistic products ; I believe one could perhaps
get a better insight in this way than by any examination of the
charitable works done by the church.

But we cannot pursue this matter. Is it mere accident that all
this has come about? How can it be any different, when theo-
logical students have no duty to get into real touch and dis-
cussion with the present day, alongside their studies, and when
they never hear actual criticism of their position in encounter
with another group altogether, such as the proletariat? There
can be no evangelical message without a knowledge of the present.
But again, I seem to see possibilities opening up of real modern
preaching. I believe that the attempt must be made to bring

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SANCTORUM COMMUNIO

proletarians into the service of the church, and that the future of
our church depends largely on our getting preachers from prole-
tarian circles, in the first instance, of course, for the working-
class congregations in the big cities. I also think that we should
attract children from working-class families to go on in the
Sunday schools to be teachers, and that schools should be
established in which likely youngsters from working-class back-
grounds should be prepared for service in the church. What all
this would mean in detail, cannot be taken further here. If the
need is recognised, then ways will be found. Serious considera-
tion of the gospel, and open eyes for the present are the powers
from which the living church will be born anew.

The church of the future will not be 'bourgeois'. We cannot
tell what it will look like. What is certain is that it is not Thor-
waldsen and Mendelssohn, but Diirer and Rembrandt and Bach
who can make the serious message of the church known. We do
not wish the proletarian spirit as such, nor compulsory socialist
doctrine, but we want to take the church to the proletariat and
out of the 'masses' we want to make 'congregations'. It is true
that the Christian church will always be a community of indi-
vidual persons, who know God in judgment and grace. There
can be no deviation from this, just to please the masses. Tillich's
ideas about the 'holiness of the masses'160 have nothing to do with
Christian theology. We know only of the holiness of the church
of God, and we know that God has bound his church to his Word
in Christ, and that this Word must be personally appropriated.
We know of no 'absolute' revealing itself in the formlessness of
the masses. We know of the actual historical will of God, and
that we do not condemn the mass, but that we yield it to the
power of the deus absconditus — hidden, namely, in his pity — to
speak to us at this point his unknown Word. In this sense we
must say, extra ecclesiam nulla salus. The masses must be pointed
to the idea of the community of the church, not vice versa.

It is not that the idea of socialism corresponds sociologically to
the idea of the Christian community, nor that socialisation means
the coming of the kingdom of God to earth, as is often said by
religious socialists. All the same there seems to us to be a certain

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THE COMMUNION OF SAINTS

'affinity' between socialism and the Christian idea of community,
which we must not neglect. What we have said earlier makes it
clear that the socialist idea of equality is theologically and
sociologically untenable ; making men equal by force is not only
bound to fail, it is also unchristian. The Christian community
is based upon the innate inequality of persons, but nevertheless,
as we have shown earlier, its basic principle is the priesthood of
all believers. The free man remains free, and the servant remains
a servant, and yet both are one in Christ.

The Christian community is also based upon the freedom of the
individual. Enslavement by the majority is unchristian, because
there is no earthly authority intervening between the individual
and God which has supreme power over the individual. The
community and the individual are maintained in equilibrium
(we call to mind the monadic image). Socialism and indi-
vidualism in the genuine sense go together. The distance which
separates socialism and Christianity is clear, when we realise
that in the last resort the Christian idea of community cannot be
fulfilled in any political or economic organisation. Nevertheless
we must take up the threads which are offered to us, and even if
the confrontation and the discussion are hard, the church must
dare to take this step into the life of the proletariat, the masses.

g. Faith in the Sanctorum Communio and 'experiencing the
church'

The point of this question is three-fold :
i. to justify the method of our inquiry;

2. to elucidate the problem of 'church and religious com-
munity';

3. to avoid solemn pronouncements about 'experiencing the
church' and to suggest a more dogmatic approach.

We have been speaking not of the experience of sin and grace
but of their theological meaning and their social intentions. It
was only thus that we were able to establish the reality of the
basic relationships and arrive at a specifically Christian sociology ;

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SANCTORUM COMMUJVIO

otherwise it would have been impossible to form a concept of the
church as opposed to that of religious community. We cannot
deal here with the important problem as to how far faith and
experience belong together. The important thing is that so far
we have kept to faith not as an experience but in so far as it
comprises realities. In so doing I think we have done justice to
the special nature of theological method. Essentially the church
can be understood only as a divine act, that is, in the utterance of
faith; only upon this basis can it be understood as an 'experience';
Only faith comprehends the church as a community established
by God. The so-called 'experience of the church' cannot in
principle be distinguished from the experience of religious com-
munity ; and yet there is a genuine experience of the church, just
as there is an experience of justification. But far too often now-
adays people forget that it is not the experience that makes the
church. Supporters of the Youth Movement who speak of the
church always fail to see the significance of the church's reality,
that is, that it is established by God, and that it exists in principle
'before' any experience. The books of Erich Stange161 and Paul
le Seur162 are especially characteristic of this. The church is not
'made' in great experiences of fellowship ; it is not only historic-
ally but in point of faith too that everyone finds himself already
in the church, when he becomes aware of it. We must re-awaken
the perception that everyone who is moved by the Spirit stands
in the church, and that this is something that is both a gift and
a task. The loudly acclaimed 'will for the church' in its most
recent forms is to be welcomed only in so far as it expresses not
the will to make the church but the will of those concerned to
recognise themselves, and be active, as the church moved by the
Holy Spirit.

The fact that the 'will for the church' and the 'experience' of
the church are for the most part confused with one another is
very characteristic. We shall see at once why it is necessary to
distinguish between them.

The confusion of community romanticism with the communion
of saints is extremely dangerous. The communion of saints must
always be recognised as something established by God, and of

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THE COMMUNION OF SAINTS

course as something we ourselves must will ; but we ourselves can
will it only if it is willed by God through us. It is thus willed by
God 'before' all human will for community, and yet at the same
time it is effective solely as will for community. This antinomy is
overcome only by God's subjection of the human will to his own
will. In actual fact this subjection always remains incipient, but
God sees what has only begun as already consummated. This
means that in .peaking only of the present movement of will for
community we have not exhausted God's action with us; it is
rather that God's merciful judgment considers the new will of
the church community, though constantly breaking down, to be
something holy now, because he himself purposes to make it
holy. God establishes the church in Christ as something which
from that time on is in his view perfect at every moment. But to
make it actual he uses the wills of men, who are thus both the
means and the end. If a community of will is moved by the
Spirit it is always ipso facto the church. The will for the church is
necessary, but genuine only in connection with, or when arising
from, faith in the church which is really present, already estab-
lished by God. 'Experiencing the church' is something else. It is
supposed to make it possible for us to experience the 'others' as
members of the church of God. There are many weighty
dogmatic considerations opposing this. 'We live by faith and not
by sight.' None of us knows whether our neighbour has been
elected, or has remained impenitent. He is completely non-
transparent to us in all that he does. This means not only that
nothing is known about a man's donum perseverantiae, but also that
Christian actions can spring from a hypocritical, misguided
heart, governed by false enthusiasm. Only the opera, and not the
persona, quae in manu Dei est (Calvin), are perceptible; 'the Lord
knows those who are his.' How then should it be possible for us
really to experience the church, and not just religious com-
munity? The church is impalpabilis, insensibilis ; as Luther says,
it must be believed. Even when men reveal their hearts to one
another in love no one of them can with certainty state whether
the other belongs to the church. It is only through faith that the
church can be grasped, and only faith can interpret the exper-

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SANCTORUM COMMUNIO

ience of communion that necessarily arises as evidence of the
presence of the church. Man 'experiences' only the religious
community, but knows in faith that this religious community is
'the church'. Even when two or three are gathered together in
Christian community, and being one in Christ, profess their faith,
they also believe in the church upon the strength of the promise
(Isa. 55.1 1 ; Matt. 18.20) and their experience is only in faith an
experience of the church.

But what does 'believing in the church' mean? We do not
believe in an invisible church, nor in the kingdom of God exist-
ing in the church as coetus electorum; but we believe that God has
made the actual empirical church, in which the Word and the
sacraments are administered, into his community, that it is the
Body of Christ, that is, the presence of Christ in the world, and
that according to the promise God's Spirit becomes effective in
it. We believe in the church as the church of God and as the
communion of saints, of those, that is, who are sanctified by God,
but within the historical form of the empirical church. Thus we
believe in the means of grace within the empirical church and
hence in the holy congregation created by them. We believe
in the church as una, for it is 'Christ existing as the church',
and Christ is the one Lord over those who are all one in him;
as sancta, since the Holy Spirit is at work in it, and as catholica,
since as the church of God its call is to the whole world, and it is
present wherever God's Word is preached in the world. We
believe in the church not as an unattainable ideal, or one which
has still to be attained, but as a present reality.163 What dis-
tinguishes Christian thinking from all idealist theories of com-
munity is that the Christian community is the church of God in
every moment of history and it knows it will never attain per-
fection within the development of history. It will remain impure
so long as history exists, and yet in this its actual form it is God's
church.164

If we now ask at what point faith most purely 'experiences the
church', then the answer is that this certainly does not come
about in the communities built upon a romantic feeling of
solidarity between kindred spirits, but rather when there is

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nothing but the church community linking the individuals con-
cerned, where Jew and Greek, Pietist and Liberal come into
conflict and nevertheless profess their faith in unity, nevertheless
come together for Holy Communion and intercede for one an-
other in prayer; it is precisely in the commonplace surroundings
of every day that the church is believed and experienced ; it is
not in moments of spiritual exaltation, but in the monotony and
severity of daily life, and in the regular worship of God that we
come to understand the church's full significance. All else
merely veils the true state of things. The impulses to community
in the Youth Movement were great, but even when the attempt
was made, they have not been able to contribute much to the
experience of the church. We cannot be too sober about this.
Until people understand what the church is, and that in accord-
ance with its nature we believe in it in spite of, or rather because
of, all its visible manifestations, it is not only dangerous but
thoroughly unscrupulous and a complete confusion of the
Protestant understanding of the church to speak of experiences
that can never constitute a church and in which there is no grasp
at all of the church's essential nature. Our age is not poor in
experiences, but in faith. Only faith can create true experience
of the church, so we think it more important for our age to be led
into belief in the church of God, than to have experiences
squeezed from it which as such are of no help at all, but which,
when there is faith in the sanctorum communio, are produced of their
own accord.

4. The church and eschatology

'We walk by faith, not by sight.' This must be so, as long as
history lasts; thus for us it is a fundamental perception that
history cannot provide the final solution, so that the end of
history cannot provide it either. Furthermore, the meaning of
history cannot be progressive development, but that 'every age
is in direct relationship with God' (Ranke). This provides
theological justification for our sociological method of asking

i98

SANCTORUM COMMUNIO

about the essential structure of the church, and not giving an
outline of its development from the point of view of the philosophy
of history. In principle the course of church history does not
teach us any more about its eschatological significance than does
the understanding of every present moment. In history there are
two fundamental tendencies warring against each other, and
both are destined to flourish in a constant increase of violence
and power. The one is the striving of the sanctorum communio to
penetrate all human life, whether community or society. It
would, however, not be correct to make the final antagonists
the empirical church and the world. Rather the rift passes mid-
way through the empirical church; the struggle between good
and evil is bound to flare up within the empirical church itself;
there will never be a pure church, just as there never has been.
The ultimate antagonists in history will forever be the sanctorum
communio and the Antichrist.165

Christian eschatology is essentially the eschatology of the
church; it is concerned with the consummation of the church
and of the individuals in the church. The concept of the kingdom
of God does indeed embrace not only the consummation of the
church but also the problems of the 'new world', that is, the
eschatology of civilisation and of nature. In speaking of the
consummation of the church and of communities we are dealing
with only a section of the total problem.

The question contains two groups of ideas: that of judgment
and that of eternal life, the consummated communion with God.

How does human community present itself at the judgment?
Judgment is executed upon persons, which evidently means not
only upon individual persons but also upon collective persons.
This implies, however, that we have to conceive of the individuals
being judged not only alone but equally as a member of the
collective persons. A people, a family, a marriage — each under-
goes its judgment as a whole. Here what we said earlier about the
eschatological character of communities and the temporal
character of societies becomes significant. The eternal judgment
is passed upon both, but upon communities as collective persons,
upon societies only as consisting of individuals. Thus the com-

199

THE COMMUNION OF SAINTS

munity, as a collective person, can expect eternal life, but the
society is dissolved. How in particular cases it is possible to
imagine a collective person as being rejected or accepted while
the individual within it is still accepted or rejected on his own
account is something that remains obscure. But we cannot con-
clude from this that the idea of the judgment of the collective
person must be rejected. We have seen how the community as a
collective person is from God to God, and how it must be thought
of as based upon the will of God ; and this holds true at the Last
Judgment as well. The New Testament, too, is familiar with this
idea (Chorazin, Bethsaida, Capernaum in Matt. 1 1.2 iff. and
the words to the churches in Rev. 2 and 3, esp. 3.16 and 3.10).
The thought that God can condemn a collective person and at
the same time accept individuals from it, and vice versa, is just as
necessary as it is unimaginable.

At the judgment each man stands consciously — perhaps for the
first time — before God to receive sentence. Here each man be-
comes a 'person', perceiving God's holiness and his own guilt;
here everyone becomes 'lonely'. But there is a loneliness in face
of the grace of God, and a loneliness in face of his wrath. It is
eternal death to exist in the loneliness of the wrath, that is, in
isolation in guilt, without any ethical connection with the other
spirits, but simultaneously knowing one's guilt and being aware
of what one is missing. If we assume that the spirit lives on free
of the body, then the possibility for communication afforded by
the body is entirely lost; in addition to the loneliness before the
judgment of wrath there is also the state of isolation.166 The
weight of God's judgment of wrath is nevertheless essentially in
the 'loneliness', and not so much in the state of general spiritual
isolation. Loneliness is an ethical category and surpasses the
wretchedness of spiritual isolation; it is not spiritual, but re-
ligious death, and it is conceivable that it will be most felt when
it is not linked with the state of general spiritual isolation.

Luther, like Paul before him, assumed a resurrection and a new
corporality for the godless as well;167 the fact that resurrection
is possible only through Christ and can thus be taken account of
only for the faithful did not prevent either of them from teaching

200

SANCTORUM COMMUNIO

universal bodily resurrection, in order to uphold the idea of the
Last Judgment. But the deepest significance in the thought of
the new body lies in the Christian concept of person and of
community. In the Christian person body and soul are bound
together in an indissoluble unity.168 Real community is possible
only through man's being equipped with a body, so we must
think of body and soul as being essentially connected. We
assume that with the body the sinful soul also dies, and that in the
resurrection God, with the soul, also creates a new body, and that
this new spiritual body is a warrant and condition for the eternal
communion of personal spirits. Whether this idea has its neces-
sary application to the godless is something we cannot go into
here. Thus we can summarise: God's judgment extends over
both individual and collective persons. In the eternal judgment
of wrath God recognises the ultimately recalcitrant will as free ;
the man who wants only himself gets his own way, but simul-
taneously finds that in asserting it he has brought about his own
religious death; for man lives only in communion with other
men and with God.

By the loneliness of the judgment of grace we understand the
judgment of faith in the eternal church, the final decision. The
significance of this moment is that loneliness is completely van-
quished in the church and that individual personality exists only
in the reality of the church. At the moment when man must live
in loneliness and before God through the unspeakable suffering
of the grief of repentance — as we assume the faithful too must do
— he enters fully into the church of Christ which sustains him.

Although we are speaking here of a double issue we must not
do so without at the same time emphasising the inner necessity
of the idea of apocatastasis. We are not in a position to resolve
this antinomy.169 In the concept of the church, as the presence of
Christ in the world urging us to a decision, the double issue is just
as necessarily required as it appears impossible to us, perceiving
that we in no way merit the gift of God's undeserved love we have
received, that others should be excluded from this gift and this
love. The deepest reason for assuming apocatastasis, however,
seems to me to be that every Christian must be aware that he has

201

THE COMMUNION OF SAINTS

brought sin into the world, so that he is linked in guilt with the
whole of mankind, and has mankind's guilt upon his conscience.
No justification and sanctification of man is conceivable if he is
not granted the certainty that with him God also draws to him-
self all those for whose guilt he is responsible. But to speak about
this is only to hope. These ideas cannot form any part of the
system.

God's judgment and grace cover persons, that is, all the indi-
vidual persons in the church ; the multiplicity of spirit as we have
described it earlier, as well as the marriages and friendships that
have entered into the sanctorum communio, and finally what unites
them all, the collective person of the church, spiritual unity.
Ultimately, however, these persons are persons solely in the
fellowship they have with each other — this is something we must
in conclusion emphasise once more — that is to say, in community
of spirit. Community of spirit, however, demands whole persons
in a corporality which must be thought of as the full expression
of the new spirituality. This precludes any mystical ideas of a
final absorption in God as the person who is one and all, of fusion
of our divine being with his. The Creator and the creature
remain distinct as persons. But the creatures too are distinct
from one another, and yet taken all together form the mighty
unity of the congregation of God. They are now 'entirely justified
and sanctified', one in Christ and yet all individuals. Their
community of spirit is based upon and is kindled at their mutual
love. They surrender themselves to each other and to God, and
thereby form community both with man and with God. And
this community, which in history is never more than incipiently
realised and is constantly breaking up, is real and eternal here.
Whereas in the church too the I and the Thou confronted each
other as strangers, in an estrangement overcome only in the
eschatological signs of sanctification, here the revelation of one
heart to the other is consummated in divine love. We behold the
community of love in the mutual revelation of hearts which are
filled by the Spirit. 'I seeks I. They find one another and flow
together . . . reality and truth become the same. . . .'170 The
meaning of love is consummated where one's own person is no

202

SANCTORUM COMMUNIO

longer seen, and so reaches its 'self' in the most intimate com-
munion with the other, a communion which may be called
blessed. It remains a community of will of free persons, and its
blessedness has nothing to do with a mystic fusion. It is the high-
est potentialisation of personal life, just as losing this communion
means death. The mystic has no understanding of the power and
the glory of love. From man's dual destiny of being under God's
lordship and in God's kingdom arises his dual function of seeing
the eternal truth — as formerly he believed it — and practising
the love that is now perfect, the perfect service of the Spirit. The
movement upwards cannot be separated from the movement
towards our neighbour. Both belong indissolubly together.
Ritschl's distinction breaks down. Standing under God's lord-
ship means living in communion with him and with the members
of the church. God wills to be the King and Father of his
subjects and children, he wills to reign over spirits whose will is
free, to have communion with them, but not, as the primal
ground of all being, to be the death of all true being. He is the
God of living persons.

Now the objective spirit of the church has really become the
Holy Spirit; the experience of the 'religious' community is now
really the experience of the church and the collective person of
the church really 'Christ existing as the church'. How they all
become one and yet each man remains himself, how they are all
in God and yet each is separate from him, how they are all in
each other, and yet each man will be alone, how each has God
entirely and alone in the merciful dual loneliness of seeing and
serving truth and love, and is yet never lonely but always really
lives only in the church — these are things it is not given us to
conceive. We walk in faith. But we shall see not God alone but
his church too; we shall no longer only believe in its love and
faith, but see it. We shall know that God's purpose to rule is
constantly over us, and we shall put it into action in the kingdom
of the church. Here the kingdom of Christ has become the
kingdom of God ; here the ministerium of Christ, the Holy Spirit
and the Word is at an end.171 Christ himself gives his church into
his Father's keeping (I Cor. 15.24), that God may be all in all.

203

THE COMMUNION OF SAINTS

What has become reality here is not the ecclesia triumphant, but
the kingdom of God in all the world. There is no longer repent-
ance and faith, but service and sight. Here the wheat is parted
from the chaff, here the age of the historical church, in all its
tribulation, is past. God will wipe away the tears from all men's
eyes. The victory is won, the kingdom has become God's.

This is the church's hope, the hope of our present-day church,
of the sanctorum communio, and it guards this hope as its treasure,
its real hope. It will not make any premature attempts to make it
present. But in hope it grows strong. It knows 'that the sufferings
of this present time are not worth comparing with the glory that
is to be revealed to us.'

204

Notes

Notes to Chapter i

1. The term comes from Comte, Cours de Philosophie, iv, 185, replacing
the term 'social physics'.

2. The best historical survey of the history of sociology is to be found
in Paul Barth, Sociologie als Philosophie der Geschichte, 1896.

3. In addition, the concepts 'sociological' and 'social' cannot be used
correctly. They are related to one another similarly to the con-
cepts 'psychological' and 'psychic'. There are social and psychic
facts, and there is a sociological and a psychological view of these
facts. This clear distinction is hardly ever maintained.

4. Troeltsch, Gesammelte Schriften, iv, 705ff., Tubingen, 1925.

5. The expression 'formal sociology' comes from Simmel's main work,
Soziologie, Untersuchungen uber die Formen der Vergesellschaftung, 1908.

6. Vierkandt, Gesellschqftslehre, para. 3, 13.

7. Vierkandt, op. cit., 28. Cf. Gustaf Stefen, Die Grundlagen der
Soziologie, ein Programm zur Methode der Gesellschaftswissenschqft und
Naturforschung, 19 12, 12: 'Since the subject of sociology is simply
the interactions or influences of human consciousness, the only
possibility for sociology is that it should form part of the psycho-
logical type of science.'

8. Vierkandt, op. cit., para. 7, 47.

9. loc. cit., 14.

10. Tonnies, Gemeinschqft und Gesellschqft, cf. Soziologische Studien und
Kritiken, 1924.

11. Cf., in addition to the work mentioned above, the Philosophie des
Geldes, 2nd ed., 1907, and the summary in the Grundfragen der
Soziologie, i6ff. : 'The insight that man's whole being and utter-
ances are determined by his living in interaction with other men
must lead to a new view in all the so-called humane studies.'
Further, and very significant for the unconscious approach to
Hegelian ideas, 18: 'Through the awareness of the social nature of
production which is interposed between the purely individual and
the transcendental, a genetic method in all humane studies has
been reached.'

12. Von Wiese, Soziologie 1, Beziehungslehre, 1924.

13. Durkheim, Les formes elementaires de la vie religieuse, Paris; also Die
Methode der Soziologie, Leipzig, 1908.

14. Gabriel Tarde, Les lois de limitations.

15. McDougall, Social Psychology, 13th ed., London.

20J

NOTES

16. A. Comte, Sociologie, cf. Tonnies, 'Comte's Begriff der Soziologie',
Studien und Kritiken n, i i6ff.

17. Sociology; also, Introduction to the Study of Sociology. Cf. Tonnies,
op. cit., 75ff., 'Spencer's soziologisches Werk'.

18. Bau und Leben des sozialen Korpers, 4 w. 18753*. ; also Abriss der
Soziologie, 1906.

ig. Gesellschqftslehre, 1919.

20. System der Soziologie, 1.

21. Die Phasen der Kultur, 1908.

22. op. cit., 135.

23. We make use of this concept, which is very unclear in Simmel, in
the interpretation of Vierkandt and others. '

24. It follows, for example, that in order to know a man fully, one must
have known him in all possible situations (Vierkandt, op. cit.,
para. 7, 51), and even then one must be prepared to discover
entirely new sides to him in new situations. Clearly this is a
profound error: to consider the power of circumstances may be
empirically perfectly right, but something decisive has been over-
looked. A man who knows others can really do so from a single
situation, without knowing from experience how the other behaves
in other situations, but simply because he looks at that moment at
the personal centre from which every possible mode of action
arises. In every action the whole person is concerned, and know-
ledge of this person does not rest on the wealth of possible modes of
action, but on the intuitive views of the personal centre.

25. Cf. for what follows Theodor Litt, Individuum und Gemeinschaft, 3rd
ed., 1926, 2056°., 22 iff.

26. Vierkandt, op. cit., 48.

27. Von Wiese, op. cit., 6ff. Cf. Vierkandt's remarks about the disunity
of the person, 5off.

28. I consider it a misjudgment to distinguish in principle SimmePs
formal sociology from the relational teaching of von Wiese and
Vierkandt, as has been done by Schumann in Systematische Theologie,
1926-7, No. 4. It is true that Simmel's formal concept is extremely
imprecise. But he seems to me to be correctly interpreted by the
other two, who have good reason for saying they are building on
Simmel's foundations. Nor does it seem justifiable to me to put
Tonnies and Oppenheimer together. They are allied by a cultural
and philosophical interest, but the interesting thing in Tonnies is
that he joins this to the formal method, whereas Oppenheimer's
method is encyclopaedic and universalist. It is true that Tonnies
deserves a special place in formal sociology; but still, his place is
there.

29. Von Wiese's and Vierkandt's so-called relational teaching is one of

208

NOTES

many accounts which have overlooked this strict distinction. This
teaching is based on a social-philosophical atomism, which at the
same time it tries to refute. Persons are stable and isolated objects,
outside the social process, whose social 'capacities' make possible
relations with other persons. Cf. Litt, Individuum und Gemeinschaft,
3rd ed., 1926, 2056°., 22 iff.; Vierkandt, Gesellschaftslehre, 51, 48;
von Wiese, Beziehungslehre, 1924, 6ff.

30. Uncertainty about the object of sociology leads to the prevailing
conceptual confusion. While the encyclopaedist - universalist
group (cf. Troeltsch, Ges. Schr. iv, 705ff., Vierkandt, op. cit.,
1 iff., and P. Barth, Soziologie als Philosophie der Geschichte, 2nd ed.,
1920) want to use sociology as a generic name for all human
studies, that is, for a universal science, but in this way unwittingly
render it superfluous as an independent discipline (cf. Oppen-
heimer, System der Soziologie, 135), the formal sociologists on the
other hand want to investigate the forms of concrete society. They
seem to find an independent subject-matter in this way. But their
use of empirical methods prevents it from reaching full individ-
uality, leaving it in the realm of historical research. Schumann,
op. cit., has grasped the problem clearly; there are almost as
many definitions of the subject-matter as there are sociological
works.

31. This method has been applied since the beginnings of formal
sociology, at first unconsciously (Simmel, Soziologie, 1908, Tonnies,
Gemeinschaft und Gesellschqft, 3rd ed., 19 19, and Soziologische Studien
und Kritiken, 1924), and later explicitly, in Vierkandt. There the
genetic and the phenomenological approach are in conflict, with
consequent obscurity. The conflict is in his concept of sociology as
a theory of relation, which would in itself require the empirical
method. The defect can be seen in Scheler's Formalismus in der
Ethik und die materiale Wertethik, 3rd ed., 1927, 495ff. Cf. the
works of the phenomenologists, Edith Stein, 'Individuum und
Gemeinschaft', Jahrbuch fiir Philosophie und phenomenologische
Forschung, v, 1922, n6ff., Gerda Walther, 'Zur Ontologie der
sozialen Gemeinschaften', ibid., iv, 1923, Samuel Krakauer,
Soziologie als Wissenschqft, 1924, and Litt, op. cit.

32. It is almost incomprehensible how Max Weber can speak of the
sociology of religion when he is describing the relations of politics,
economics and religion, i.e., of various distinct spheres of learning,
to one another, and is actually doing historical work. Cf. Aufsdtze
zur Religionssoziologie, in; the apparently systematic 'sociology of
religion' in Wirtschaft und Gesellschqft, 1922, 227-363, is also in the
last analysis historical. Cf. the following definition of sociology:
'Sociology should mean a science which interprets social action,

209

NOTES

explaining its course and effects causally.' This explains the
wide range of Weber's essays. Cf. his 'Uber einige Kategorien der
verstehenden Soziologie', Logos iv, 1903. Before Weber, sociology
of religion had hardly ever been concerned with anything but the
history of religion, either from a universalist or an economic
standpoint. Cf. Spencer, Principles of Sociology v, 1, Schaffle,
Bau und Leben des sozialen Kbrpers, 1875, iv, I44ff., and more system-
atically in 1, 68gff., Spann, Gesellschaftslehre, 1919, 323-49. Here
too the prevailing interest is the history of religion. A possible
exception is Durkheim in his study of totemism as the original form
of human society (Les formes elementaires de la vie religieuse, Paris,
19 1 2). Yet even here it is the history of religion and ethnology
rather than a systematic treatment which dominate. So far as I
know, it was Simmel who first attempted a systematic sociology of
religion in his book Die Religion, 2nd ed., 1912. He really dis-
cusses questions of structure in religious societies. Troeltsch in
his The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches (E.t. 1931) un-
folded the history of Christian ideas of community in terms of an
autonomous systematic sociology, though he did so with an
emphasis upon the contingent social structure rather than on the
essentially Christian structure. Finally, Max Scheler in the
Formalismus outlined a systematic sociology, with emphasis on the
problem of a Christian sociology, with which we have still to deal.
If we recall Schumann's essay, already mentioned, which is
concerned with a systematic understanding of sociology, then it
may be seen that we are slowly gaining an inkling of the in-
adequacy of the old concept of the sociology of religion.

Notes to Chapter n

1. Windelband, History of Philosophy, para. 13.

2. We must pass over the medieval developments of Aristode's
philosophy, which were of no small significance for social philosophy
and can in fact be traced as far as Spinoza's and Leibniz's inquiry
into the principium individuationis.

3. The Patristic conception of the person is very close to this Stoic
view, only the personal element is more pronounced, due to the
personal concept of God with its I-Thou relation as the basic one
between man and God, as well as the doctrine of personal life after
death, which is not found in ancient philosophy. Here it is sufficient
to notice the social philosophical teaching of Stoicism which arises
from the new concept of the person.

4. Even Kant agrees (cf. Religion within the Limits of Pure Reason, hi,

210

NOTES

i, 2), except that he considers an emergence from the state of
nature both possible and required.

Exception will perhaps be taken to my ranging Kant among the
idealists. I am conscious of his distance from them all, and shall
have to speak later of how the idea of transcendence is constantly
in conflict with the idea of immanence. But for our present purpose
he is the first of a line stretching to Hegel.

Cf. Heinrich Barth, 'Kierkegaard der Denker' in ^wischen den
Zeiten, 1926, 3, 208, who attempts to base Kierkegaard's ethics on
Kant. What Barth takes to be formalism is the correlate either to
radical subjectivism or to a materialist ethic, which empties the
concept of formalism of any significance. In Kant formalism and
universality are necessarily connected, and this provides a content
for his ethic. When Brunner, in Die Mystik und das Wort, 331,
identifies the Kantian and the Christian concepts of person, the
point of identity lies elsewhere. From many different starting-
points in his ethic Kant could have destroyed his own epistemology.
Cf. Scheler, Formalismus, 512, n. 1.

Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltburglerlicher Absicht, 4th
proposition.

Fichte considered the question of the 'synthesis of the world of
spirits' more seriously than anyone else. He was the only one to
see that the presence of other living men 'in self-active freedom'
was a philosophical problem, which threatened the whole system.
How does one man approach the other? Where is their common
origin? Fichte's answers are manifold and yet very much alike.
(Cf. Hirsch, Die idealistische Philosophie und das Christentum, 1926,
'Fichtes Gotteslehre', 140-290, esp. 26off.) The synthesis of the
world of spirits lies in God. Only because we all come from God
can we reach mutual understanding. Where the essential human
encounter takes place, there is God; and in God the complete
unity of all men is present in the spirit. Outside God each man is
alien to the other, and there is only a plurality of atomistic I's. But
this is not all that Fichte says. In his The Science of Knowledge,
1 80 1 -2, lie sees the synthesis of the world of spirits as founded in
certitude. Certitude necessarily presupposes universal conscious-
ness as well as individual, and is itself neither of these, but absorbs
them within itself. But universal consciousness comprises some kind
of synthesis of spirits, not only from the epistemological but also
from the ethical standpoint. Basically this is what Kant says, when
he links the metaphysical category of the One and the social
category of the species (the synthesis) in the concept of rational
knowledge; as we have already seen, this was misguided and had
unhappy results. Fichte's view must also be rejected as being

211

NOTES

epistemologically false. For on an epistemological basis he draws
conclusions about a fact which lies beyond epistemological com-
prehension. It is impossible to move from the idea of universal
consciousness to the idea of the other man in the sociological sense.
Fichte's basic concept of relation is not a social but a metaphysical
category, namely, the unity of an undialectical synthesis, of same-
ness on the basis of likeness.

Cf. Hirsch, op. cit, 66ff., and Eberhard Grisebach, Die Grenzen des
Erziehers und seine Verantwortung, 1925. The chapter was finished
before I read Gogarten's Ich glaube an den dreieinigen Gott, 1926,
which may also be consulted.

Only when God himself gives man the impulse, enters into him, is
it possible to speak in the Christian sense of such an identification,
and only from the standpoint of 'faith'.

This is not the place to discuss in what sense man is and is not a
barrier for God (sin).

This conclusion cannot help recalling certain ideas of Fichte, the
only idealist philosopher who felt the inadequacy of the idealist
categories for mastering the problem of the 'other'. In connection
with the question of the synthesis of the world of spirits (see above),
Fichte concludes that one man cannot exist at all without kindling
his own personal being at the other man. The realm of persons is
thus closely united by this law of 'collision' ; one man cannot be
thought of without the other. But there is a decisive difference
between Fichte's theory and our own. Fichte says that 'the concept
of the Thou arises by union of the "It" and the "I" ' (Werke, ed.
Medicus, hi, 86, 19 10, cf. Hirsch, op. cit. 236ff.), thus clearly
ignoring any non-synthetic, original concept of Thou. For him the
Thou is identical with the other I and at the same time an object.
Both these ideas we have already rejected.

The other thinker who strove to achieve a concrete grasp of
reality in this problem of the person is Kierkegaard. Our criticism
of the idealist view of time and reality is close to his. But we
differ where he speaks of the origin of the ethical person. For
him to become a person is the act of the I establishing itself in a
state of ethical decision. His ethical person exists only in the
concrete situation, but it has no necessary connection with a con-
crete Thou. The I itself establishes the Thou ; it is not established
by it. Thus in the last resort Kierkegaard did not abandon the
idealist position, and thus he founded an extreme individualism,
which can only attribute a relative significance to the other (cf.
below, on the sociology of the care of souls) .

212

NOTES

Notes to Chapter in

i. Cf. Christliche Dogmatik, Reinhold Seeberg, i, 484.

2. This distinction, which is of course outdated, is used here for
simplicity's sake. It is not important for the general argument.

3. To prevent misunderstanding, we present several pairs of concepts,
essential to our argument, which have to be strictly distinguished.
Structure and intention : the structure of the whole is visible only
in the intention of individual acts, but is in principle independent of
them. Thus a person's structural openness is not affected by
'intimate' intentions (to use Scheler's term), just as, conversely,
structural unity does not affect social intentions. We must also
distinguish between all acts that are real only in sociality, and the
will for community. The former are indeed only acts in virtue of
willing and thinking, but the will does not extend to the com-
munity as content, but the intention of the act, in accordance with
its structure, is indirectly related to the community. Similarly,
an intimate intention does not lead the agent out of the structural
community. But the will for community leads to a concrete form-
ing of basic ontic relationships, and the will to be a person leads to
empirical solitude, without any effect upon the essential structure,
which becomes visible in the intentions of the acts. Basically,
these distinctions end in two different concepts of community, the
first purely ontological, the second empirical. It is unfortunate
that there are not two different words for these concepts. Later we
have to give yet a third meaning to community, as a social type,
and not the summary of all empirical groupings. But the context
will always indicate the proper meaning. The distinctions must be
borne in mind.

4. Cf. Hamann. Humboldt, too, spoke similarly. Cf., for instance,
L. G. A. de Bonald, Essai analythique sur les his naturelles de Vordre
social ou du pouvoir du ministere et du sujet dans la societe, publ. anon.
1800, 2nd ed. 181 7; and P. S. Ballanche, Essai sur les institutions
sociales, 1818. De Bonald and Ballanche develop some highly
imaginative ideas on the original community and its disintegration
in present society. Their ideas about universal reason are tradi-
tional, recalling Hegel's view of objective spirit and ending in a
glorification of the church.

5. Cf. Edmund Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen, vol. 11, 3rd ed. 1922,
8ff. 'Ueber Bedeutungsintention und Bedeutungserfullung' ; Hans
Freyer, Theorie des objectiven Geistes, 1923, 51; F. Mauthner, 'Die
Sprache' in Gesellschaft by Martin Buber.

213

NOTES

6. Cf. Sozialpadagogik, 2nd ed., 1904, 830°. In the long introductory
chapters Natorp seems to me to go beyond his neo-Kantian scheme.
In his account of the three stages of the will, in particular, he
penetrates deeply into a phenomenology of the will and of social
being as a whole.

7. Scheler is certainly right in describing self-consciousness as a
'singularising act of the individual'. But this is just what expresses
a man's intention to detach himself from the Thou as well as to
enter into relations with it. This Scheler overlooks, as Litt has
rightly pointed out. Litt maintains that in its involvement with
the Thou the I learns 'to see itself through others' eyes', or rather, it
learns that it can be observed 'from outside'. The danger is that the
experience of the Thou is put before consciousness of self. But this
is a contradiction : for if I know that I can be observed from outside,
then I must clearly already have some knowledge of my 'self'.
Natorp, op. cit., 'How could I become a Thou for myself, if there
were not first a Thou facing me, in which I recognise another I?'
(90) Cf. Scheler, Formalismus, 543, and Litt, Individuum und
Gemeinschaft, 2316°.

8. Natorp, op. cit., 93. A more detailed philosophical discussion of
this thesis cannot be given here. Cf. the writings of Natorp and
Litt already mentioned.

9. Othmar Spann, Gesellschaftslehre, i03ff.

10. A theory of objective spirit will be given later.

1 1 . See note 2 above.

12. The criterion for such acts is certainly not immediacy. Here Litt,
rather than Scheler, is right (213). But it seems to me that Litt's
fear that to accept the idea of intimate personal acts would run the
risk of establishing stratifications in structure and substance within
the I, between an intimate and a social part of the person, thus des-
troying the essential unity of the I, does not enter into consideration
for us. So long as the one person is conceived as having his place
only in sociality, the direction of the person's intentions cannot
affect the issue.

13. There is no difference in principle here between Fichte's earlier
synthesis of the world of spirits (in the light of the goal) and his later
synthesis (in the light of the origin'). Cf. Hirsch, op. cit., 1406°.
The question simply proves that it is possible to isolate the I. It
is more correct to speak of thesis than of synthesis. Fichte's ultimate
basis for the Thou is the union of the It and the I.

14. Cf. Kistiakowski, Einzelwesen and Gesellschqft, 1899 cc. 1 and 2.

15. Scheler (Formalismus, 54off.) sees the sense in this assumption.
W. Stern (Die menschliche Personlichkeit, 40ft0.) agrees with Scheler.
E. Stein (Individuum und Gesellschqft, 2506°. ) modifies the idea in her

214

NOTES

discussion of Scheler. Litt (op. cit. 2340°., 26off.) rejects it.

16. Rousseau, for instance, committed the error of confusing these
two questions. If with his idea of the social contract (the book
written in 1754, printed in condensed form in 1762) he meant
to say that all specifically human community has its essential basis
in the conscious being possessed of a will, then we should be able to
agree with him. His error, however, consists in the fact that ( 1 ) the
conscious will of the individual is introduced in the wrong place,
appearing already in the origin of organic social formations, such as
marriage in its most primitive forms, and in particular (2) that this
will is conceived of as being purely contractual, which would mean
that all empirical social units should be thought of as having arisen
from such a contract. This, however, is sociologically untenable.
Sociologically a contract cannot be conceived of without the under-
lying social ethos supporting the idea that a contract is binding
(cf. Vierkandt, Gesellschaftslehre, para. 29). The interpretation of
marriage as a form of economic life (Kant, opposed by Hegel) is
one that would never be capable of fully comprehending mon-
ogamy (Kant, Metaphysische Anfangsgrunde der Rechtslehre, para. 24,
Hegel, JVaturrecht, para. 161).

17. From this it follows that the 'social categories', for instance of
statistics, such as of drinkers, unmarried people, suicides, etc.,
cannot be considered as communities either. These distinctions are
already treated in the study of logic. Cf. Sigwort, Logik, 2nd ed.,
vol. 11, 1893, 662ff. ; F. Kistiakowski, Einzelwesen und Gesellschaft,
1 1 iff., H7ff.

18. This in opposition to Schumann's recent definition (£eitschrift
fur systematische Theologie, 1926-7, no. 4) of the social unity which,
he says, is present 'if every soul in question knows of every (!) other
soul that is at one with it in that unity which is comprised in self-
relation to a common aim ; or, as we may more briefly say, at one
with it in the common act of willing'. Cf. for example Gerd
Walther 'Zur Ontologie der sozialen Gemeinschaften', op. cit.,
132. The reciprocal act of the will has no place in the list she
presents of the thirteen constituents of community.

19. It was Hobbes who was probably the first to express the purely
social significance of strife. He saw the origin and sense of
socialisation in the helium omnium contra omnes, and Kant, with
reservations, agreed with this (Religion within the Limits of Pure
Reason, 111, 1.2). But Hobbes was only seeking to present the theory
of the contract, and the status belli omnium in omnes (as Kant amended
the expression) is something which essentially exists before and
outside society. It is to regulate this state, so to speak, that the
social contract is entered into (Rousseau, see above). Kant sees

215

NOTES

'antagonism' as the spiritual principle that drives society forward
{Ideen zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltburgerlicher Absicht, fourth
proposition). Attraction and repulsion always go together; in
strife life, talent and art develop. 'Man wants harmony, but
Nature has a better knowledge of what is good for the human race;
Nature wants discord' (Kant ibid.).

20. Seeberg, Christliche Dogmatik 1, 513.

a I. Tonnies, Gemeinschqft und Gesellschqft, 6th ed., 1926, 103, has dis-
tinguished between 'essential will' ( Wesenwille) and 'arbitrary will'
(Kiirwille). (Eng. tr., Community and Association, 1955, i36ff.,
'natural and rational will'). The distinction we shall make does not
correspond to this, because Tonnies confuses the phenomenological
analysis of the acts of the will and the social structures with a genetic
method of observation, a proceeding which, following the principles
we have so far evolved, must be rejected as unmethodical. Clearly
for Tonnies the genesis of social structures assumed a heuristic
significance for his phenomenological analysis, so that he was un-
able to break away from it again. The genetic method does in fact
come close to the truth here, but its application to the concept of
the church, for instance, would bring results which we shall later
show are faulty, as they appear in the works of Troeltsch. Even
Scheler often seems to lapse into the genetic method of observa-
tion, instead of following the phenomenological one at which he is
consciously aiming. In order to overcome this error we shall keep
purely to the social acts of the will which we consider essential, and
analyse them alone, deducing the typology of the communities
from them.

22. Cf. Tonnies's definitions, op. cit., 1, para. 1 and 19; the distinction
between the organic and the real formation of the community, and
the ideal and mechanical formation of the society. Freyer, in his
Theorie des objectiven Geistes, 53ff. comes close to the Aristotelian
conception.

23. Windelband, Einleitung in die Philosophic, 2nd ed., 19 19, 'Willens-
gemeinschaften', 306.

24. See the conclusive proof in Scheler, Formalismus, 552ff. ; further
Vierkandt, Gesellschaftslehre, para. 29.

25. von Gierke, Das deutsche Genossenschaftsrecht, esp. 1, 1868, 12-
140.

26. I cannot agree with Schumann's view £eitschrift fiir systematische
Theologie, 1926-7, 691, that associations of authority do not create
a unity because A, who is giving the order, seeks to have B's will
directed towards the alteration X, whereas B, who is obeying
it, only wants the alteration X, which means that the will's
object in each case is different. B, however, does not want X, but

21 6

NOTES

wants to conform to A's will, which consists in the guiding of B
towards X.

27. Vierkandt, op. cit., 427; Le Bon, Psychologie des Foules, 1895 (Eng.
tr., The Crowd, a Study of the Popular Mind, 1896). Simmel, Grund-

fragen, 4 iff.

28. This is why people come to confuse the awareness of unity present
in the mass, and the feeling of community; as in my opinion
Vierkandt does (cf. 202ff.), in including the theatre, the literary
circle, the philosopher's republic and also the idea of the invisible
church under the notion of elevating communities. This is clearly
to overlook the intermediary concept of the public, which, how-
ever, is a subsidiary of the concept of the mass.

29. Schumann (op. cit., 690) answers this question in the negative, but
we maintain the opposite. It is a sign of Tonnies's profound view
that he writes (op. cit., 5) 'Community is enduring and authentic
life together, society is transient and illusory.' This view is con-
firmed phenomenologically.

30. This in opposition to Freyer, Theorie des objectiven Geistes, 536°. 'It
is just as complicated, but just as possible in principle, to formulate
the teleological structure of meaning of a moral association or the
community of a people, as it is of the aesthetic structure of meaning
in a symphony.'

31. Cf. Seeberg, Dogmenschichte vol. 11, 3rd ed., 2636°.; Troeltsch,
Soziallehren der christlichen Kirchen und Gruppen; Schilling, Die
Christlichen Soziallehren, 1926.

32. Troeltsch, op. cit., 936°.; Schilling, op. cit., 456°., 796°.

33. Schilling, op. cit., sgff.

34. Troeltsch's terminology.

35. Seeberg, op. cit., 503, 3.

36. Schilling, op. cit., 58: 'State law is nothing but an institution of
reason, enacted by the wielder of power for the protection of the
whole, and for the maintenance of the common weal. This is
essentially the view found as early as Tertullian.'

37. Augustine, de bono conjug. 1.

38. Schilling, against Troeltsch, op. cit., 77. As proof of this the
Fathers often adduced the divine grace of the emperor.

39. Later Aegidius of Rome defended private property in de regime
principium.

40. Troeltsch, op. cit., 127: 'As presupposing plea sure in possession and
gain, trade was suspect to the ascetic view, as taking from one what
it gives to the other, and to the attitude of love it was suspect as
enriching itself with the goods of others.'

41. The fitting of the monastic orders into the organism is somewhat
difficult for a formal concept of equality like that of Troeltsch.

217

NOTES

42. Cf. especially Maurenbrecher, Thomas Stellung zu dem Wirtschafts-
leben seiner £eit, 1898.

43. Cf. Seeberg, Dogmengeschichte, vol. 11, 3rd ed., 4o6ff., 50 iff.

44. Thomas, Summa Theologica, 1, 2 para. 81, 1.

45. Cf. Hegel, Philosophie des Geistes, paras. 483!!.; Hans Freyer,
Theorie des objektiven Geistes.

46. Cf. pp. 87ff.

47. Litt, Individuum und Gemeinschaft, 260. 'The structural principle
which we called social involvement precludes the forming of any
particular supra-personal centre of action, but at the same time
renders any return to such centre of action superfluous.' Why then
should only the individual person have monadic being? Litt
would probably answer: because only the individual has a body.
But the community too has a body (see below). Thus in my
opinion the introduction of collective persons does not do away
with the idea of the monadic image (see also above). Cf. Litt's
excellent critique of organology, 2796°., and also Scheler, Formal-
isms, 54off., on the collective person. Scheler's sociological thesis
has as its starting-point the life-community, seen as the entity
which engulfs the individual. Opposing this there is the society,
which has its basis in individual I's. The highest form of social
being is then, in Scheler's view, the Christian idea of community,
'the unity of autonomous, spiritual, individual single persons, in an
autonomous, spiritual, individual collective person' (p. 555). Its
moral law of life is solidarity (cf. Phdnomenologie und Theorie der
Sympathiegefiihle, 19 13, 65ff.). At the deepest level there are only
two pure collective persons; those of a civilisation, and the
church (p. 668). Thus for Scheler the church is ultimately an
entity which deploys itself in the moral world, and is morally sacred ;
with this, however, he has arrived at most of the idea of religious
community, but not at that of the church. In so far as the socio-
logical structure is concerned, he has failed to understand it in all
its depth, since he lacks an understanding of the concept of Christian
love.

48. Freyer, Theorie des objektiven Geistes, 61.

49. Hegel's Philosophy of Right, tr. T. M. Knox, 1942, para. 156.

50. Freyer, op. cit., 81.

51. Scheler, op. cit., 4136°., 566.

Notes to Chapter iv

1. Two preliminary remarks: in the history of dogmatics the false
translation of ty' d> (Rom. 5.12) by in quo has had a devastating

2l8

MOTES

effect. It was thought that the core of a physical doctrine of
original sin could be seen here, even though I Cor. 15.22 should
have proved that this idea was impossible, with its 'in Christ' along-
side 'in Adam'. Further, it is to be noted that Paul does not regard
the analogy between Adam and Christ as complete. This is clear
without his actually saying it. Adam is man by nature, he is also the
first man, he stands in history. His sin was the 'first' sin. But in a
qualitive sense there are only 'first' sins (see below). Christ was
man and God, he stood both in and beyond history. In so far as
Adam is the man, he can be set over against Christ as the repre-
sentative of the old mankind, in contrast to the new, in a limited
analogy.

The concept of the mass presented here is not a sociological concept
of a social structure, but gathers together a number of persons from
one standpoint.

Cf. Seeberg, Dogmengeschichte 11, 504ff. We cannot go into the
matter of Augustine's theological ambiguity.

Since scholasticism there have been various efforts to establish an
ethical idea of mankind. Anselm, with his background of Realism,
sees in mankind a single substantial reality. Through the fall of the
one man the one mankind was also bound to fall (de fide terin 11) .
Duns Scotus attributes the lost of the divine image to a divine decree,
Thomas Aquinas emphasises the physical and moral unity of man
in Adam. The physical unity consists of the Adamic nature of man :
'omnes homines qui nascuntur ex Adam possunt considervri ut unus homo,
in quantum conveniunt in natural {Summa Theol. 1, 2, qu. 81. 1).
Thomas establishes the moral unity as consisting in the fact that
the members of a community are regarded as unum corpus, while the
community is regarded as unus homo {in civilibus omnes homines sunt
qui unius communitatis reputantur quasi unum corpus et tota communitas
quasi unus homo . . . sic igitur multi homines ex Adam derivati sunt,
tanquam multa membra unius corporis (1, 2, 82.1)). The individual
person of one man stands within the collective person of the human
race. But from this point Thomas turns for clarity to the biological
image of the organism. The member does not have free will, but
must act in accordance with the will of the head. If in the first case
the Augustinian view of nature is not overcome, in the second case
we hear of the moral solidarity of all people, and in the third case
the exclusive responsibility is ascribed to the head of the body. Post-
tridentine Roman theology has taken up the problem at this point,
and developed the theory of the decree of God and his covenant
with Adam (following Duns Scotus). (Cf. Busch, Lehre von der
Erbsunde bei Bellarmin und Suarez, 7off, 1 7ifT., 186; and Ambros.
Catharinus, De casu hominis et peccato originali, 184: 'ipso existentes

219

NOTES

ratione simul naturae et pacti.' So also Suarez. The biblical basis is
Gen. 2.i6ff.) None of these to reach an ethical view of mankind
could succeed so long as they clung to a biological view of man,
connected with the Roman view of infant baptism.

5. Ritschl, Rechtfertigung und Versohnung, 2nd ed., vol. in, 31 iff.

6. Cf. Seeberg, Dogmatik, 11, 4gfT., who was the first to express this
idea. Thus, at page 52, 'however paradoxical it may sound, it is
understandable that men have been able to spread their anti-
social egoism in virtue of their social disposition.'

Notes to Chapter v

1. F. Kattenbusch, Das apostolische Symbol, 11, 928ff., makes it clear that
this word-order was the original one. The earliest source for this is
Jerome, Epistle 1 7, between 374 and 397. The fact that Nicetas of
Remesiana (c.400) uses the opposite word-order is certainly striking,
but this may be explained from the construction of the sentence
(De symbolo 10; cf. Burn, Niceta of Remesiana, 1905, 48). Moreover,
a few lines earlier the sentence occurs: ecclesia quid aliud quam
sanctorum omnium congregatio? (Kirsch, Lehre von der Gemeinschaft der
Heiligen im christlichen Altertum, 1900, 217, n. 4, and 2i5ff. ; English
tr., The Doctrine of the Communion of Saints in the Ancient Church, 191 1,
257, n. 4, and 254ff.). On the question whether it is sancti or sancta
in the sanctorum communio, and who are intended by the sancti, see
the relevant literature: Theodor Zahn, Das apostolische Symbol,
1893, giff.; Kattenbusch, op. cit., 94if.; Harnack, Das Apost-
olische Symbol, 32ff. ; Kirsch, op. cit., 22off. ; Seeberg, Dogmen-
geschichte 11, 1923, 465ff., n. 4. Without being able to give full
evidence here, it is my view that the original form was certainly
sancti; but it is hard to say whether the saints in heaven or
Christendom was intended. There is much in favour of the first
(Kirsch, op. cit., 22off.). In our study the concept is referred to the
church of Christ, 'the company of the saints' (Seeberg). Admit-
tedly, this idea of a company in the sense of a co-operative group
cannot be used by us, in view of the definition we have already
given. We shall speak of a communion or a community of saints,
though as we shall see these do not mean precisely the same thing.

2. (1, 82) Calvin, Institutio, 1536, in, 14.11.

3. (2, 82) Weimar edition of Luther's collected works, 11, 457 (referred
to hereafter as 'W. ed.')

4. (1, 86) Formalismus, 9 if.

5. (1, 88) Luther, from whom Scheler might have been able to learn

220

NOTES

something here, had already made this point. W. ed. iv, 401:
quia spiritualia habent hanc naturam, ut non possint dividi in diversa, sed
diversos et divisos colligunt in unum.

6. (2, 88) H. Scholz, Religionsphilosophie, 2nd ed., 1922, esp. H5fT.

7. Simmel, in Die Religion, 246°., has some perceptive comments on
this point.

8. This definition seems at first to ignore the primitive religions. But
this is not really so. Cf. Seeberg, Dogmatik 1, 70-7. It seems to me
right that genuine Buddhism is not included in our definition. Its
development into a religion only came after the Buddha was
deified.

9. Friedrich Heiler, Das Gebet, 4th ed., 536°.

10. Cf. Durkheim, Les formes elementaires de la vie religieuse — le totemisme,
19 12. Durkheim attempts to make totemism the sole source of all
social life, and especially of the religious social life. The establish-
ment of brotherhood, through a common meal of a cultic animal,
with common rights and duties, led later to the animal being
regarded as the symbol of a community, and this has certainly had
considerable influence on sexual, family and economic life. But the
extent of this influence was not as great as Durkheim supposed.

11. Cf. Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, 228.

12. ibid., 250ft0., and Seeberg, Dogmatik 1, 52ft0.

13. Holl, Kirchenkampf des Paulus in seinem Verhdltnis zu dem der Urge-
meinde, Sitzungsbericht der preussischen Akademie, 1921, g2off.

14. ibid., 932.

15. Cf. especially Cremer, Bibl. Theol. Worterbuch, 'Ekklesia', 480,
Scheel, 'Kirche', 13, Sohm, 'Kirchenrecht', i6ff., Kostlin, P.K.E.3,
'Kirche', Traugott Schmidt, Der Leib Christi, 113ft0., Kattenbusch,
Quellort der Kirchenidee, Harnack, Festgabe, 1921, 1436°.

16. Cf. Harnack, Mission und Ausbreitung des Christentums, 4th ed., 1924,

i, 4IO-33-

17. Schmidt, op. cit., 120.

18. Cf. Dorner, Grundriss der Dogmenschichte, 1899, 40, B. Weiss, Biblische
Theologie, §105, Beyschlag, jV. T. liche Theologie 11, 226ft0., Gloel, Der
Heilige Geist, 303ft0., Holtzmann, N. T. liche Theologie n, 19 iff.,
Feine, Theologie des NT, 446ft0., Alfred Krauss, Dogma von der
unsichtbaren Kirche, 124ft0.

19. Cf. Seeberg, Dogmatik 11, 320ft0., with which I agree.

20. I agree with Schmidt's exegesis of the passages, op. cit., 135.

2 1 . This does not exclude the Holy Spirit giving Christ to the individual
heart, Gal. 2.20, Phil. 1.21, or the Holy Spirit being at work in the
church.

22. v. Hofmann, Commentary to I Cor. 12.12, 'Christ is the I of the
community of his body.'

221

NOTES

23. Cf. Kattenbusch, 'Quellort der Kirchenidee', Harnackfestga.be, 1921,
1 43 flf. , where a similar conclusion is reached to that of Schmidt in
Der Leib Christi. Christ and the church are regarded as being
identical, without, it is true, any mystical conceptions being linked
with this idea (this latter point in opposition to Schmidt). Whereas
Schmidt is still chary (p. 154) of making the equation, after the
example of Bousset (II Cor. 5.17 and elsewhere), between 'in
Christ' and 'in the church', Kattenbusch states that he approves of
this (p. 157). evSvcroLcrOat tov ^ptcrrov is incorporation in
the church. Thus to Paul it is the same whether a man lives
6v xpLcrT<l> or ev eKKXijcria ; ev Irjcrov never occurs as a mystical
expression. Cf. Deissmann, In Christo Jesu: Die neutestamentliche
Formel untersucht, 1892, vi.

24. irXr'jpw/ix here means 'vessel'.

25. Schmidt, op. cit., 154: 'When the community enters Christ, it is not
only turned around by his person, but it fuses with him and is
absorbed in him.' Feine speaks of the 'mystical depth' of the idea
of the church (op. cit. 447). Holtzmann discusses the doctrine of
the church under the title 'Mysteriousness' and speaks of 'mystical
life of association' (194), and then coins the happy formula, 'the
social miracle'. The reference to the mysticism of the idea of the
church is very ancient, and owes a lot to the concept of the corpus
mysticum taken from Eph. 5.32.

26. Cf. Althaus, Die Letzten Dinge, 3rd ed., 1926, 155 and i6gff. ; also
Augustine Ep. 208, 2ff.

27. Cf. Kistiakowski, Gesellschaft und Einzelwesen, 1898, cc. 1 and 2.

28. Cf. Hofmann, Erste Schutzschrift, 1856, 19. Cf. also Schriftbeiveis 1,
1852, chap. 6.

29. A. Ritschl, Rechtfertigung und Versohnung 1, 621 (Eng. tr., A Critical
History of the Christian Doct. of Just. & Recon., 1872, 546), quoting
Hofmann loc. cit.

30. Irenaeus, Adversus haereses in, 24. 1 .

3 1 . Thus Scheler, Formalismus, 555ff.

32. Schleiermacher too finds a theological basis for this scattering of
the disciples {The Christian Faith, para. 122.2): 'We find the
disciples in the mood thus to disperse after Christ's death, and up
to the time of His Ascension their life together was so much inter-
rupted and decreased as to become quite formless. But even when
Christ was alive it could not but be that each felt mainly dependent
on Him, and sought to receive from Him; no one of them all
considered himself ripe for free spontaneous activity in the King-
dom of God yet to be formed.' Jesus had addressed himself to the
disciples' receptivity, they were completely dependent upon him.
Only the Holy Spirit brought about their independent activity and

222

NOTES

reunion. To this it can be objected: i. Schleiermacher equates
the events of Ascension Day and of Pentecost (paras. 122, 1 and 2).
Yet the church was assembled with one accord in prayer and
supplication before Pentecost (Acts 1.1 4-2.1), that is before the
imparting of the Spirit. 2. Schl's. distinction between receptivity
and spontaneous activity is theologically dubious, as he himself
realises (para. 122, 3). In so far as Christ acts, he makes us fully
into recipients, but also fully into independent agents. This
Schleiermacher also admits later, but the spontaneous action, he
says, became truly 'joint' action only after Christ's departure,
and it was only then that he could manifest himself as Holy
Spirit.

33. If the church's temporal determination is posited in Christ, the
action of the Holy Spirit comes under the church's spatial
intention.

34. Cf. I Cor. 15.24. See further Luther's exposition, Erlangen ed. 51,
159 — and Karl Barth's pertinent observations in The Resurrection of
the Dead, 1933, I72f.

35. Seeberg, Dogmatik 11, 27 iff.

36. There is, however, also an ethical idea of vicarious action, meaning
the voluntary acceptance of an evil by one man in another man's
stead. It does not involve the other man's self-responsibility, and
as an act of humanly heroic love (for one's country, friend, etc.)
it remains in the sphere of the highest ethical obligation even of the
man acting vicariously. In acknowledging it a man does not set his
whole ethical person at stake, but only what he owes to the one who
acted vicariously in each case (his body, honour, money, etc.),
whereas he acknowledges Christ as acting vicariously for his entire
person, and thus owes his entire person to him.

37. Schleiermacher, for example, did not perceive this connection.
There are two conflicting lines of thought on the nature of the
church. Cf. Seeberg, Begriff der christlichen Kirche, 1884, 202ff. —
Krauss, Das protestantische Dogma von der unsichtbaren Kirche, 1876,
1036°. — A. Ritschl, T. & R. I Rechtfertigung und Versohnung, ET,
445ff., 475f. This can be shown briefly as follows. 'The Christian
church takes shape through the coming together of regenerate
individuals to form a system of mutual interaction and co-opera-
tion' (The Christian Faith, para. 115). 'If there is religion at all, it
must be social . . . you must confess that when an individual has
produced and wrought out something in his own mind, it is morbid
and in the highest degree unnatural to wish to reserve it to him-
self (On Religion, Fourth Speech, 1958, 148). The basis for the
formation of religious community lies in the individual's need to
communicate. The church is the satisfaction of a need, its

223

NOTES

construction is individualistic. The famous words in The Christian
Faith, that Protestantism makes the relation of the individual to the
church dependent upon his relation to Christ (para. 24) points in
the same direction ; here clearly individual communion with Christ
is conceived of independently of the church. Opposing this there is
the idea of the church as the entity present before any individual,
outside which there is no religious self-consciousness (ibid. para.
1 13), and the entire doctrine of the collective life of sin and grace,
of the shared Holy Spirit engulfing the individual. This contra-
diction was noted by Ritschl, who interpreted it as meaning that
Schleiermacher accorded ultimate precedence to the Individual
over the communal, in that the latter is given only historical,
preparatory significance (paras. 113.2 and 122.3) f°r tne evolution
of the Individual. Thus while the community takes temporal
precedence over individuals, individuals are nevertheless those
who 'would have co-operated in the founding of such a com-
munion if it had not been there already' (para. 6.2), so that the
congregation is at every moment created anew by the individuals'
need. If this were not so Schleiermacher could not have said that it
is the individual's life in communion with Christ which first estab-
lishes his attitude to the church, and only thus can he assert that the
basic sociological structure of the church is the individual's need to
communicate. In his thinking the individualism of social philo-
sophy, which is, however, not 'personalism', although occasionally
it seems indeed to become such, as for instance in this very idea of
the individual's life in communion with Christ, clashes with a
spirit-monism, a pantheism which should, I think, nevertheless in
the last analysis be interpreted as a result of this concept of the
person. Only thus can one explain such diverse judgments as that
of P. Althaus, Das Erlebnis der Kirche, 1924, 8: 'Schleiermacher
proceeds from the individual and justifies the church as a religious
community thus: "Man feels that he must communicate . . . thus
the church arises as a free association" — and that of A. Krauss,
op. cit., 103: "Schleiermacher thus quite ignores the proposition
which previously had had axiomatic force, that in defining the
church one must proceed from the individuals who make up the
coetus. He proceeds instead from the quality of the spirit mightily
manifesting itself in them." '

38. E. Lohmeyer, Zum Begriff der religiosen Gemeinschqft, 1925, 42ff., 44:
'The possibility one has of drawing back becomes a duty for the
believer.'

39. Kierkegaard, who was almost without equal in his ability to speak
of the burden of loneliness, makes it the reason for rejecting the
idea of the church (cf. Furcht und £ittern, ed. H. Gottsched and C.

224

NOTES

Schrempf, 1922, 171). 'From the moment the individual has
entered the sphere of paradox, it is impossible for him to arrive at
the idea of the church' (106; cf. Eng. tr., Fear and Trembling, 1939,
107).

40. Scheler, Formalismus, 587: 'The idea, on the other hand, that the
individual person, resting solely and exclusively upon this his
lonely relationship with God, must first master the idea of solidarity
by means of this necessary detour, would be a denial of the essential
idea of the church itself.' And the note to this: 'This denial has
many forms. Historically, for instance, it is just as much implied
in the consequential doctrine of election by grace as in that of
justification by faith; for according to both doctrines the com-
munity of love and salvation, in its solidarity, is not an intercourse
with God which is as original and necessary as the immediate
intercourse of the intimate person with God. Both are pre-
sented as being first derived from this intimate relationship.' In
simply equating the teaching of election by grace and that
of justification Scheler is overlooking the entire problem of the
Word.

41. Thomas Aquinas, it is true, gives another definition of the church's
compass, as according to him those who are not predestined are also
members of the church. Summa theologica in, 8.3: 'ecclesia con-
stituitur ex hominibus qui fuerunt a principio mundi usque ad finem ipsius
. . . sic igitur membra corporis mystici accipiuntur non solum secundum
quod sunt in actu, sed etiam secundum quod sunt in potentia . . . qui in
potentia sunt ei uniti, quae nunquam reducetur ad actum, sicut homines in
hoc mundo viventes qui non sunt praedestinati.'' This we cannot accept.
Cf. W. ed. vi, 302: 'A head must be incorporated with its body
. . . hence Christ cannot be a head in common with any evil mem-
ber.' The stimulus for the use of the doctrine of predestination for
the idea of the church had already been given by the ancient church,
by Augustine. But it is wrong to think that Augustine's idea of the
sanctorum communio is entirely contained in the doctrine of pre-
destination (Holl, Augustins innere Entwicklung, Akademische
Abhandluangen, Berlin, 1922, 4 iff.). On the contrary, his idea of
the sanctorum communio was merely disturbed by the idea of pre-
destination; he developed a view of the sanctorum communio which
had a tremendous wealth of content, and compares well with
Luther's. R. Seeberg, Dogmengeschichte 3rd. ed., Vol. 11, 1923, 464ft0.,
and Begriffder christlichen Kirche, 38ft0. Wycliffe (Trialogus lib. iv.22)
was the first to present a purely predestinarian idea of the church.
He was joined by Huss, and later by Zwingli (Huss, Tractatus de
ecclesia, esp. chs. 1-7), whose frank division of the idea of the church
into three parts (predestined church, individual local church,

225

NOTES

universal church) , merely succeeded in making the embarrassment
quite evident. The definition of the church's compass cannot tell us
anything about its nature. Krauss, op. cit., p.16: 'The definition
praedestrnatorum universitas is no answer at all to the question of the
nature and concept of the church. We must first have the concept
of the whole as such, before we can reflect upon the individual
parts.'

42. Cf. J. Kaftan, Dogmatik, 4th ed. para. 63, 597.

43. Seeberg, Dogmatik 11, 339X : Ritschl, Justification and Reconciliation
in, 1900, 320: Tf therefore God eternally loves the community of
the Kingdom of God (Eph. 1.$.), He also loves already the indi-
viduals who are to be gathered into it, in so far as He purposes to
bring them into the kingdom.'

44. Holl, Luther, 293, n. 3.

45. I call attention for all that follows to Communio Sanctorum, 1929, by
P. Althaus. Unfortunately it appeared so late that I was unable to
use it fully, but had to confine myself to references on some points
of detail. I was of course delighted to find there the fullest possible
illustration, through Luther, of important parts of the present
work.

46. Lohmeyer, ^«m Begriff der religiosen Ge.meinschqft, 62.

47. Cf. Karl Barth, The Epistle to the Romans (ET of 6th ed., 1933), esp.
45 iff., 4926°. I cannot agree with the way in which in that com-
mentary he interprets the command to love, or with the idea of
community that he deduces from it. 'Love is the still more excellent
(incomprehensible) way (I Cor. 12.31), the eternal meaning of our
comprehensible ways, and the realisation of their "highest places".
Love is therefore human religious impossibility — when it is appre-
hended as the possibility of God : in other words, love is the ful-
filling of the law' (4936°.). Again, 'In the visible and concrete
existence of our contemporaries the problem of God is therefore
formulated concretely and in such a manner as to demand a
concrete answer' (452). That is certainly a legitimate way of
putting it. Tn the concrete fact of the neighbour we encounter,
finally and supremely, the ambiguity of our existence, since in the
particularity of others we are reminded of our own particularity,
of our own createdness, our own lost state, our own sin, and our own
death' (494). This too we can accept. But he then goes on to say
that the nature of love of one's neighbour is 'in . . . the other . . .
to hear the voice of the One' (ibid.). Again, 'we must acknowledge
that our most questionable "I" is one with the "Thou" by which
we are confronted. ... In Christ ... I am not only one with God,
but, because "with God", one also with the neighbour' (495). The
relationship to the other man 'is to be related to the Primal Origin'

226

NOTES

(454), and yet all deeds of love do not aim at a result, but are pure
sacrifice, obedience in the sight of him who confronts our sacrifice in
his 'freedom ... as God' (452). While we can agree with this last
statement, we maintain that love really loves the other man, and
not the One in him — who perhaps does not exist (double pre-
destination! Barth, 452) — and that it is precisely this love for the
other man as the other man by which 'God . . . must be honoured'
(453)' What authority has Barth for saying that the other 'in him-
self is trivial and temporal' (452), when this is the very man that
God commands us to love? God has made our neighbour 'of
supreme significance' in himself, and for us there is no other way in
which he is important 'in himself. The other man is not only 'a
parable of the Wholly Other . . . the emissary' of the unknown
God ; but he is of supreme significance in himself, because God
considers him significant (ibid.). Am I ultimately to be alone in
the world with God ? Is not the other man as a real man to receive
his rights infinitely through God's command? We are not speak-
ing of 'the other man's eternal soul', but of God's will for him, and
we believe that we can apprehend the will of God in all earnestness
only as it is manifested in the concrete form of the other man. Cf.
R. Bultmann, Jesus and the Word, 1935, 115: 'Whatever of kindness,
pity, mercy, I show my neighbour is not something which I do for
God ; . . . the neighbour is not a sort of tool by means of which I
practise the love of God. ... As I can love my neighbour only when
I surrender my will completely to God's will, so I can love God only
while I will what he wills, while I really love my neighbour.' The
second difference between Barth and ourselves is in our con-
ception of communio. 'To be one' with God and with one's neigh-
bour is something totally different from having communion with
him. Barth, however, makes the two things synonymous. Where
there is only love of the One in the other there can be no communio
for here there is ultimately a creeping danger of Romanticism.
Cf. for the whole Kierkegaard, Leben und Walten der Liebe, ed. A.
Dorner and C. Schrempf, 1924.
48. Schleiermacher motivates love for all men as follows: 'No one can
be aware of the divine spirit unless he is at the same time aware
that the whole human race belongs to this spirit. The difference
between individuals is only one of time, namely that some already
have the pneuma hagion, whereas others have not yet received it'
(Christliche Sitte, ed. L. Jonas, vn.ii, 514). This is an impossible
method of finding a basis for love, since apocatastasis can at most
be an ultimate word of eschatological thinking, not a self-evident
point of departure for a dogmatic train of thought. Materially
we have rejected the biological formulation of the idea of mankind,

227

NOTES

as we have the anthropological formulation of the idea of the
pneuma.

49. Luther, Romerbrief, ed. Ficker, 1, 118.

50. Wesen und Form der Sympathiegefuhle, 1923 (ET, The nature of Sym-
pathy, 1954).

51. The Christian Faith, para. 165, 1. Cf. in opposition to this Ritschl,
Justification and Reconciliation in, 277f. ; love is a constant attitude of
will when it 'strives to . . . appropriate the individual self-end
of the other personality, regarding this as a task necessary to the
very nature of its own personal end.' This idea of ends was bound
to follow as soon as love was conceived of as volitional. Haring, for
example, attempts a synthesis: 'Love is the desire for fellowship
. . . for the realisation of common ends' (The Christian Faith, 1913, 1,
340), without making the necessary distinction. Seeberg aptly
defines love as the community of ends in which the one who loves
makes himself the means for the other's achievement of his end
(Dogmatik 11, 322).

52. Is it mere chance that in I Cor. 13 there is no mention of love's will
for communion?

53. Seeberg, Dogmatik 11, 324.

54. Luther, Disputations, ed. P. Drews, 1895-6, 45of. ; christianus est
persona, quae iam sepulta est cum Christo in morte eius, mortuus pecca'o,
legi, morti . . . sed hoc ipsum non cernitur, sed est absconditum in munao,
non apparet, non occurit in oculos nostras . . . in praesenti saeculo non vivit,
mortuus est, versatur in alia vita longe supra hoc posita, coelesti . . . sed e
contra christianus in quantum miles et in militia versatur, hie etiam sentit et
expetit quotidie militiam carnis suae. Cf. 452 — W. ed. lvi, 58: hate
vita non habet experientiam sui, sed fidem ; nemo enim scit se vivere
aut experitur se esse iustificatum sed credit et sperat. Romerbrief, W. ed.

n, 457-

55. W. ed. v, 165: Oportet enim non modo credere, sperare, diligere, sed
etiam scire et certum esse se credere, sperare, diligere. Cf. O. P'.Jer,
Theologie und reine Lehre, 1926, 5 : 'In faith all we can ever do ^ just
believe that God has given our hearts the proper faith. . . .'

56. Cf. Seeberg, Dogmengeschichte 11, 4646°. — Begriff der Kirche, 38ft" —
Augustine's doctrine of the sanctorum communio is to a certain extent
foreshadowed by earlier Christian writers, cf. Augustine, Bapt. v
21 (29) ( Migne, PL 43.191): Sacramentum gratiae dat deus etiam pei
malos, ipsam vero gratiam non nisi per se ipsum vel per sanctos suos.

57. Cf. Althaus, Erlebnis der Kirche, 16. 'Only the church which wor-
ships and loves is an end in itself in the full sense to the eternal God,
as his goal for the world.'

58. Recent sociological works have asserted that the idea of the
sanctorum communio is based upon an indirect, non-immediate

228

NOTES

linking together in a communion. Cf. Spann, Gesellschaftslehre,
I44f. 'The communion of saints: in it, if I understand aright, the
saints are conceived of as beholding only God directly, while among
themselves they are linked only by their similar bond with the
divine Being ... in accordance with his own wish to be a sacred,
distinct state, and not a social one.' Even in the greatest work we
have on theological sociology we find the proposition that the saints
are solely in God, and are thus linked only indirectly with each
other. (Cf. Troeltsch, The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches,
ig3 1, 56: 'In the last resort the idea of fellowship springs from
the fact that those who are being purified for the sake of God meet
in Him.') cf. Scheler, Formalismus, 519.

59. W. ed. x, Part 1.1, 100 — iv, 280; Holl, Luther, 10 1.

60. W. ed. 11, 750. Sermon von dem Hochwiirdigen Sakrament des heiligen
wahren Leichnams Christi, 15 19. Here Luther presents some splendid
and profound thoughts upon the question.

61. Ibid., 749: '. . . Thus we too are truly drawn and transformed into
the spiritual body, that is, into the communion of Christ and all
saints. . . .' 750: 'That is to say transformed through love in each
other.' Baader expresses this by saying that 'with the blood of
Christ's sacrifice' the heart's blood of each individual man was
made fluid again and thus made free; in this wise man was
delivered and redeemed from the petrifaction of his selfhood.
Schriften zur Gesellschaftsphilosophie, Die Herdflamme, 781.

62. Lohmeyer, Zum ^eSrW der religiosen Gemenschaft, 83 . . . 'This
expression of a state where all things melt into one, which no longer
knows the frontiers between the I and the Thou, because in its
religious exuberance it overlooks, as indeed it is bound to do, the
basic fact of the I's singularity.'

63. W. ed. 11, 749: 'Our sins afflict him just as in return his righteous-
ness is our protection.'

64. Ibid., 745.

65. Tesseradecas consolatoria pro laborantibus et oneratis, 1520. W. ed. vi,
131: onus meum portant alii, illorum virtus mea est, castitas aliorum
meae libidinis tentationem suffert, aliorum ieiunia mea lucra sunt, alterius
oratio pro me sollicita est. Atque ita vere congloriari possum in aliorum
bonis, tanquam meis propriis, atque tunc vere et mea sunt, sic gratulor et
congaudeo eis . . . eorum merita ( /) meis medebuntur peccatis.

66. Ibid., 132: quare si dolemus, si patimur, si morimur, hue feratur intutus,
etfortiter credamus ac certi simus, quod non nos aut non soli, sed Christus et
Ecclesia nobiscum dolet, patitur, moritur . . . comite tola Ecclesia viam
passionis et mortis ingredimur.

67. W. ed. 11, 745.

68. W. ed. 10. m, 1; 9th March, 1522.

229

NOTES

69. This phrase 'the communion of saints dies with' makes every
psychological interpretation impossible.

70. W. ed. n, 746.

71. Ibid., 745^

72. W. ed. vi, 131 : nam etsi non sentiatur vere tamen ita agitur, immo quis
non sentiat?

73. W. ed. 11, 754.

74. Symeon the New Theologian, Homily 22 (Migne, PG 120-425):
T have seen a man who so fervently desired his brothers' salvation
that he would often beg God with bitter tears either to save them
or let him also be condemned with them.'

75. Lipsius ad loc, in Holtzmann, Hand-Commentar zum Neuen Testa-
ment, vol. 11, Part 2, 2nd ed., 1891, 145.

76. A. Khomiakov, Collected Works (Russian) 11, i8ff.

77. Cf. I Tim. 2.1 ; Mart. Polyc. 5.1 ; 8.1 ; also Matt. 5.44; Luke 23.4;
Rom. 12.14. Luther, W. ed. vi, 237, demands that we should pray
'for all the distress of all men, friend and foe'.

78. Ps. 49. 7f. I read iacK with the Massoretic Text.

79. W. ed. vi, 238ff.

80. Ibid., 239: 'For verily the Christian church on earth has not any
greater strength nor work than such common prayer against all
that might strike against it. . . .' Prayer is 'invincible'.

81. Ibid.

82. W. ed. vi, 131 : quis ergo queat desperare in peccatis? quis non gaudeat
in penis, qui sua peccata et penas jam neque portat aut si portat non solus
portat, adiutus tot Sanctis filiis dei, ipso denique Christo? tanta res est
communio sanctorum et ecclesia Christi.

83. W. ed. 11, 745.

84. W. ed. vi, 130, where Luther describes the church as the nova
creatura.

85. Cf. Confession of Augsburg vn: nee necesse est ubique esse similes
traditiones humanas seu ritus aut ceremonias ab hominibus institutas. I Cor.
1 . 10 refers to the destructive, evil will, and not to dogmatic opinions.
Likewise Phil. 2.2-3.16.

86. Quotation in T. Schmidt, Der Leib Christi, 136.

87. Upon this subject Schleiermacher, Fichte, Hegel and Kant all
basically say the same thing. Schleiermacher's central concept is
the biological notion of the species. Personality is constituted by
the 'whole system of psychic and physical organisation, which the
spirit appropriates to itself' (Christliche Sitte, 150), whereat the
person disintegrates. A man is a single example of a species
(ibid., 558) and an individual uniquely differentiated from other
men. The individual being is an 'organ and symbol' of the species
(Ethik, para. 157). 'The spirit is one and the same in all men, and

230

NOTES

considered in itself does not bear the personality within it at all,
irrespective of whether we consider it as ~vevfxa aytov or
as Kotvo? Aoyog (Christliche Sitte, 510; The Christian Faith,
para. 123, 3). The first statement on the unity of the spirit seems
acceptable to us. To the question as to the nature of the Holy
Spirit Schleiermacher gives a characteristic answer by identifying
the Holy Spirit and the common spirit, and awareness of the Holy
Spirit with common awareness. The Christian common spirit
tends by its very nature to become the 'spirit of the species'.
Hence the Holy Spirit is clearly nothing but awareness of the
species. The apersonal nature of this concept of spirit and com-
munity is fully revealed in the definition of the Holy Spirit as the
'union of the divine essence with human nature in the form of the
common spirit inspiring the life of the faithful in fellowship with
one another'. This union cannot, however, be described, as that
with Christ can, as formative of persons ( The Christian Faith, para.
1 2 1. 3), and the Holy Spirit's activity is exercised 'without regard
to personal peculiarities' (ibid.). Under these conditions Schleier-
macher's description of the common spirit as a 'moral personality'
(para. 12 1 .2) is no longer of any use. As the One in all individuality
the Holy Spirit effects a 'true unity' (ibid.), which is increasingly
strengthened by men's 'co-operative and reciprocal activity' (para.
121). The individual is taken possession of by the spirit for the
community, so that it may best work through him for the whole
(para. 123.3). The unity of the common spirit is thus constantly in
motion towards itself, or better, is in a continual state of growth
(para. 121), to which end the individuals (examples of the species)
are made use of by the common spirit.

Schleiermacher's positive achievement was his recognition that
the individual has a life which is solely for the community and in
the community, and that the effect of Christ and the Holy Spirit is
primarily directed towards the church, towards its entire life
(para. 12 1.2; biblical basis in John i6.7ff.; Acts i-7ff. ; 2.4;
John 20.22f.). This, as we showed previously, is of course only the
one aspect of Schleiermacher's thinking. This insight, however,
was won at the cost of grievous errors : 1 . The disastrous identific-
ation of the Holy Spirit and the spirit of the species. 2. The
individual must be an instrument, which for Schleiermacher means
that he must be extinguished as a person. 3. In this way Schleier-
macher debarred himself from understanding genuine community
of spirit and genuine spiritual unity. The idea of spirit, by its
application to the species, becomes anthropological and biological
in character, the reason for this being the doctrine of apocatastasis
which Schleiermacher makes his premise. The idea of spirit

231

NOTES

becomes a category of the psychology of species and peoples. The
species is accorded the final claim upon God, because it is the
species; it is the 'value' God wants, which is to be realised and to
which the individual is sacrificed. It is clear that this prevents any
understanding of the New Testament. The biological notion of the
species has no place in a theological inquiry into the church (see
above). If we too describe the Holy Spirit as the spirit of the
church, then it is in an entirely different sense, as has been shown
and will further be shown.

If the common spirit swallows up the spirit of the individual, so
that his personality disintegrates, this bars the way from the outset
to a social idea of community. In this way community is bound to
become 'unity' — that was made clear from the beginning — but
this is to mistake the essential structure of all communities, and
thus of the church too. Schleiermacher's idea of unity, moreover,
is not theological, but psychological, and this confusion goes deep.
It rests on his identification of 'religious fellowship' and 'church'
(para. 12 1.3). The unity of the former is psychological, but the
unity of the church is hyper-psychological, established by God,
objective. If Schleiermacher had seen this fundamental dis-
tinction he would never have identified the Holy Spirit and the
awareness of the species. The former subsists in principle only in
the church. The latter belongs to any community. Seen from
without, the church is indeed a 'religious fellowship', but that is in
fact an untheological way of looking at it.

Summarising, we may say that Schleiermacher not only fails to
penetrate to a conception of social community, and thus to the
essential nature of social 'unity', but that in spite of his efforts with
regard to group life and the union of mankind, he does not reach
the social sphere at all. Thus to call him a collectivist is as in-
correct as to call him an individualist. He is a metaphysician of the
spirit, and the concept of sociality defeats him. This is character-
istic of all the Idealist philosophers. Even Hegel, who talks most of
community, does not succeed in overcoming this deficiency.
Man's natural wonder at the other man's reality has been lost, or,
as Idealist philosophy imagines, 'overcome'.

We can now, very briefly, sketch the further course of the Idealist
conception of community (cf. esp. Hirsch, Die idealistische Philo-
sophic und das Christentum, 66ff. and 20,ff.). It is based upon the idea
that persons are analogous and equal in value. These qualities are
assured by the person's participation in universal reason (Kant and
Fichte), or in the objective and absolute mind (Hegel). There are
many I's, but there is no I-Thou relationship. Kant, who intro-
duces the concept of the ethically responsible person in his concept

232

NOTES

of the kingdom of God (Religion within the Limits of Pure Reason in,
1.4), or sees it, rather, as constituted by such persons, does not
grasp the idea of concrete community, since his concept of person
is apersonal. And yet he came nearest to the Christian idea of
community (Hirsch, Die Reich-Gottes-Begriffe des neueren europdischen
Denkens, 1921, 2off., 25). Fichte's idea of community is best
studied in his theory of the State (Rechtslehre, ed. H. Schulz, 1920).
The community is a 'great self, a collective person to which the
individual persons have to surrender entirely; the persons, how-
ever, merge in this 'unity' (see note above on Fichte's idea of
synthesis) . Hegel was open to concrete individual life, but for him
too it is merely a form of the universal spirit ; thus it is the fate of all
individual life to be drawn up into the spirit of the community.
This spirit is by its very nature hyper-individual ; it is the objective
spirit that has entered into man's historical and communal life
(Rechtsphilosophie and Philosophie des Geistes, paras. 438ff.), 'the
reason of man's life as a species' (Windelband, Geschichte der neueren
Philosophie, 3436°.). — 'In and by reason of my particularity my
personality springs from what is finite in me. . . . The relationship
to the other man arises from the fact that free personality is inwardly
related to the unity of the Unconditional' (Brunstadt, Vorrede zur
Geschichtsphilosophie, Reclam, 27). Everywhere we encounter the
concept of unity; the fundamental reason for this is the concept of
the immanence of God or the identity of the human and the divine
spirit. (So the State is paid divine honours; Philosophy of Right,
para, 258: 'this real God' — similarly Hobbes). This basic ten-
dency is clearly manifested once again in Hegel's concept of the
Christian church. When in Christ the human spirit had recog-
nised that it was one with the divine spirit, and finitude had been
destroyed by the death of death, what had become apparent in
Christ had now to be made effective in the church (Religionsphilo-
sophie, ed. P. Marheineke, 1832, n, 2576*"., 'Das Reich des Geistes';
cf. E. T., of 2nd ed., The Philosophy of Religion, 1895, m, iooff.).
'God existing as the church' (ibid., 261) brings the 'many indi-
viduals . . . back into the unity of Spirit, into the church', and lives
in it as 'real, universal self-consciousness' (ibid., 257; ET, 101).
The awareness of the spirit and of unity is faith, through which
'material history is made the starting-point for Spirit', and in
which it returns to itself (ibid.), 266; ET, 121). There is, I think, no
doubt, in spite of recent objections, that Hegel simply identifies the
Holy Spirit and the common spirit of the church. On his view, the
central point of the entire Christian doctrine of the unity of the
spirit and of the church must be the Lord's Supper. In it the
awareness of reconciliation with God, the return and dwelling of

233

NOTES

the Spirit in man, is most clearly and really represented (ibid.,
274; ET, 132).

88. Hirsch, Die idealistische Philosophie, 73.

89. One might well ask whether it is not the Holy Spirit which best
characterises the personality of the church, and in the Bible it is in
fact the Spirit which is set forth as the uniting principle (see above).
But it is the working together of Christ and the Holy Spirit that
characterises the peculiarity of the object, and the Holy Spirit is
never imagined as the bearer of a 'body'. Seeberg (Dogmatik n,
328) raises the question of the Holy Spirit becoming man in the
church, and wonders whether the Spirit becomes flesh in the
individual members of the church, but rightly points out that this
cannot be, owing to the sinfulness of all men.

90. W. ed. xii, 488: 'Since then we are one cake with Christ, then this
makes us to become one thing among one another too.' rv, 400.

91. W. ed. vi, 293.

92. Sociologists too have acknowledged the sociological significance of
the Lord's Prayer.

93. Cf., as representative of many, Rene Wallau, Die Einigung der
Kirche vom evangelischen Glauben aus, 1925.

94. Troeltsch, The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches, 17 1-6.

95. Modern philosophy of value is unwilling to accept any absolute idea
of equality. When the 'working out of our deepest personality,
that liberating of the soul from everything that is not the soul
itself, that living oneself out according to the law of the I' (Simmel,
Religion, 7gff.) is interpreted as obedience to God's will, when all
depends upon 'the disenchantment of the value present in the
soul', equality can consist only in the fact that 'each individual soul
has allowed its own idea to grow through everything exterior to
itself.' The absolute 'communist idea of equality' must be
rejected. In principle equality before God and equality before
the law mean the same thing; the latter does not imply that 'the
breaker of a police regulation and the man who commits murder
in the course of robbery are of equal value in the law's eyes,' but
that only factors relevant to the law should be taken into con-
sideration; all else is of no significance. Seen theologically, the
concept of sin which this implies is quite superficial. Before
God one sinner is de facto the same as another; each one really
shatters the community. God does in fact overlook our differences
in value; for him there are no degrees of obedience; there is just
obedience or disobedience. The Christian idea of equality
cannot be overcome by the concept of value.

96. Usually in Protestant dogmatics the unity of the church as one of its
'notes' merely signifies something like the unifying bond. In

234

MOTES

Roman Catholic dogmatics this idea is accorded considerably
more importance (cf. the Encyclicals of Pius IX, 1864, Denzinger,
1685-7, and Leo XIII, 1896, ibid., paras. 1954-62; — Bartmann,
Lehrbuch der Dogmatik, 1923, n, para. 149). A distinction is made
between unitas fidei, unitas cultus, sacramentorum, liturgica and the
unitas societatis regiminis, caritatis, which means, however, that the
essential interest is in the principle uniting the empirical church
(Primacy of the Pope, cf. Vatic, sess. IV const, dogm. I de ecclesia,
1 8. 7. 1 870: Peter and the Pope are the perpetuum utrinsque unitatis
principium ac visibile fundamentum ; cf. also, for instance, Adam,
Wesen des Katholizismus,2 1934, 42ff.), and the wish is to show that
the church, being united, is also the one and only church (original
meaning of katholike"= una sola) . The Russian Orthodox Church
lays an uncommonly strong stress upon the idea of unity. Khom-
iakov's presentation (E.T., The Church is One, 1948), in which
he talks essentially of the unity of the church, has a strength and
depth making it almost without parallel among works on the
church (cf. also Arseniev, Die Kirche des Morgenlandes, 1926,
7gff.). But here too the author is really talking of the unifying
spirit of love.

97. Cf. Seeberg, Dogmatik 11, 400.

98. Religion within the Boundary of Pure Reason, in, 1.4: 'Sublime as is the
idea of an ethical commonwealth, it can never be fully attained or
realised by man, but dwindles in his hands down to an institution
that does no more than transcribe the Form of the other ; for when
we come to the material requisite for instituting such a whole, we
find that our means are very much abridged, being contracted by
the narrow limits of our moral nature. But how should we expect
a perfect frame to be hewn from such twisted wood?(!)' Kant's
idealistic scheme had a great effect upon theology, and only
to-day can it be said to have been overcome. See Riickert, Ein
Bikhlein von Kirche, 1857, i62f. ; Hase, Gnosis, 3rd ed., 1869 para.
159; Biedermann, Christliche Dogmatik, 8814, n, para. 935: 'The
Protestant distinction of ecclesia visibilis and invisibilis ... in fact
expresses the contrast between the earthly appearance and the idea
of the church.' Seeberg's recent discussion (Dogmatik 11, 345ff.) of
the essence and appearance of the church is not based upon Kant's
scheme. Rather the essence is what is real in the appearance,
which represents only what is possible. Cf. 346: 'The historical
church is thus the church in so far as it makes it possible for the
true or essential church to exist, and the essential church is the
church because it turns this possibility into a reality.' This com-
pletely disposes of Kant's idea.

99. Cf. the saying of Tichonius, De septem regulis 6 (Migne, PL 18.54) '•

235

NOTES

'If a man believes that the Word has become flesh, why does he
persecute the Word in the flesh?'
ioo. Rosenstock, Soziologie i, 1925, 55. 'No genius, no office, no national
spirit or party spirit in art or science, strife or politics has any
direct connection with the Spirit of God. That spirit is not God.
All sociology begins with this bitter insight.' Rosenstock is dealing
here with a problem usually foreign to sociology.

10 1. Luther's second Preface to Revelation, W. ed. Deutsche Bibel
7,42 1 : 'A Christian is hidden from himself, so that in himself he does
not see his sanctity and virtue, but his unvirtue and unsanctity.'

102. Enarr. in Ps. 128.2, Migne, PL 37.1689^

103. Dorner, Kirche und Reich Gottes, 1883 — Seeberg Dogmatik n, 334ff.

104. Ritschl's well-known distinction between the kingdom of God and
the church {Justification and Reconciliation in, 284ff.) is both theo-
logically and sociologically untenable. 'Those who believe in
Christ, therefore, constitute a church in so far as they express in
prayer their faith in God the Father, or present themselves to God
as men who through Christ are well-pleasing to Him. The same
believers in Christ constitute the kingdom of God in so far as,
forgetting distinctions of sex, rank or nationality, they act recip-
rocally from love and thus call into existence that fellowship of
moral disposition and moral blessings which extends through all
possible gradations to the limits of the human race' (285). How
can the two be separated ? Is not the new morality possible only
in conjunction with prayer? Does faith not imply action? Is not
the community of love inseparable from the unity of faith, the
kingdom of God from the rule of God ? The kingdom of God on
earth, that is, the church, is the community, placed under the
Word, of penitents, of those who pray for one another, and of
those who love, and as such in its whole being it is the Body of
Christ. Ritschl is thus trying to separate two things that belong
together.

105. Hofmann, Schriftbeweis 11. 2, 1855, 67: 'Abram's faith, through
which he became the forefather of the church (Gemeinde) . . .';
97: 'The element in the Old Testament which forms the com-
munity is the promise to the people who obey the Law . . .' Cf.
130.

106. Hofmann, ibid. 125.

107. Seeberg, Dogmatik 11, 348.

108. Hofmann, op. cit., 128 — The church 'has no other adherents than
those living in the flesh', hence those who have died in faith are
not in the church. 'There is no other presence of the Kingdom of
God on earth between the Ascension and the Second Coming than
that present in the shape of the Christian church'; the only

236

NOTES

question is whether God sees the Christian church in more places
than we do.

109. Cf. Ritschl, op. cit. in, 286ff. ; Krauss, Das protestantische Dogma von
der unsichtbaren Kirche, 1071".

no. Roman Catholic dogmatic theology states that they do (see the
quotations from St. Thomas Aquinas, Chap. v. n. 41 above). Dead
members, it says, correspond to the necessary bad parts in the
human body. Protestant dogmatics came very close to this
idea in considering everyone who had been baptised a member of
the essential church, but this meant the introduction of an un-
Protestant conception of the sacrament. (Lohe, Drei Biicher von der
Kirche, 1845; Delitzsch, Vier Biicher von der Kirche, 1847; Kliefoth,
Acht Biicher von der Kirche, 1854; Vilmar, Dogmatik, 1874;
Stahl, Kirchenverfassung nach Lehre und Recht der Protestanten, 2nd ed.,
1862.)

in. For all these ideas are in the last resort identical as far as subject-
matter is concerned. We cannot here go into the much-discussed
problem of the visibility and invisibility of the church. There is
agreement in recent dogmatic theology that the terms should
be avoided to obviate misunderstandings. The special
danger of speaking of the church's invisibility is that when the
term is used the visible, that is, the empirical, church is not
considered as the church, while 'invisible' is used not as the
opposite of what is optically visible, but to describe the essence
of an object, whether it be an object of thought or of visual per-
ception. The 'essential' church becomes optically visible in the
empirical church; its members are seen quite concretely; but
they are seen only by faith. It is meaningless to speak, as people
often do, of making the invisible church visible. The 'invisible'
church is visible from the outset. One can speak only of an em-
bodiment of the empirical church corresponding in a greater or
lesser degree to the essence of the church. The invisible and
visible church are One Church. Luther says they go together like
body and soul (W. ed. vi, 297). This comparison is acceptable so
long as it does not lead us to consider the souls of the particular
believers who are united in this way as the church's invisible side,
which would be an egregious error. We have yet to discuss the
extent to which the church is an object of faith. Cf. Ritschl:
' Vber die Begriffe sichtbare und unsichtbare Kirche'', Studien und Kritiken
32, 1859; 'Die Begrundung des Kirchenrechts im evangelischen
Begriffvon der Kirche', £eitschrift fur Kirchenrecht 8, 1869, 22off.

112. Hirsch, Die Reich-Gottes-Begriffe des neueren europdischen Denkens,
1926.

113. Hofmann, Schriftbeweis 11.2, 95.

237

MOTES

1 14. W. ed. vi, 300.

115. Ad Carolum imperatorem fidei ratio, 1530: sumitur ecclesia universalis
pro omnibus scilicet, qui Christo nomine censentur.

116. The Eastern church lays a quite peculiar emphasis upon the em-
pirical church as a totality. It is not the individual local church,
and even less the individual, but the church as a whole that is in-
fallible. Thus the Pope in Roman Catholic dogmatics is replaced
in the Eastern church by the church as an empirical whole : unity
and infallibility coincide. In the Protestant idea of the church,
where each individual local church is the Body of Christ, it too is
infallible.

117. When our church constitution (Art. 4.1) says that the church is
built up out of the congregation, this is an expression of the
relation between an unorganised and an organised body. 'Church'
here does not signify either the single congregation (this follows
from 4.2) or the historical universal church. The fact that in 4.4
it can be stated that the congregation has to maintain connection
with the church implies that the church is imagined as in principle
separable from the congregation; it would be better to exchange
the extremely flat 'maintain' for a sentence clearly defining the
situation, to the effect that when the congregation is not
its living and sustaining basis the church becomes a meaningless
organisation (Constitution of the Church of the Old Prussian
Union, 1922).

118. Holl, Luther, g6f. ; W. ed. xx, 336: Fides, magna vel parva habet
totum Christum, iv, 40 1 : nunquam habet aliquis sanctorum totum
Christum.

1 19. Religionssoziologie m, 3o6f.

120. Luther could say that if others were of a mind to quote Scripture
against Christ, he was for quoting the dominus scripturae, Christ,
against Scripture. Disputationes, ed. Drews, 12, thesis 49.

12 1. Second Swiss Confession, 1. Cf. Karl Barth, 'Menschenwort und
Gotteswort in der Predigt', in £wischen den £eiten in, 2, 1925;
'Das Schriftprinzip der reformierten Kirche', ibid., 111, 3, 1925;
Thurneysen, 'Schrift und Offenbarung' ibid., 11, 6, 1924.

122. Cf. P. Althaus, Wesen des evangelischen Gottesdienstes, 1926, 176°.

123. I read Kaipuy, not Kvpiia.

124. Luther, Disputationes, ed. Drews, 689, Theses 41 and 42: non est
negandum miracula fieri posse per impios in fide mortua, praesertim si sunt
in officio vel in coetu ecclesiastico, sicut sacramentum et verbum i.e. vita
aeterna, quae superant omnia miracula etiam per Judam Scharioth con-
feruntur. 730. Theses 9-12.

125. Mulert, 'Congregatio sanctorum, in quae evangelium docetur\ (Festschrift
for Harnack, 2926°.), has been at pains to reveal contradictions in

238

NOTES

the 'in qua' which were contained, he said, in the very heart of the
Reformed idea of the church. He thinks that in fact preaching does
not take place in the sanctorum communio, but in the empirical church
and that thus while it sounds as if the sanctorum communio is the wider
circle by comparison with the circle of the Word, in fact the circle
of the sanctorum communio is smaller than that of the empirical
church. He is dominated by the idea of the coetus, which is quite
irrelevant here. His later formulation, congregatio, in qua, does not
represent any dogmatic advance.

126. Wider den hochberiihmten Romanisten, W. ed. vi, 298.

127. See the essays of Barth, mentioned above ; also Lohmeyer, op. cit.,
4ff.

128. Masse und Geiste, 1922.

129. This is what makes instruction for confirmation particularly
significant. It — and not confirmation itself — is the means whereby
the church meets the responsibility it assumed for the child in
baptism. The fact, however, that this instruction is given essentially
with a view to confirmation shows, in my opinion, that the nature
of both is generally misunderstood. Confirmation was and is
largely regarded as the moment when the young person makes his
profession of faith, that is, the faith held by the church. Such a
conception does not seem to me to be adequate to what the
congregation as such can do. At the children's baptism the congre-
gation vows to educate and instruct them in the Christian doctrine,
but it cannot vow that it will bring them to a free profession of their
state as Christians. Confirmation is rather an endorsement by the
children of the fact that they have been instructed by the congre-
gation, and so a demonstration of their gratitude towards it ; the
congregation makes a further vow to take them up, this time as
members who are already instructed and are beginning to have a
will of their own. It intercedes for them and is aware of its full
responsibility for their life. It is confirmandi, and not confirmantes,
who are in question. If the wish is nevertheless to insist upon a
profession of faith by the children who are being confirmed, this
could only be seen in their expression of a desire to remain associ-
ated with the congregation. Hence confirmation is essentially a
vow and a prayer by the congregation for the children instructed
by it, and perhaps further a profession on the children's part of
being members of the church; for the time, for truth's sake, more
should not be required. This, however, is not to say that the
church's confessional character should be abandoned. Rather
the first partaking of the Lord's Supper should be regarded as the
first act of free confession, which means that the combining of
confirmation with Holy Communion is wrong. (Here I find myself

239

NOTES

in agreement with L. Thimme: Kirche, Sekte und Gemeinschafts-
bewegung, 1925, 300.)

130. Cf. further Miinchmeyer, Das Dogma von der sichtbaren und unsicht-
baren Kirche, 1 854, 1 1 4. We have an excellent critique of the book
in Ritschl's Vber die Begriffe sichtbare und unsichtbare Kirche.

131. Cf. Althaus: Communio Sanctorum, 75ff.

132. Indicative! KxrayyeWere , Schmiedel ad loc. in H. J. Holtz-
mann, Hand-Commentar zum Neuen Testament, vol. n, part 1, 2nd ed.,
1891, 131.

133. Hollaz's idea that the influxus of Christ upon the faithful is the
foundation of the most intimate communion evidently has its
origin in the idea of the Holy Sacrament. Examen theologici
acroamatici iv , 1293.

134. G. Hilbert, Ecclesiola in ecclesia, 2nd ed. 1924 — Thimme, op. cit.,
254ff.

135. W.ed. xrx, 72ff.

136. W.ed. 11, 39.

137. Let me add that in my opinion the greatest task at the moment is to
make private confession once again into a living source of strength
for the church. In it the one man assumes the status of a priest for
the other, by virtue of Christ's priesthood, as the church
that makes intercession and forgives sins. The fact that such an act
does not take place only generally in worship, but particularly in
the affliction and anxiety of a concrete encounter between two
persons, is of great significance for the realisation and experience
of the Christian idea of community. We have good reason to listen
here to Lohe's impressive words in his Drei Bucher von der Kirche,
1845, Book 3.

138. W.ed. 11, 470.

139. H. Barth, 'Kierkegaard, der Denker', J?wischen den £eiten rv, 1926,
3, 204.

140. Cf. K. Barth, Church Dogmatics 1.2 (1956), paras. 21 and 22.

141. Empirically, both types usually have an element of community,
sometimes to such an extent that the description 'association' is
sociologically inaccurate. Cf. Spann, Gesellschqftslehre, 419, who,
with the Roman Catholic Church in view, defines the church as
the institution for religious community-life (420). He does not
make any clear distinction between the association and the
institution, as is plain from his definition of the association as a
'voluntary institution' (417). Cf. Gierke, Das deutsche Genossen-
schqftsrecht 1, 143-6, 844-65; 11, 526-72.

142. Cf. Chap, in n. 28 above.

143. It is true that the new church constitution does speak of exclusion
and suspension of the right to vote (para. 15, 2, 3), but never of

240

NOTES

exclusion from the congregation. On excommunication see n. 150
below.

144. We are not speaking here of whether this is right or wrong. Per-
sonally I cannot see in this feature of the church any of the weak-
nesses that are so often condemned. I see it rather as a strength
rooted in the church's historicity, the strength it has of bearing its
forefathers with it, at the risk of being outwardly old-fashioned.

145. 'Kirche und Sekte in Nordamerika', Die Christliche Welt, 1906,
558ff., 578ff.; Religionssoziologie 1, 211. 'A church is in fact an
institution of grace administering the religious goods of salvation
like a trusteeship. Membership is (according to the idea of the
church) obligatory, and is thus no guarantee of the qualities of the
members themselves. One is born into it.'

146. Soziallehren, 362ff.

147. In applying the idea that the church is an institution one must dis-
tinguish between the individuals' relation to the institution and
that of the individuals among themselves. The form of the contract
here is other than with the association, in so far as it is entered into
between the individual member and the management of the
institution, but not between him and the other members. Thus it
is only the contract between the institution and the member that is
'social'. The relation of the individuals among themselves remains
unregulated, and seen from the point of view of the institution
itself is purely accidental. Each man lays claim only to reception
of the gift; individual wills run parallel. Thus it seems possible to
conceive of the participants, seen as a unit, as constituting a mass —
which would be sociologically impossible in an association.

148. An institution which educates its members for community is atom-
istic in construction.

149. Cf. Althaus, Communio sanctorum, who uses other terms but reduces
the difference between the Roman Catholic and Protestant idea of
community to our distinction between society and community
(36) ; whether he is right is something upon which I still have some
doubts. It probably depends whether one considers the Roman
Catholic Church at the point where it is degenerate, or at the
point where it has retained some original good.

150. The answer to the question of Protestant excommunication varies
according to the church's inner and external circumstances. Paul
excommunicates (and even perhaps passes sentence of death) so
that the soul of the man excommunicated may be saved at the last
day (I Cor. 5). That is the only principle we have for our guidance
upon this point. In a pure confessing church, excommunication is
possible and meaningful, but only of course in accordance with the
indicium caritatis on who belongs to the church (cf. Luther's hopes

241

NOTES

for a confessing church in which excommunication might be
possible. W.ed. xrx, 72ff. — W.ed. x, 2, 39). The man, however,
who proves himself by going to church, taking Communion and
living a pure moral life can be regarded as a member of the
church (thus Calvin). For our national church such a definition
would be quite meaningless. To-day it is surely no longer con-
sidered an ostentatious act not to go to church or to take Com-
munion, as it was in Calvin's time. In a national church, ex-
communication, being impracticable, would be devoid of meaning
from the outset. To-day the iudicium caritatis would have to cover a
much wider field than it did previously, and embrace all those
who have never formally renounced the church. If excommunica-
tion is practised in 'the church within the church' there can be no
objection provided it is practised in the Pauline sense. Non
personam ipsam quae in manu atque arbitrio dei est in mortem abdicamus,
sed tantum qualia sint cuiusque opera aestimemus ex lege dei, quae boni et
mali regula est. Calvin, Institutio, 1536, rv, 12.9. It is not per-
missible simply to apply in reverse the New Testament idea 'the
tree is known by its fruit'. Abraham and Hosea, for instance,
would certainly have been excommunicated from a Calvinist
church. Cf. Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling.

151. Social Teaching of the Christian Churches, j8ff., ggf, 2856°.; 'Repeat-
edly we are reminded that Christendom is a great family' (287).
— T. Meyer, Die christlich-ethischen Sozialprinzipien und die Arbeiter-
frage, 1904, esp. 7off.

152. It is a mistake to identify the society-group and the authority-
group because the latter bears reference to the relation of strength
between the wills, the former to the way in which their direction
is determined. It is of course only the authority-group (by
virtue of the spirit-structure peculiar to it, where the one who
commands himself sets in motion the will of those who obey, and
thus serves them) that makes possible the unity between the will for
community and the will for society. All three forms are neverthe-
less to be upheld in complete purity.

153. Elementa theol. dogmaticae, 2nd ed., 1764, para. 2.

1 54. Weber, Religionssoziologie 1, 211.
155- Troeltsch, op. cit., 993, 331.

156. Luther, 244.

157. Cf. Thimme, Kirche, Sekte und Gemeinschaftsbewegung, 250. He
rightly rejects Troeltsch's concept of the sect, but without, as it
seems to me, a sufficiently clear grasp of the sociological questions
involved.

158. Soziallehren, 967.

159. op. cit., 983

242

NOTES

1 60. Masse und Geist, 1922.

161. Die kommende Kirche, 3rd ed., 1925. Cf. 68f. — another very charac-
teristic expression is to be found on 29, where Stange says that the
state is lacking in the 'earnest wish to represent the kingdom of
God'.

162. Die Meisterfrage beim Aufbau der evangelischen Kirche, 1924. Every
emphasis is laid upon the community movement. The author's
understanding for the church is expressed in the statement that it
is 'an essentially Roman Catholic' phenomenon and is surpassed by
the congregation. Cf. the table on page 6 1 which is meant to make
the relation between the church and the congregation quite clear.
Cf. Richard Karwehl's essay: 'Zur Diskussion iiber die Kirchen-
frage', ^wischen den £eiten V, 2, 1 78ff.

163. Cf. E. Vurpillot's excellent work, De la necessite d'une ' doctrine*
protestante de Viglise, Montbeliard, 1926, 11.

164. Here once again the inadequacy of the concepts of invisible and
visible church becomes clear. Nonetheless I find no justification
for concluding from this, like many recent writers, that the em-
pirical church has absolute doctrinal power, that its dogma is
absolutely binding and that it alone can provide by its doctrinal
power a basis for the certainty of faith of individuals. One of my
reasons for not so concurring would be the monadic image. Cf. the
unusual work of Erik Peterson, Was ist Theologie?, 1925, 22ft0.;
O. Piper: Theologie und reine Lehre, 1926, 2ff.

165. Establishing the dual course of history. Cf. the two most recent
important eschatological studies: R. Seeberg, Dogmatik n, 6o6ff.,
and P. Althaus, Die letzten Dinge 3rd ed., 1926, 1 igff., which show
a great measure of agreement upon this issue.

166. Seeberg, op.cit., 5846°.

167. Althaus, against Stange, op.cit., 285ff.

168. C. Stange, Unsterblichkeit der Seele, 1925, 12 iff.

169. Cf. Seeberg, op.cit., 625ft0. — Althaus, op.cit., 203ft0.

170. Seeberg, Ewiges Leben, 191 5, 93.

171. Luther, Disputations, 116, Thesis 24.

243

Index

Index of Scripture References

Acts

1.14-2.1

223

i.7ff

231

2.4

231

10.34

142

15.8

142

Colossians

*-"5

1. 18

2.17

100

2.19

99=

102

3-9

100

3.10

100

3.11

100

3-i5

129

Confession of Augsburg,

163, 187,

230

/ Corinthians

1.2

1. 10

230

1. 12

101

I.I3

100

I.30

100

171

3-"

3.16
5

100.

, 101
241

5.6
6.5

6.15
6.19

10.32-15.9
11.26

I2.2ff

I2.4ff

12.7

12.12

12.13

12.31

»3

99. ioo,

101
100

139
101

99.
101.

148
101

137
131

IOO, 129, 221

99, 137
226

228

15-5

15.20

15.22

15-23
15.24

15-27
15-45
16.1

II Corinthians

1.1

4.16

5-7

5-i7

6.16

13-3
13-5

Ephesians

i.4ff

1.22

1.23

2.15

2.18

2.20ff

2.21

2.22

3-15

4-3

4.4

4-5
4.8ff

4.12ff

4-x3

4-i5f

4.16

4.24

5-23ff

5-25

5-30

Ezekiel
18.2, 20

112

219

100

203

157

100

222

100, 1 01

99
100

98, 103, 151

99, 100

98, 100, 137

99> '71

171

182

138

99, 101, 129, 137

139

100

129

100, 171

102

100

101

247

INDEX OF SCRIPTURE REFERENCES

Exodus

20.5

32.32

Galatians
1.2

LIS

2.6

2.20

3-27

3-28

4.4

6.2

6.15

Genesis

i-3
2.18
8.2
18.32

Hebrews
1.6
12. 1

Isaiah
55-n

James
5-i5f

Jeremiah

3!-29

Job

14.14

John

3-3
5-i6f

i3-!5

13-34*"

15.16

i6.7ff

17.21

17.23

20.19

20.22f

20.23

2I.I5f

I John

3.10

131

3.16

5.16

Luke

n.nff

142

17.21

221

23-4

100

100, 137

108

Matthew

127

3-15

100

5-44

II.2lff

l6.l8

l8.20

41, 42

/ Peter

1.20

2.4

1 .21

2.1

172

2.2-3.16

3.20

*7> 190, 197

Psalms

5i-7

133

58.5

Revelation

1-5

2 and 3

Romans

157

3-23

133

3-24

129

5-12

129

6.i3> 19

88, 98, 103

8.14

231

8.19

141

9-iff

160

10.17

112

12.46°

231

12.5

135

12. II

112

12.14

129

168

140
101

230

108

230

200

112, 184
157, 197

151

99
221

99
230
100

73
73
73

84, 200

142

73
73
99
99
99

131

157
99, 129

137
161, 191

230

248

INDEX OF SCRIPTURE REFERENCES

Romans [cont'd]

13.14

15.20

/ Thessalonians

2.14

4.16

100
99

98
100

II Thessalonians
2.13

/ Timothy
2.1

II Timothy
1-9

98
230
103

Index of Names

Abelard, 122

Abraham, 242

Adam, 71, 86, 103, 104, no; in-
dividual perfection in primal state,
42-3; mankind of, 82, 84-5,
106-8, 219; and original sin, 73-7,
219

Aegidius of Rome, 2 1 7

Althaus, P., 222, 224, 226, 228, 238,
240, 241, 243

Ambrose, 64

Ambrosius Catharinus, 219

Anselm, 78, 219

Aristotle, 23, 24, 25, 56, 64, 210

Arseniev, 235

Augustine, 43, 148, 217, 219, 222;
on cantos as bond of church unity,
141 ; and communion of saints,
125, 134-5, 228; and concupiscence,
74-5; and individual guilt, 75-6,
78 ; on institution and community,
177; and original sin, 73-6; and
predestination, 225

Baader, 229

Bach, 193

Ballanche, P. S., 213

Barth, H., 211, 240

Barth, K., 165, 207, 209, 223, 226-7,

238, 239, 240
Bartmann, 235
Bernard, 136
Beyschlag, 221
Biedermann, 235
Bonald, L. G. A. de, 213

Bousset, 222
Brunner, E., 211
Brunstadt, 233
Buber, M., 213
Bultmann, R., 227
Busch, 219

Calvin, 196, 220, 242
Cicero, 64

Comte, A., 17, 207, 208
Cremer, 221

Deissmann, A., 222

Delitzsch, 237

Democritus, 24, 25

Denzinger, 235

Descartes, 24

Dorner, A., 221, 236

Drews, P., 228, 238

Duns Scotus, 219

Durer, 193

Durkheim, 17, 20, 207, 210, 221

Feine, P., 221, 222

Fichte, 27, 30, 211-12, 214, 230, 232-3

Freyer, H., 213, 216, 217, 218

Gierke, O. von, 59, 216, 240
Gloel, 221
Goethe, 60
Gogarten, 212
Grisebach, E., 212

Hamann, 213
Haring, 228

249

INDEX OF NAMES

Harnack, A., 220, 221

Hase, K. v., 235

Hegel, 63, 134, an, 315, ai8, 230;

Christian church, concept of, 233;

spirit, theory of, 27, 49, 68, 146,

148, 213, 232-3
Heiler, F., aa 1
Hilbert, G., 240
Hirsch, E., 211, 212, 214, 232, 233,

234. 237
Hobbes, 24, 215, 233
Hofmann, 151, 221, 222, 236, 237
Holl, 185, 221, 225, 226, 229, 238
Holtzmann, 221, 222, 230, 240
Hosea, 242
Humboldt, 213
Huss, 225
Husserl, E., 217

Irenaeus, 222

Jerome, 220
Judas, 162

Kaftan, J., 226

Kant, 24-5,210, 230; on antagonism
in empirical social relations, 37,
315-16; church, concept of, 145-6,
152> 235; formalism, 27, 211;
Kingdom of God, concept of, 152,
233-3; and ' radical evil ', 146; on
spirit as highest principle of form,
37; time, view of, 29-30

Karwehl, R., 243

Kattenbusch, 100, 109, sso, 321, 333

Khomiakov, A., 133, 330, 335

Kierkegaard, 173, 211, 212, 224-5,
237, 243

Kirsch, 330

Kistiakowski, F., 314, 315, 333

Kliefoth, 163, 337

Kostlin, 331

Krakauer, S., 309

Krauss, A., 331, 333, 334, 336, 337

Lactantius, 64

Le Bon, 3 1 7

Leibniz, 53, aio

Litt, T., ao8, 309, 314, 315, 318

Lohe, 337, 340

Lohmeyer, E., 334, 326, 239, 339

Luther, 113, 12a, 130, 152, 153-4.

163, l88, 196, 330, 333, 335, 338,

343; and communion of saints,
137-9, 1'S5> 239; on counsellors,
173; and excommunication, 341-3;
and Holy Communion, 168, 169,
339; and original sin, 76; and
prayer, corporate, 134, 140, 169,
330; on preaching, 163; on pre-
destination, 118; priesthood of all
believers, doctrine of, 1 43 ; and re-
surrection, 300; and sinners, church
of, 146-7, 336; and spiritual unity,
138, 139; on visible and invisible
church, 337; and the Word, 161,
238

McDougall, 17, ao7
Marheineke, P., 333
Maurenbrecher, 318
Mauthner, Fr, 313
Mendelssohn, 193, 193
Meyer, T., 343
Moses, 131
Mosheim, 184
Mulert, 338-9
Muller-Lyer, 17
Munchmeyer, 340

Natorp, Paul, 46, 314
Nicetas of Remesiana, 330
Nietzsche, 133

Oppenheimer, 17, 308, 309

Paul, 63, 131; on Christ as the
church, 100, 138, 332; concept of
church, 97-9, 100-2, 138; and ex-
communication, 341 ; and patriar-
chalism, 182; and universality of
sin, 73

Peterson, E., 243

Piper, G\, 228, 243

Plato, 23, 51

Ranke, 198
Rembrandt, 193

250

INDEX OF NAMES

Ritschl, A., 77, 203, 220, 222, 223,

224, 226, 228, 236, 237, 240
Rosenstock, 59, 236
Rousseau, 215
Ruckert, 235

Saint Simon, 152

Schaffle, 17, 210

Scheel, 221

Scheler, M., 32, 34, 78, 80-1, 90-1,

117, 122, 209, 210, 2ii, 213, 214,

216, 218, 222, 225, 229
Schelling, 32
Schilling, O., 217
Schleiermacher, 43, 76-7, 93, 96,

123, 222-4, 227> 230-2
Schmidt, 100, 221, 222, 230
Scholz, H., 91-2, 221
Schopenhauer, 164
Schulz, H., 233
Schumann, 208, 209, 210, 215, 216-

Seeberg, R., 73, 113, 213, 216, 217,
218, 219, 221, 223, 225, 226, 235,
236, 243; egoism, general, and
sociality, 220; and empirical
church, 114; on Holy Spirit, 234;
on innate spirituality, 43, 96; on
love, 228; on receptive-active
nature of man, 93, 96

Seur, Paul le, 195

Sigwort, 215

Simmel, W., 16, 17,, 207, 208, 209,
210, 217, 221, 234

Sohm, 221

Spann, O., 17, 210, 214, 229, 240

Spencer, H., 17, 210

Spinoza, 34, 210

Stahl, 163, 237

Stange, C, 243

Stange, E., 195

Stefen, G., 207

Stein, E., 209, 214
Stern, W., 214
Suarez, 220
Symeon, 230

Tarde, G., 17, 207

Thimme, L., 240, 242

Thomas Aquinas, 63, 64, 78, 218,
219, 225, 237

Thorwaldsen, 193

Thurneysen, 238

Tichonius, 235

Tillich, P., 166, 193

Tolstoy, 152

Tonnies, 16, 17, 56, 207, 208, 209,
216, 217

Troeltsch, 57, 216, 229; church and
sect, distinction between, 178, 185,
186, 190, 242; on conservatism,
188; institution, church as, 176,
177; and patriarchalism, 183; on
primal equality, 64, 217, 234;
sociology, concept of, 16, 17, 207,
209, 210; on Word as church, 105

Vierkandt, 17, 18, 60, 207, 208, 209,

215, 216, 217
Vilmar, 237
Vurpillot, E., 243

Wallau, R., 234

Walther, G., 209, 215

Weber, Max, 57, 156, 176-7, 185,

186, 190, 209-10, 221, 242
Weiss, B., 221
Wiese, von, 17, 18, 19, 57, 207, 208,

209
Windelband, 210, 216, 233
Wycliffe, 154, 225

Zahn, T., 220
Zwingli, 154, 225

251

Index of Subjects

action, centre of, 51, 68-9, 82, 83-4

actualisation, in, 115, 116

Adam, mankind of, 82, 85, 107

adiaphora, 186

agape, 119

antagonism, the basic law, 27, 54-5,

215
Antichrist, 199
apocatastasis, 201, 227, 231
Apostles' Creed, 139
Ascension, in, 222-3
association, church as, 175-6, 178-9
atomic view of society, 17, 18, 21, 241
authority, 173-5, J775 association of

authority, 41, 58, 59, 62, 126, 166,
181-4, 216

baptism, 166-7; infant, 75, 166-7,

179
barriers, 29, 31, 33, 44, 121
'being at one', 123
' being for one another ', 129
being in Adam, 74-7
being in Christ, 100, 222
being in the church, 100, 135, 222
' being with one another', 127, 129
Bible (and preaching), 161
blessedness, 203
body (of collective person), 51, 68-9,

218
body: 'new', 46, 200-1; spiritual,

201
Body of Christ, 99-102,108, 135, 139,

145, 146, 147, 151, 153-5, l68, 170,

197
bourgeoisie, 191-3
Buddhism, 221

capitalism, 190
Catholicism, 88,
186-7, 189, 219
certainty, 158, 21 1
charisma, 162

124, 174, 177-8,

'Christ existing as the church', 85,
100, 101, 102, 135-6, 139, 143, 145,
147, 149, 160, 180, 197, 203

Christ in the church, 135, 222; in
Israel, 108, 222; in others (Thou),
119, 147; and time, 112

Christology, 35, 103-4, I22

church, 38, 41, 49, 52, 57, 60, 67,
87-90, 111-12, 138-9, 148; as asso-
ciation, 175-6, 178-9; confessing,
189, 241; 'gathered', 151-2, 169,
171, 187-9; as institution, 175-9,
186-7, 241; missionary, 157, 184;
national, 151-2, 167, 171, 186,
187-90, 242; in New Testament,
97-102; of Old Testament, 151;
and state, separation of, 184; as
trusteeship, 176; universal, 154-5;
visible and invisible, 60, 133, 152,
197-8, 237, 243; word of, 166,
173-5; and world, 63, 199

church, concept of, 37, 38, 44, 52 ;
Catholic, 186-7; Kant's, 146;
Luther's, 146, 152, 153; misunder-
standing of, 87; predestinarian,
1 17-18, 136, 148

church authorities, 189

church council, 149, 174, 238

church discipline, 179, 184

church history, 148; 'counsel of our
neighbour', 172

church taxes, 1 76, 1 79

'church within the church', 169,
242

churches: individual local, 153-5,
159-60; unification of, 141

co-operative association, 59

cognition? 37

collective person, 84, 102, 138, 200,
218

common awareness, 231

common spirit, 231-2

communication, need for, 96, 223

252

INDEX OF SUBJECTS

communion with God, renunciation equality, 64, 142-4, 234

of, 131

community, 16, 60-2, 66-70, 122-
6; ethical, 84; religious type of,
112, 138, 145; and society, dis-
tinctions between, 16, 66-8

community, concept of, 22, 180, 230-
3; Christian, 22, 28, 40

community life, 57

community of spirit, 118-36, 180-4,
202

concupiscence, 74-5

confession, private, 173, 240

Confession of Augsburg, 163, 230;
error in, 187

confirmation, 175, 178; and Holy
Communion, 239

conflict, 41, 54, 137

congregation, 95-7, 103, 118-36, 115-
60; more than individual, 135; as
Mother, 157, 159, 167; 'necessary
to salvation', 157; and preacher,
164-6, 169; and sacraments, 166-9

conscience, 31, 71-2, 84

conservatism, 188-9

constitutio and does, 139, 184

Constitution of the Church of the
Old Prussian Union (1922), 238

corporate prayer, 134, 140

'corporation subject to law applying
to public bodies', 88

'counselling', 172

creation, conformity of, 87

creatureliness, 32

Cross, paradox of, no

cum ira et studio, 20

dialectical theology, 181

dogmatics, 20; begun with doctrine

of church instead of God, 97
donum perseverantiae, 1 50, 1 96

Easter, 1 1 o

ecclesia triumphans or militans, 101, 204

end in itself, 'communion' as, 123,

125, 135
'enjoyment', 130
Enlightenment, 24
Epicureanism, 24, 25

eros, 1 20

eschatology, 198-204

eternal life, 199-200

ethically responsible person, Kant's

concept of, 232
ethics, 29-31, 52, 146, 219
evil, original 74-5; radical, 146
example, importance of, 172
excommunication, 179, 241
exegesis, 41-2
experience, 124, 194-5, 196, 197-8,

203

faith, 89, 118, 120, 124-5, !95> *98;
and church, 149, 197; and com-
munity, 116; confession of, 1 39-40 ;
confirmation and profession of,

239
Fall of man, 42, 71
family, 64, 94, 95, 182
fanaticism, 173
freedom, 173-5

'gathered' church, 151 -2, 169, 171,

187-9
genus, as opposed to individual, 23,

German repentance, 83

God: community of, 40-1, 233; in

other men, 36-7 ; image of, 34, 42 ;

Kingdom of, 109, 112, 150, 152-3,

203-4; people of, 83; personal,

34, 40

God, concept of, 22, 23, 34, 40;
voluntarist 31

grace, assurance of, 158

gratitude, 159

guilt : of community, 83 ; concept of,
74-6, 78; German, 83; isolation in,
200; redemption of, 1 13-14; uni-
versal, 79, 80, 84

historicity, 66, 67, 88, 153, 154, 179
history, 31, 38-40, 61-2, 83, 103, 145-

8, 152-3. !72, i95» !97> 198-9
'Holy', religious value of, 90-1
Holy Communion, 109, 123-6, 128-9,

135, 140, 157-71, 233

253

INDEX OF/'SUBJECTS

Holy Spirit, 36, 98, 99, 104-5, IIJ»
1 15-18, 147, 161, 162, 181-3, 223
house-church, 155, 159-60

I— Thou, 26, 32-5, 40, 44-52, 54, 71,

80, 82, 93, 119, 125, 127, 136, 147,

212, 232
idealism, 25, 28-31, 35, 49, 54, 65,

69, 138, H1, H6* J97. 211, 212,

232
image of God, 34, 42
imperfection, 145-9
impulse and will, 46
incarnation, 101
individual, the, 23, 32, 37, 54, 102,

116, 200
individualism, 18, 68, 212
infant baptism, 75, 166-7, 1 79
institution, church as, 175-9, I^6-7,

241
intercession, 132-4

judgment, 199-202; of grace, lone-
liness of, 201
Justus peccator, 112, 146

Kingdom of Christ, 112, 151, 203-4
Kingdom of God, 109, 112, 150, 152-

3> 203-4
Kingdom of sin, RitschPs doctrine of,

law, 108, 142

local church, 153-5; and house-
church, 159-60
loneliness, 109, no, 117, 200-1, 224-5
Lord's Prayer, 140
love, 40-1, 118-41, 181-5, 226-8

man, God's conception of, 52

marriage, 64, 155, 215

mass (or public), 54, 60, 75, 91, 165,

166, 1 91 -4; concept of, 59-60,

62
massa perditionis, 75, 166
merita, 129, 229

metaphysical hypostatisation, 31, 68
ministry, 125, 156, 160-3; Catholic

idea of, 162; and community,

159-60, 162; counselling, 17 1-2;

priestly, 1 71-2
missionary church, 157, 184
moment, concept of, 30, 37
monadic image, 51, 68, 79, 148, 194,

243
monastic orders, 217
moral and biological-metaphysical

categories, 138
mysticism, 54, 91, 93, 94, 95, 123, 202

nationalism, 83

natural right, concept of, 63, 64
nature (the sense-world), 46
neighbours: love for, 121-2, 124;
work for, 130

objective spirit, 46, 48-50, 65-70, 105,
144-50, 161, 167, 180, 182, 184,
233; and Holy Spirit, 147, 203

oecumenical problem, 137, 141, 154,
238

organism, idea of, 64, 69, 1 00, 102,
189

orgy, ' the social form of ecstasy ', 95

original evil, 74-5

original sin, 42, 43, 72-82

'other', the, 32-3

partisanship, 54

pastoral care, 171-3

patriarchalism, 148, 182-3

patristic view, 63-5, 210

peccator pessimus, 80

peccatorum communio, 80, 85, 86, 144,

147
Pentecost, m-12, 223
people, 57; God's, 83; spirit of, 68-9
person, concept of, 17-18, 22, 23-5,

28, 31 ; Christian, 20, 22, 25, 30, 35,

37. 39
pietas, 94
pneuma, 100

potentiality, category of, 105
power, 126, 181
prayer, corporate, 94, 134, 140; of

intercession, 132-4
preaching, 150, 155, 159, 160-3, 164-

5, 169, 170-1, 184, 192-3; and

254

INDEX OF SUBJECTS

administration of sacrament, 163,

180
predestination doctrine, n 7- 18, 136,

148; double, 227
Presbyteries, 174
priesthood of all believers, 143, 163,

184
primal state, doctrine of, 38-44, 63,

69
progress, 188-9
proletariat, 190-4
property, 64
psychology, 35
public, 54, 60. See also mass
punishment, nature of, 113
'pure doctrine', 187

qahal, 98

race, sin of the, 78-9
radical evil, Kant's concept of, 146
realisation and actualisation, 1 1 1 , 115
reality, 35, 39-40, 89, 91-2, 104;

concept of, 29, 31, 52, 104-5, 114;

necessity of, 97
reason, 23, 27

relation, doctrine of, 16-21, 22
religio-ethical qualification, 185
religio-romantic Youth Movement,

88
religio-social Youth Movement, 152
religion, 92-7, in, 223; Christian,

90; concept of, 90, 93; natural, 71 ;

and revelation, 112; sociology of,

20, 96
religious community, 87-90, in, 112,

138, 141, 149, 173, 180, 183, 193-4,

i97> 203, 218, 231
religious death, loneliness as, 200-1
religious fellowship, 232
religious misunderstanding of church,

religious motives, 88

religious need, satisfaction of, 223

religious social area in mankind,

22
religious value, higher, 143
repentance, 83
responsibility, 30, 32, 33

resurrection, III, 200; of ungodly,

200
revelation, 37, 38, 91, 103, 112
romanticism, 195, 227
rule, God's, 140, 184, 203

sacraments, 125, 150, 163, 164, 180;

Catholic and Protestant concepts

of, 166-70
sacrificium conscientiae, 1 74
sacrificium intellectus, 174
saints, communion of, 116, 125-9,

J34-5> r47> !95-6> 228, 229
salvation, congregation necessary to,

157

sects, 57, 185-9

self-assurance, 133

self-consciousness, 35, 44, 46-7, 49,
77, 214

self-determination, 46, 49

self-responsibility, 114, 223

self-preservation, 82

sense-experiences, 164

separateness of persons, 37

sexuality, 42, 74

signa praesentis gratiae, 1 24

silence, qualified, 174

sin, 31, 39-40, 43, 63-4, 72-82, 145-9;
consequences of, 113; Kingdom
of, 77. See also original sin

social philosophy, 15-16, 18-20, 22-5,
44-52, 63, 207

socialism, 193-4

sociality, 19, 20, 26, 39, 43-4, 66,
232

society, 16, 17, 57-64, 199; atomist
view of, 17, 18, 21, 175; concept
°f> '75-95 differences from com-
munity, 16, 66-8

sociology, 15, 59, 100, 207, 209, 215

solidarity, impossible between Christ
and man, 107

solipsism, 28

souls, care of, 171 -3

species, biological notion of, 230

speech, 46, 164

spirit, and nature, 46

spirit-monism, 146, 224

spiritual body, 201

255

INDEX OF SUBJECTS

spiritual communion, distinct from
that based on mutual love, 122

spiritual death, 200

spiritual form, 72

spirituality, human, 37, 44-52

sport, 166, 191

State, 63, 184, 188

stimulus, 62

Stoicism, 23-4, 25, 210

subject-object relation, 25, 26, 34

suffering, 128

surety for man's renewal, Jesus Christ
as, 113

symbolism, of Holy Communion,
168-9

symbols, 67, 91

telos, 40, 61

testimony against oneself, 172

theology: dialectical, 181; recent,

147
thesaurus. Catholic, 130
time, 29, 30, 60-1, 66, 113; bounds of,

61, 67, 199; problem of, 29-30;

and revelation, 104
time-form, 114
totemism, 210, 221
tradition, 176, 188
transcendence, 33, 211

treasury of merit, 130
trusteeship, church as, 176

unity, concept of, 27, 140-1, 232, 234-
5

validity, universal, as supreme prin-
ciple of action, 27, 28

value, philosophy of, 234

values, order of, 90

vicarious action, 84, 107, 1 13-14,
120, 136, 223

war, 83

will, 46-7, 53-65, 1 20, 123; for church,
195; and impulse, 46; 'for a
meaning', 56; 'rational purposive',
56

Word, 1 15-16, 123, 135, 151-2, 155-8,
160-1, 163, 166, 169, 184; and
church, 146, 171; of scripture, of
preaching and of man, 161

world and church, 63, 199

world history, 146

worship, 155-60, 169

Youth Movement, 88, 152, 166, 191,
195. 198

256

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